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SUMMARY
The purpose of this project has been to identify and assess legal
and institutional factors likely to affect the development and commercial
diffusion of phosphoric acid fuel cells, and to help define issues for
future research and action. The study has addressed matters relevant to
both central and dispersed utility operations and to on-site applications.
It has examined both perceived barriers and potential opportunities for
fuel cell commercialization.
This report first discusses the general concept of commercializa-
tion as applied to emerging energy technologies. It briefly reviews the
conditions which warrant participation by government, the range of activi-
ties government can pursue in support of overall energy policy objectives,
and the importance of legal, regulatory and institutional analysis as input
to the commercialization effort.
Against this background, the report next examines federal fuel use
and pricing policies under the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of
1975 and the Natural Gas Policy Act, viewed by some as potentially
serious barriers to commercialization of first-generation fuel cells.
The analysis suggests that in fact these regulatory schemes would not
prohibit the use of natural gas or petroleum derivatives in most fuel
cell applications, nor should they seriously deter fuel cell use except
in certain commercial and industrial applications in regions where
natural gas shortfalls are likely and alternate fuels are unavailable.
However, to conclude that existing regulatory schemes will not
preclude most fuel cell applications is not to say that the technology will
1
be viewed as commercially desirable by all or any of those who sight
actually benefit from its use. To sasses those prospects, the focus
shifts to legal and institutional considerations which provide positive
inducements or potential opportunities for fuel cell comercialization.
The cogeneration potential of fuel cells is generally viewed as a 	
A
desirable characteristic for a wide range of applications. The analysis
here reveals that the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 and
its implementing regulations, requiring electric utilities to purchase
power from qualifying cogeneratoos at the utility's "avoided cost,"
provide attractive opportunities to leverage the cogeneration value of
fuel cells in certain settings. The discussion suggests that these find--
ings have fundamental implications for demonstration and market assessment
activities, as well as for the design and sizing of fuel cell systems.
The fuel cell's low-polluting characteristics are likewise viewed
as an attractive feature which contributes to the versatility and siting
flexibility of the technology. Analysis of the clean Air Act and regu-
lations discloses that this feature not only can permit electric genera-
tion or cogeneration where it might othervise be prohibited, but can
translate into tangible economic value. This is particularly true for
larger fuel cell applications in certain identifiable air quality regions,
where owner/operators may be able to realize substantial savings and/or
income not available through the use of cor.;eting generation equipment or
cogenerating equipment. These findings, too, have important implications
for fuel cell market assessment activities.
Because of the nature and versatility of the technology, feel
cell commercialization necessarily involves a wide range of potential
2
E	 _
'	 _
participants and institutional arrangesiouis. The legal and regulatory
barriers+ and opportunities examined here can affect each of these differ-
ently. The final chapter of this report reviews specific issues relevant
to particular participant groups confronting the problem of commercialisa-
tion, including those interested in promoting fuel cell technology and
those interested in acquiring it.
PRECm1t4G PACE KM NOT FILMED
I,	 INTRODUCTION
This report presents the results of research performed by the Earl
i	 -
Warren Legal Institute under a grant from the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration. 	 The need for this type of research was presented
to the Institute early in 1980 by senior personnel from NASA's Lewis
Research Center responsible for managing the U.S. Department of Energy's
Phosphoric Acid Fuel Cell Program. 	 It was based on their recognition
that as this developing technology approaches commercial feasibility,
the issues confronting it will expand beyond the scientific and engineer-
ing challenges of the laboratory to include legal, institutional and
behavioral considerations operating in the commercial marketplace, and
that these considerations can profoundly influence future development
directions insofar as they affect the viability and attractiveness of
particular commercial applications.
i
NASA's program managers accordingly sought to supplement their
own expertise in scientific and technical matters with comparable expo--
tise in legal and institutional areas affecting emerging energy technolo-
gies.
	
The Earl Warren Legal Institute had demonstrated such capabilities
through similar work with the Department of Energy, state governments and
the business community in the fields of geothermal and solar energy.	 It
3g
was therefore asked to undertake what was then conceived of essentially
as the "issue definition" phase of a longer-term action program for fuel
cells which NASA and DOE hoped to pursue.
The basic objectives of this research have been to identify legal
and institutional issues affecting commercialization of phosphoric acid
fuel cells; to assess the relative importance of these issues to ongoing
5
approach shaped in part by actual research findings emerging in the course
	 N
of the project.	 t
}
i
t	 -
This approach has, however, been informed by certain basic hypo-
theses suggested by our previous energy studies and by the technology under
consideration. It is clear, for example, that institutional and behavioral
f
considerations affect commercial acceptance of some energy supply technolo-
gies more than others. In general, these considerations tend to be more
pervasive and more critical to success where the technology's potential
applications extend beyond the energy industry to other sectors of society:
where these applications vary widely; where fuel supply questions are
involved; and especially where the technology invites or requires new
i
types of commercial participants, new roles for old participants, or novel
ways of doing business.
Applied to fuel cells, these general observations suggested that
relevant issues for commercialization would arise across a very broad
legal, institutional and behavioral spectrum, and would increase in number
and importance as the analysis moved from centralized utility systems
toward dispersed and on-site applications. The Institute's research
generally has confirmed these hypotheses, and this report reflects a
corresponding emphasis on issues arising in connection with the latter
types of applications.
It also reflects some effort to adapt the original conception of
this research to the reality of changed circumstances occurring since its
6
inception. As noted above, the project was conceived early in 1480 as the
first phase in a longer-term program of research and action. In that con-
text, it could be most useful by identifying the widest possible range of
legal and institutional issues relevant to commercialization efforts and
defining an agenda and priorities for future research. However, the change
in Administrations and in federal energy and budgetary priorities which
F
	
	 occurred early in the project eliminated the prospect of a longer-term
basic research program. Without such a program to pursue any research
agenda defined at this stage, the broad identification of issues alone
would be of limited use. It therefore seemed sensible to narrow the scope
of our inquiry somewhat in order to address in greater depth certain areas
which preliminary research suggested were most critical, an approach in
which NASA concurred early in 1981. Accordingly, this report will concen-
trate most heavily on certain fuel use and pricing issues commonly perceived
at the start of this project as potential barriers to fuel cell diffusion,
and on some important incentives to fuel cell use under recent energy and
environmental law and regulations. It will also suggest a variety of
g
second-order issues requiring attention as commercialization efforts
proceed ( albeit with a reduced federal presence).
However, the objective of this report is not only to examine
specific issues identified in the course of our research, but equally
important, to provide a useful context for assessing their relevance to
the efforts of NASA, DOE and the private sector to shepherd these advanced
technologies from the laboratory to the marketplace. Toward that end, the
following chapter examines the basic problem of "commercialization" and
the relation of legal and institutional factors to the other elements
which comprise it.
^i
F
	 7
{
^.«ter
	 = ^ ^_
FitEt^Q^ PAGE &AMW1'
II. THE COMMERCIALIZATION CONTEXT
A. IN GENERAL
In common business usage, the tern commercialisation is sometimes
used to describe the usual process through which many new products pass
on their way from concept to market. This process typically begins with
an idea and its associated research, passes through prototype development,
commercial product design, market surveys and testing, establishment of
production facilities and distribution networks, and ends with the commer-
cial offering of a new product or service. Used in this business context,
commercialization often refers to the activities which take place near the
end of this sequence, although it may also refer to the entire process.
However, the term commercialization is also used to describe a
separate set of activities designed to influence the usual concept-to-
market path for a new product, and that is the meaning which we adopt
here. Traditionally, although perhaps not necessarily, carried out by
government, this kind of commercialization tries to assist some product
or service into the marketplace. The objects of commercialization
assistance are usually judged to possess some social or political advan-
tages for society as a whole but, at least in the short run, to be only
marginally attractive in the marketplace or to present tradeoffs unaccept-
able to key participants needed to get them there. Although the theoret-
ical work on commercialization addresses a variety of new technologies
and innovative processes or services, at least since the 1973-74 oil
embargo the major federal programs in the field have focused on bringing
new energy technologies into the commercial arena. Scc of the basic
conditions which can render such government efforts appropriate, and the
9
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B. THE GOVERNMENT ROLE IN COMMERCIALIZATION
	
l
I. CONDITIONS FOR GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION
To the extent that government is involved, energy commercialization
is not an end in itself, but a means to achieving broader energy and
public policy objectives. Clear formulation of those objectives is an
essential prerequisite for government action in this sphere. On the	
4
broadest level, at least, that prerequisite has been present in the form
of national energy and environmental legislation adopted by Congress in
recent years. That legislation, discussed in the following chapters,
establishes national priorities which include, among others, reduced
dependence on foreign suppliers, allocation of premium fuels to their 	 y
most essential uses, increased energy efficiency, greater reliance on
coal and renewable alternatives, diversification and competition among
domestic energy suppliers, and a cleaner environment.
The promise of a genuine contribution toward meeting some or all
of these priorities is a threshold criterion for any technology consid-
ered a candidate for government commercialization. Beyond that, the
presence of several related factors in combination suggests the appropri-
ateness of government action. These include the need for heavy capital
investment by prospective commercial participants, the need to compete
in a highly regulated environment, and the need for certain participants
to incur substantial risks if benefits to other participants and the
public at large are to be realized.
10
The means available to government to raise and channel large ants
of capital, and the propriety of its doing so in pursuit of high national
priorities, require little count. The inescapable influence of
goverment in a regulated environment --where to do nothing in reality
is to prefer government policies already in force to others not yet
endorsed — means that government "intervention" will occur either way,
and the only real issue is whether it will occur by default or by delib-
erate policymaking whicn takes account of changing energy imperatives as
they arise.
Apart from capital requirements and regulatory implications, the
presence of some commercially unacceptable risk is a fundamental condition
for government involvement in commercialization. Government commerciali-
zation programs were started largely because the private sector found the
risk/reward balance of certain new energy technologies which promised
public benefits either too uncertain or too heavily weighted toward risk.
f
These programs have spawned a variety of activities, but most basically,
have attempted to solve problems of excessive risk.
These risks may be absolute as they were in the case of nuclear
power, where the predictable liabilities from a major accident were enormous.
Even the best financed and most stable corporations and insurance companies
could not allow themselves to be exposed to risks of that magnitude, and
it was only after the Price-Anderson Act limited those liabilities that
nuclear power could be fully developed. The huge capital investments
required by some synfuels projects such as the Great Plains Coal Gasifica-
tion Project reveal another side of this problem of absolute risk.
More commonly, however, the issue centers a-
risks both in time and among the interested parties. Virtually all commer-
cialization programs propose to absorb or redistribute unacceptable short-
term risks in return for projected long-term benefits. For laboratory-
demonstrated technologies which appear promising, these short-term risks
may arise in at least three closely related settings. First, there may
be a stage, such as the move from prototype development to initial
commercial production now facing fuel cells, at which the degree of risk
and the capital commitment required are simultaneously at their highest.
Second, at some stage in its development, a new technology may be only
marginally competitive measured against rival technologies or against
standards for ROI or market size which some of the important participants
require for a new venture. Third, and perhaps most relevant to the
research reported here, they may be excessive market uncertainties which
are not sufficiently clarified by conventional market analysis.
Where these types of risks present obstacles to the development
or diffusion of technologies promising real public benefits, government
action designed to ensure or accelerate these benefits seems entirely
appropriate. The following summarizes the range of actions traditionally
relied on by the federal government for these purposes and, where appro-
priate, notes factors which could be relevant to their use in the fuel
cell context.
2. FORMS OF GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION
Direct Subsidies
The federal government has provided direct subsidies to energy-
related technologies and new energy sources. These subsidies, like other
less direct forms of support, serve fundamentally to affect the balance
,' 3
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12
between competing technologies in the marketplace. They have not neces-
sarily been intended to advance commercialization: aid to technologies
with commercial applications has long been a spinoff of government research
in other areas, including defense and space exploration. Thus nuclear
power generation enjoyed the benefits of the most basic government-
sponsored research into nuclear weaponry and of later work on nuclear
reactors, and fuel cells have benefitted from publicly-supported research
related to America's space program. Since the 1973-74 oil embargo, the
federal government also has, or course, subsidized research into numerous
energy sources and technologies with the express intent of aiding their
commercial introduction.
Direct subsidy of new technologies has not been the main tool
of commercialization policy. High costs, particularly for sustained
support, and ideological preferences shared by both major political
parties, have limited its use. Much federal commercialization policy
has been based on the idea that government funding, if properly applied,
can have an effect on new product development and marketing far beyond
its actual percentage contribution to the total necessary expenditures.
This has resulted in efforts to identify the points of leverage in each
particular commercialization problem. Larger efforts have focused on
providing tax incentives, loan guarantees, public markets for initial
offerings of new products, and demonstration projects. Smaller scale
programs dictated by this approach have prominently included identifica-
tion of barriers and efforts to remove them, as discussed more fully in
Part C, below.
13
Tax Incentives
Tax incentives are intended to change the financial balance in
an investment decision to increase rewards or reduce risks. Some recent
tax credits aimed at supplier investment in new energy technologies or
sources actually have been intended not to confer special advantages on
these technologies, but to accord them treatment equal to that given
certain existing energy sources. Geothermal tax policy since 1978, for
instance, has offered essentially equal treatment with oil and gas in
covering certain investment and resource depletion risks, and in that
sense can be viewed as removing barriers to geothermal competition
created by previous tax policies. On the other hand, tax credits offered
to prospective users of alternative technologies clearly favor the eligi-
ble technologies over conventional competitors not included, and represent
efforts to assist the favored technologies into the marketplace by stimu-
lating consumer demand.
Tax policy has not always proven to be a precise instrument in the
service of commercialization. Tax credits passed to aid the development of
a new industry do not necessarily affect all segments of it equally.
They can shape an industry as well as promote it, and shape it in ways that
do not necessarily reflect deliberate policy choices of the government.
Tax credits, for instance, favor large companies with income against which
to apply them over small, single product companies with little taxable
income. Moreover, as political pressures result in the extension of tax
incentives to all the competitors in a new field, relative advantage
for any individual technology is lost. Such shotgun tax policies may
favor investment or purchases in a particular field such as energy,
but tend to dilute the effects of policy decisions to promote individual
technologies.
A
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Loan Guarantees and Development Banks
Another tool of commercialization has been aimed directly at risk
reduction. Federal guarantees of loans from private lenders and direct
federal loans to innovative projects have been tried separately and in
combination to induce a flow of private capital into projects which would
not normally meet conventional lending requirements. Loan guarantees,
in particular, seem to offer a way to leverage the federal investment in
promoting innovation. Development banks offering loans at less than
full market rates have also been set up to pay for themselves in the long
run.
Guarantees and development banks have too often failed in their purpose
because government finds it extremely difficult to absorb risks. Pressure
from past administrations and from congressional oversight have tended to
make federal risk-absorbing institutions at least as conservative as the
private sector they were meant to reassure or replace. The Geothermal
Loan Guarantee Program, for instance, approved only four applications for
guarantees during its first several years of existence. The standards
it imposed on projects and the detailed and lengthy review it made of
every aspect of proposals eliminated most of those intended to benefit
from the program. The recently formed National Consumers Cooperative
t	 Bank, intended to support innovative cooperatives unable to find conventional
financing, made its first large loans to three of the oldest and most
stable cooperatives in the country.
Apart from the problem of government', own risk aversion, conven-
tional loan guarantees probably are not the most effective option for
stimulating fuel cell development for two reasons related to the • rticular
is
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nature of the commercialisation problem confronting fuel calls. first,
the uncertainties preventing the manufacture and commercial distributtAm
of fuel cells are primarily related to anowsmat of markets. Prospective
manufacturers and distributors are lose concerned about the risks asso-
ciated with one project, which night be guaranteed, than with lorq-term
prospects for a broad and substantial market. Secondly, the major partici-
pants in fuel cell development are large corporations and utilities which
have historically been uninterested in loan guarantees because their credit
ratings do not allow them to default even on guaranteed loans.
Demonstration Projects
Support for demonstration projects probably has been the most widely
used form of federal commercialization assistance. Various governisent
agencies have supported demonstrations of innovative products and serviceeg
ranging from the Dial-A-Ride program for transporting the elderly and
handicapped to light water nuclear reactors and other highly sophisticated
products of technology, including advanced energy technologies in general
and fuel cells in particular.
The work of others who have examined the demonstration concept
in detail suggests several observations of relevance here. I One is the
importance of avoiding premature demonstrations — i.e., those where perfor-
Sumner Myers and E.E. Sweezy, why rnnovations Falter and Fall:
A Study of 200 Cases (Denver Research Institute. University of Denver Report
#R75-04, Denver, CO); The Demonstration Project as a Procedure for Accolorat-
Ing the Application of Now Technology (Charpie Task Force Report, U.S. DOE,
Feb. 1978); Office of Technology Assessment, rho Role of Demanstratiom In
Federal R&D Policy (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 1978).
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manes problems which technical personnel may consider routine are likely
to exceed the expectations of the demonstration's nontechnical sudience,
thus discrediting the technology rather than advancing its cause. Another
is the absolute necessity of defining the intonled audience and determining
precisely what is to be demonstrated— i.e., is the primary audience
prospective manufacturers, suppliers, end users, investors, public agetw1on
or someone alse, and is the demonstration's central purpose to stimulate	 -
f
production, to create a market, to attract private or public capital, or
some other objective? Finally, these studies confirm the importance of
assessing the institutional environment into which the demonstrated tech-
nology is expected to fit, and parts;ularly whether its adoption would
continue or depart from basic tradit.1ons characteristic of that institu-
tional setting.
Most of the questions raised by these studies have so far teen
addressed quite straightforwardly for the multi-megawatt fuel call and
its utility market. Here, an easily defined, technically sophisticated
	
i
audience should be influenced by a properly conceived and executed demon-
stration. Both the manufacturers and the users have recognized the need
to quantify fuel cells' special credits in order to determine their true
value. Although Con Ed's federally-supported 4.8 MW demonstration in
New York will not satisfy all the audience's questions, ides of pilot
plants and perhaps some more aggressive demonstration program supported
by the manufacturers could fill in the gaps. (This rather sanguine view
of the value of demonstration to the commercialization of multi-megawatt
fuel cells depends, of course, upon their performing as predicted.)
Demonstrating multi-kilowatt fuel cells presents a quite different
set of problems largely because the potential audience is far broader and
for more varied. To the extent that the performance to be demonstrated
17
remains basically technical and economic and the audience continues to be
largely the manufacturers and gas utilities, the demonstration remains
subject to a relatively conventional set of arrangements and analyses.
However, at some point in the commercialization process the demonstration
may need to expand to include user attitudes and response, and the audi-
ence oay have to broaden to include potential and users themselves; these
prospects present complex challenges for any demonstration project. If
adoption and diffusion of fuel cells depends upon demonstrating their
merits to an audience of energy users not now generating their own
electricity, the demonstration faces one of the most difficult institution-
al environments. At this point, it remains an open question whether or
not the 40 KW program currently planned can be structured to answer some
of the regulatory, institutional and behavioral questions which may be
crucial to widespread adoption of fuel cells by their ultimate users.
Government Markets and the "Big Buy"
Ironically, one of the government activities which has most success-
fully aided the commercial introduction of new products has done to inad-
vertently. The purchase by government agencies of the early production
of UNIVAC and IBM computers, for instance, contributed vitally to the
success of what was then a fledgling industry — but these purchases were
motivated by governmant's nee4 for information processing capabilities,
not by a public policy decision to assist the struggling computer industry.
Defense Department support for micro-chip development and subsequent
purchases related to the design and manufacture of "smart" weaponry like-
wise were motivated by a shift in tactical planning and weapons requirements.
In these and other cases, technological advances and lowered unit production
costs which accelerated commercial introduction were unintended benefits.
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Having observed this pt menu, commercialization plamors have
cried to devise ways to use government purchases to assist new technologies
into the marketplace. Programs such as the legialatively-mandated Federal
Buildings Program have tried to guarantee that alternative energy sources
	
f
would be ueod to satisfy some portion of federal energy needs. However,
these conscious attempts to recreate accidental successes in commarcialt-
nation have so far produced only limited results: a few solar-heated
Veterans Administration hospitals have been built; some geothermal surveys
have been performed at federal installations; part of the government motor
pool has been required to use gasohol. These government purchases have
been too small to significantly affect the development of the industries
in question. They have, in fact, been much more on the order of demonstra-
tion programs in both scale and result than of government purchases. prob-
ably because the technologies involved have been marginal competitors in
both the private and the government market.
s
The success stories of the computer and the micro-chip occurred
where a need for information processing capabilities or national defense
requirements created a real government market for the special character-
istics of the new technology. Such a market can induce research which
produces commercially successful arplications of new technologies or can
support investment in major production facilities which greatly accelerates
their commercial introduction. The keys to this process are whether the
innovation has characteristics that serve some substantial government
requirement for additional capabilities and then whether the private
sector can use those special characteristics. If both are true. then a
commercialisation situation exists which can properly and effectively
be assisted by government purchases.
19
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This approach to commercialization can work in cases where an
t
innovation offering quantifiable benefits is passing through a transitional
	
t
stage involving especially high risks, uncertainties or capital require-
seats in relation to the participants' capabilities. The predicted techni-
cal performance of fuel cells, the current stalemate in moving to commer- 	
F
cial production, and DOD's expressed need for reliable, efficient, silent
cogenerating equipment using domestically-produced fuels meet the criteria 	
A
for effective commercialization through a federal "big buy."
C. INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
The importance of institutional factors has become part of the
conventional wisdom in most studies of the adoption and diffusion of
innovations. Under previous Administrations, work in this area has been
the subject of continuing, if modest, direct support under the aegis of
federal energy commercialization programs. This work has focused on
identifying and ameliorating barriers to the introduction of promising
technologies, and to a much lesser extent, on identifying institutional
opportunities. It has proceeded in part from a recognition that some
innovative energy industries were so embryonic that they had not yet
defined the problems they were likely to encounter in dealing with
institutional patterns and constraints developed over time without regard
to today's energy imperatives, and that they were necessarily confronting
one of the most heavily regulated environments in this country. Most
commercialization planners by now have seen the possible impact on inno-
vations of legal and regulatory decisions and institutional factors, and
have recognized that real and perceived barriers to commercial acceptance
20
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do arise from these sources and from uncertainties about regulatory
policies. The following discussion briefly examines the regulatory
environment facing energy innovators and the resulting additional risks
they confront in assessing markets for their technologies.
1. REGULATION AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
Supply structures and consumption patterns surrounding energy are
very deeply embedded in the larger structures of American society. Acquir-
ing, producing, delivering and maintaining adequate supplies and pricing
those supplies have profound domestic political consequences and momentous
national security implications. The habits associated with energy
consumption have shaped a way of life for this country's citizens and
a way of operating in international politics, and significant changes
affect huge segments of the populace and some of our largest and most
powerful institutions. 	
i
Because of the enormous public interests involved, there is no
more thoroughly regulated process in this country than the supply and
consumption of energy. The regulatory framework encompasses the whole
range of actual and potential participants from resource companies through
equipment manufacturers, energy producers, transmitters, distributors,
and end users. Myriad regulatory regimes provide complicated, multilevel
avenues through which these different and often conflicting interests
influence the process and are in turn affected by it. Regulation affects
virtually every conceivable aspect of the process from environmental
concerns to fuel uses and allocations, to financing and taxation, to
rates and quality of service.
`I
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All of this should suggest that promising new energy technologies
are a matter of supreme public interest, and that technological advance*
in the field — especially ones such as fuel cells which could fundaman-
}
tally alter tine practices of and relations among several major sectors of
the structure — cannot possibly escape the effects of government policies
already in place or future government actions. As the federal government
reduces its participation, state, regional and local institutions which
already play a significant role in energy regulation can be expected to
assume a greater voice in directing the course of the adjustment in energy
supply practices now clearly upon us.
Because of the critical importance of energy in an industrial
society, pervasive regulation is likely to continue to be a fact of life
for energy industries and for those dependent upon them. Thus despite
current efforts to minimize the federal presence, energy irnovations will
continue to compete in a heavily regulated, highly structured, mature
market. Ultimately, each must somehow find its place within a complex
environment shaped by legislation, administrative policy, political pres-
sures, and patterns of firmly fixed institutional and individual behavior.
The need to address, to understand,and in some cases to alter these condi-
tions to favor larger energy policy objectives provides part of the justi-
fication for commercialization activities.
2. MARKET UNCERTAINTIES AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
The projected market justifying investment in a new energy technol-
ogy may be a decade or more in the future. long-range projections defining
such markets have limited credibility in predicting both the timing and the
ultimate magnitude of demand. Uncertainty over the application of existing
22
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regulatory policies and the direction of future policies adds to the "future
noise" which obscures the analysis. and can present a serious disincentive
to investment now by potential participants.
This is understandable, since the legal framework can dramatically 	
c
alter the costs and benefits associated with new technologies. and can actually
F
define what is possible. Federal legislation expressing national energy and
environmental policy, state regulatory regimes, and local law allow certain
activities and prohibit others; encourage participation by some entities
and discourage it by others; and confer advantages on some institutional
structures for energy supply while penalizing others. Those directly
and substantially interested in the commercial success of a particular
technology may be in a position to do the research needed to understand
aspects of the existing legal framework which directly affect that
technology. They may be able to analyze and assess the probabilities
of changes occurring which would significantly alter the potential market
for their product, and may even be in a position to help shape some of those
changes. However, there are larger and less well understood legal and
institutional issues which necessarily affect planning, and these tend to
fall beyond the sphere in which most commercial enterprises are accustomed
to dealing.
Essential services such as energy are customarily provided for
users through an elaborate set of institutional, social and economic
arrangements. Although some changes in production and supply patterns
will have little impact on these arrangements, others can dramatically
affect planning assumptions and development directions. For instance,
shifts in the mix of large-scale generating capacity used by the major
utilities still leave large corporate entities dealing with each other
in familiar and conventional ways, while energy end users still turn
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_on their switches, receive their customary supplies and accept their bills.
Such shifts may cause problems for these large entities by exposing them, -
for example, to closer government scrutiny or to the intervention of
anti-nuclear groups. Nevertheless, the fundamental system or production
and distribution remains essentially untouched, and the basic issues facing
commercial participants remain quite familiar.
In other cases far more dramatic effects can be expected. Legis-
lation such as the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (commonly
known as PURPA, and discussed in detail in Chapter IV, infra) presents
numerous specific issues requiring traditional legal analysis and business
judgments by particular participants, but its overall purpose is to reshape
the existing energy production and delivery system to accommodate a new
group of possible entrants into the field. The prospect of such changes
generates a novel and far-reaching set of questions about both institutional
and individual behavior, where legislatively-created economic opportunities
require tradeoffs between the costs of change and the comforts of inertia.
Although laws like PURPA generally result from pressure from
groups and individuals with direct and substantial interests in institu-
tional change for one set of reasons or another, the changes they induce
provide opportunities for action by less committed energy users. These
opportunities raise questions central to market assessment about the
behavior of those people who, because of a new technology like the fuel
cell, find themselves able to take advantage of a new law or regulation
to enter an additional business or to provide themselves with a necessary
product or service through an entirely new institutional structure.
In evaluating the likelihood that apartment developers or owners,
for example, will consider on-site fuel cell services, cost and projected
24
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savings will be the threshold determinant, but other questions will arise.
Will it solve or create problems that other energy options won't? How much
trouble is it? Will it complicate relations with the tenants? Will the
next owner value it? Will it entail doing busiwws with.unfamiliar and,
perhaps, untrusted itnstitutions? Ir -assessing the =tradedffa trait potential
participants will make, the central issue may be the extent to which legal
and institutional considerations allow fuel cell xsanufacturera-or distribu-
tors to absorb the institutional costs while still producing savings for
users and profits for themselves. In the final analysis, the answers to
these questions will be balanced with technical and economic considerations
in a complex equation. Framing that equation is a central task for market
assessment planning, and fitting the results into a credible market
analysis is properly the task of experts in the marketing field. However,
defining the larger legal and institutional components which belong in
the equation and examining their implications for other factors integral
to a solution, is a task beyond the usual boundaries of commercial market
analysis.
It is worth fc using on the uncertainties of market analysis
because, in a sense, all other issues except technological performance are
secondary. Put simply and obviously, the size and certainty of the market
can go far toward justifying even the largest investment. In a survey of
corporate managers of new product successes and failures, a Canadian study`
found that the quality of market assessment activities and initial
2Robert G. Cooper, "Identifying Industrial New Product Success:
Project NewProd," 11hdustria3 Market Mannyement,"l $7:1241.155`:
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marketing strategies form the most significant element in determining
success or failure for new industrial products.
Thus how well market-oriented activities are exv;uted
appears to be most critical in terms of determining the
outcome of new industrial products. Overall, the five
market-oriented activities... have a mesa correlation
of 0.402, compared to 0.332 for the five technical-
production activities and 0.340 for the two evaluation
activities. (p. 131)
This survey goes beyond many other studies confirming the imper-
tance of market-related activities to eventual new product success, by
examining the perceptions of managers as to how well they are served by
such activities. In their views, two of the five market-related functions
moat important to success were the most poorly executed. These two,
detailed market study/marketing research and test-marketing/trial selling,
remain ahead for those working to bring fuel cells into the commercial
market.
Mistrust of market projections, particularly long-range estimates
in an area so volatile and so subject to regulatory intervention, is a
critical barrier to the commercial introduction of fuel cells, both on-
site and multi-megawatt. Research into, and analysis of, legal and
institutional questions cannot remove that uncertainty, but it can
narrow it substantially by identifying issues and providing a context
for market research and testing. Such work thus becosms an extremely
Important precursor to shaping a credible assessment of potential fuel
cell markets.
In approaching these questions, this report will focus first on
perceived legal barriers of critical importance to all first-generation
fuel cell applications, in the form of federal fuel use restrictions and
26
natural gas pricing and curtailment policies. (Chapter III) The favorable
resolution of these issues is in some sense the ate *
 qua ran for further
commercialisation efforts, since other issues would become moot if fuel
restrictions were effectively to preclude fuel cell use. Since the
analysis presented lure indicates that that will not be the case, the
report proceeds to an examination of the positive prospects for fuel cell
commercialisation, in the form of incentives and opportunities provided
by the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act and by current air quality
regulatory regimes. (Chapter IV) Finally, the implications of the
overall legal analysis for particular groups of participants in the commer-
cialization process are explored, and recommendations for further action
suggested, in Chapter V.
t^
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 PERCEIVED BARRIERS TO FOEL CELL US-E
FEDERAL FUEL USE AND PRICING POLICIES
A. FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS ON PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS USAGE
IN LARGE FACILITIES (PIFUA)
1. BACKGROUND
Following the oil embargo of 1973, the federal government under-
took efforts to reduce the nation's reliance on costly and insecure
foreign petroleum supplies, to conserve dwindling domestic oil and
natural gas reserves, and to promote the development of abundant domestic
coal resources. 3	In 1978, the U.S. Congress enacted the Powerplant and
Industrial Fuel Use Act (PIFUA), which furthered these goals by restric-
ting the use of petroleum and natural gas in "electric powerplants" and
"major fuel burning installations" (MFBIs).
The following pages describe the workings of PIFUA's statutory
provisions and the U.S. Economic Regulatory Administration's (ERA's)
regulations implementing the Act, and explore the implications of their
petroleum and natural gas use restrictions for the commercialization of
fuel cells.4
3Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 (PIFUA) 5102(b).
4 A EPRI-funded study has recorded utility industry concerns that
federal fuel use restrictions such as PIFUA, and attendant uncertainties
in the federal regulatory process, present significant impediments to
the operation of fuel cells utilizing natural gas or naphtha or other
petroleum products. (Energy Transition Corporation, Con wrcial^zing the
Utility Fuel Cell (prepared for the Electric Power Research Institute,
Contract Igo. TPS 79-760), January 1980.)
k	 €
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2. CURRENT RESTRICTIONS ON NATURAL GAS AND PETROLEUM USAGE
a. YM TERMS
1. "Electric Powerplants" and 'WBIs"
Current regulations apply only to natural gas and petroleum
usage in "electric powerplants" and "major fuel burning installations"
both of which are statutorily defined. 5
 A fuel cell system
must fall within one of these two definitions in order to be subject
to the Act's fuel use restrictions. Two types of fuel call systems will
be tested against these definitions:
1. A fuel cell standing alone; and
2. A fuel cell used in conjunction with a waste heat recovery
or supplemental-fired boiler.
A fuel cell system must satisfy both of the following two tests
before it is regulated as an electric powerplant or MFBI:
Test One: Site of Facility
First, a single fuel cell unit suet have a minimum fuel heat
input rate of 1.056 X 10 11 joules (100 million Btu (NOtu)) per hot,-., 6 or
a combination of such units (or of such units together with existing
generating units) at the same site must each have a minimum input rate
5See note 8, infra. Title IV of PIFUA (f9401-405) also authorizes
ERA to prohibit, by rule or order, natural gas use in certain boilers pro-
ducing steam for space heating and consuming at least 8.5 X 10 3 m'(300 Mcf)
per day of natural gas. To dare, ERA has not invoked this authority.
610 CFR 500.2, 500.4; PIFUA 11103(a)(7)(A), (10)(A).
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of 5.28 X 10 10
 joules (50 MMBtu) per hour and an aggregate rate of 2." X 1011
joules (250 MMBtu) per hour. Assuming a heat rate of 9.5 X 10 4 joules
(9,000 Btu) per KWH, to satisfy this test a fuel cell system would need to
have an electric capacity exceeding 11 MW standing alone, or 5.5 MW if used
in combination with other units with an aggregate capacity of more than
28 MW. 7
 In _short, the only fuel cell systems, if any, subject to PIFUA's
provisions under current regulations are some multimepwatt systems.
Test Two: Type of Facility
Second, the fuel cell system must additionally consist of a
"boiler," "gas turbine," "combined cycle unit" or "internal combustion
engine" in order to cosy within existing statutory and regulatory defini-
tions of electric powerplant or MFBI. B The definitions of these devices
comport with normal industrial usage, 9 and it is doubtful that FERC or
the courts could reasonably interpret them to cover fuel cells.
7These would generally be limited to electric utility and certain
large industrial fuel cell applications.
8"Electric powerplant" refers only to certain stationary generating
units consisting of a boiler, gas turbine or combined cycle unit, which
employ a generator to produce electric power for purposes of sale or
exchange. (10 CFR 500.2; PIFUA 1103(a)(7)(A))
"MFBI" is restricted to certain stationary units consisting of a
boiler, gas turbine, combined cycle unit or internal combustion engine.
(10 CFR 500.2; PIFUA 1103(a)(10)(A))
9"Boiler" is "a closed vessel in which water is heated or vaporised
to produce steam of one (1) percent or more quality." 60 CFR 500.2)
"Gas turbine" (or "combustion turbine") is "a unit that is a rotary
engine driven by a gas under pressure that is created by the combustion of
any fuel." (M.)
"Ccabined cycle unit" is "a unit that consists of a combination of
one or more combustion turbine units and one or more waste heat boilers with
a substantial portion of the required energy input to the waste heat boiler
provided by the exhaust gas from the combustion turbine unit(s)." (Id.)
"Internal combustion engine" is "a heat engine in which the combus-
tion that generates the heat takes place inside the engine proper." (M.)
i
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Thus, since a fuel cell standingalone does not fit within any
of the categories of "boiler," "gas turbine," "combined cycle unit," or
"internal combustion e.^.gine," it cannot be considered an electric power-
plant or MFBI subject to PIFUA's fuel use restrictions even if it exceeds
the size threshold described above.
A boiler standing alone which produces thermal energy (e.g., process
steam or heat) is an MFBI (hereafter, "boiler MFBI") if it meets the mini-
mum fuel heat input rate criteria discussed above. A fuel cell cogenera-
tion system which includes a supplemental-fired boiler to produce usable
thermal energy, arguably might be considered a boiler MFBI. 10 On the
other hand, a fuel cell cogeneration system with a waste heat recovery
boiler (without supplementary firing) probably would not be considered a
boiler MFBI, since the fuel cell standing alone would not be an MFBI and
since the boiler itself would not require natural gas or petroleum as a
fuel.11
i
lOIt would not be an electric powerplant since the boiler does not
employ a generator to produce electric power; instead, the boiler itself
produces thermal energy.
ERA could, alternatively, apply the minimum fuel heat input
rate criterion to the entire fuel cell system or to the boiler alone
in order to determine whether MFBI regulations are triggered. As
described in a later subsection, even if IRA decides that the fuel cell
oyster ur the boiler component of it constitutes an MFBI, a cogeneration
exemption f.om PIFUA's fuel use restrictions should be readily obtain-
able in most instances.
11This interpretation is bolstered somewhat by an ERA pronounce-
ment at the time it issued the current final rules for PIFUA in June 1960.
Combined cycle units consist of one or more got turbines and waste heat
boilers, but the units are considered to be " nonboiler MFBIs" (as are gas
turbines and internal combustion engines), which are subject to different
PIFUA regulations than "boiler MFBls." ERA had indicated in an interim
rule prior to June 1960 that small amounts of supplementary firing would
not cause a unit to lose its designation as a combined cycle unit. When
pressed for a delineation of how such supplementary firing would be per-
missible, ERA proclaimed that it could not set an a priori maximum level,
i
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"new" facilities (powerplants or MFBIa). Generally, a facility's designa-
tion as "new," as opposed to "existing," hinges upon whether construction
at the facility began after November 9, 1978. 12
 A fuel cell cogeneration
system whose components (fuel cell and boiler) are newly constructed will
be considered a new boiler MFBI if it otherwise satisfies the MFBI criteria
(subject to previously mentioned caveats).
ERA also deems "construction" of a ro<,: facility (a new combined
cycle unit) to occur in the following two situations: 13
- Addition of a waste heat recovery or supplemental-fired
boiler to an existing combustion turbine unit;
- Addition of a combustion turbine as a heat source for
an existing boiler.
By analogy, retrofitting a fuel call to an existin3 boiler to create a
cogeneration system may also constitute construction of a new facility:
a new boiler MFBI.
abrogated the interim rule and announced its intent to examine the issue
on a case-by-case basis. (45 Fed. Reg. 38276, 36277 (June 6, 1980))
It would appear that a combined cycle unit is deemed to be a
"nonboiler MFBI" because its waste heat boiler utilizes little or no
natural gas and because its gas turbine component is a "nonboiler MFBI."
By analogy, a fuel cell cogeneration system having a waste heat boiler
without supplementary firing would not be an MFBI ("boiler" or "nonboiler")
insofar as a fuel cell standing alone would not be an MFBI. By the same
token, a fuel cell cogeneration system with a supplemental-fired boiler
would be a "boiler MFBI."
1210 CFR 500.2; FIFUA 11103(a)(8), (9), (11) and (12).
13 10 CFR 500.2; 45 Fed. Reg. 38276. 38277 (June 6, 1980).
33
IBM
b. FUEL USE RESTRICTIONS FOR N1W MFB
PIFUA calls for different use restrictions on natural gas and
petroleum as "primary energy sources J4 applying to the following four
categories of facilities: "existing powerplants;" "new powerplants;"
"existing Mlo;" and "new MFBis." The previous subsection indicated
that at present most fuel cell systems will not be subject to PIFUA's
restrictions, and that those systems which arguably might be subject to
the Act world fall within the category of "tun+ RBIs."
For new MFB1s consisting of a boiler (hereafter "new boiler
RBIs"), ERA prohibits the use of petroleum or natural gas as a primary
energy source. i5 ERA may, but so :ar has not acted to prohibit such
use in new MFBIs consisting of a gas (combustion) turbine, combined
cycle unit. or internal combustion engine. lb
14 "Primary energy source" generally means the fuel or fuels used
by a powerplant or MFBI. (10 CFR 500.2; PIFUA 1103(a)(15).
1510 CFR 503.3(a); PIFUA 1202(a).
16 10 CFR 503.3(b); PIFUA 1202(b).
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The analysis to this point suggests that only multi-megawatt fuel
cell systems arguably classifiable as boiler MFBIs would be subject
to PIFUA's i:vstrictions. These would be cogeneration systems with
supplemental-fired boilers (or possibly with waste heat recovery boilers
without supplemental firing). Whether consisting of newly constructed
fuel cell and boiler components or of a fuel cell retrofitted to an
existing boiler, thef -ould most likely be considered new facilities.
Such systems therefore could be subject to PIFUA's fuel use restric-
tions for new boiler MFBIs, unless exempt under other provisions of
the Act. The following subsection describes exemptions which would
enable most such facilities to escape these restrictions.
c. EXEMPTIONS FROM FUEL USE RESTRICTIONS
PIFUA empowers ERA to issue both temporary (5-10 years duration)
and permanent exemptions from its restrictions to operators of new
boiler MFBIs. Grounds for such exemptions include, among others, the
unavailability of a reasonably priced supply o f coal or other alternate
fuel; inadequate fuel transportation or storage facilities at the
facility site; and inability to comply with applicable environmental
requirements. 17
Additionally, the operator of a new boiler MFBI can seek a
permanent exemption as a "cogeneration facility" on one of two
alternate grounds (discussed below) after satisfying all of the
'I
i^
17 10 CFR 503.20 through 503.44; PIFUA 11211-214.
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following three general criteria:
1. The facility produces electric power and any other Torsi of
Sf
useful energy (such as steam, gas, or heat) that will be
used for industrial, commercial or space heating, purposes;
2. Electricity generated by the facility constitutes more than
10 and less than 90 percent of its useful energy output;
and
3. The facility operator does not sell or exchange 50 percent
or more u,`. its net electric output. 1s
All fuel cell cogeneration systems should satisfy the first criterion,
and all or most should also satisfy the second. Fuel cell cogeneratoos
who plan to sell 50 percent or more of their electric output to an elec-
tric utility and/or other entities could run afoul of the third. (See
Chapter IV, infra.) Fuel cell systems deemed new boiler RBIs which
violate any of the above criteria would be ineligible for a "cogeneration
facility" exemption.
The operator of a fuel cell system which satisfies all three of_.
these criteria may seek such an exemption on either of the following
two grounds: 19
1. The oil or gas consumed by the facility is less than would
be consumed in its absence; or
2. The "public interest" would be served by granting an exemp-
tion "because of special circumstances such as technical
innovation or maintaining industry in urban areas."
18 10 CPR 505.27. We have found no time period specified in the
regulations over which the percentages noted are to be calculated.
19 id.
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Fuel cell cogeneration systems may have some difficulty in
qualifying on the ground of oil end/or natural Sea savings. 	 The reguld-
tions require complicated calculations for demonstrating fue1sav-ings.
The oil and gas usage to be displaced by the cogeneration facility may
come from one or more of the following types of facilities: 	 existing or
new facilities which are too small to be covered by PIFUA (i.e., those with
fuel heat input rates less than 1.056 X10 11 joules (100 MMBtu) per hour);
existing facilities subject to PIFUA which cannot burn an alternate
fuel such as coal and which will be retired when an exemption is
granted; new facilities which would be eligible for a PIFUA exemption;
and powerplauts whose electrical energy supplied to the grid will be
displaced by the cogeneration facility, based on-a 10-year forecast
20
of utility loads and -resource a.	 An industrial firm with no existing
oil and-lor gas-fueled facilities to retire, located in'a utility service
area with high projected electric deTmnd growth, may be : 'hardpressed to
demonstrate net oil and gas savings from a multimegawatt fuel cell
cogeneration system operating on natural gas or naphtha.21
Fuel cell cogeneration systems should, however, be able to
qualify on "public interest" grounds, since they utilize an innovative
electrochemical approach to electrical and thermal energy production
to achieve unusually high efficiencies with only nominal air pollutant
emissions, which in turn can promote industrial growth in urban areas
2010 CFR 505.27(c).
21 Insofar as it is a product derived from crude o-.', naphtha
is a form of "petroleum" subject to PIFUA's fuel use restrictions.
10 CFR 500.2; PIFUA f103(a)(4).
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with severe air quality problems that hamper the use of conventional
energy technologies. 22
To summarize, multimagawatt fuel cell facilities employing supple-
mental (and conceivably waste heat recovery) boilers for cogeneration
arguably could be subject to PIFUA's fuel use prohibitions as new boiler
MFBIs, but most should be able to obtain permanent exemption as "cogenera-
tion facilities" on "public interest" grounds. Facilities which cannot
qualify for this exemption (generally because of planned sales of 50
percent or more of their electric output) :il' ,.eed to obtain a permanent
exemption on an alternative basis, such as inability to comply with
applicable environmental requirements, 23 or face the PIFUA prohibitions
on new boiler MFBIs using natural gas or petroleum (e.g., naphtha). The
practical effects of these restrictions for large utility or industrial
fuel cell systems may be to discourage cogeneration activities requiring
the use of supplemental (or possibly waste heat recovery) boilers using
natural gas or petroleum derivatives; to limit anticipated electricity sales
to 50% of output to qualify for a cogeneration exemption; or, where on-site
electrical demand would be significantly less than 50 percent of the system's
electrical output. to down-size the system to achieve a high capacity factor.
22 SeeAppendix for a discussion of metro politan "nonattain-
ment" areas where fuel cells may have a marketable advantage over
conventional energy technologies in the industrial sector.
23ERA has recently proposed the streamlining of the criteria
for obtaining a permanent exemption based on inability to comply with
applicable environmental requirements: the facilit y operator can file
with ERA a certification stating that the facility is located in a
"nonattainment area" or a "Class I attainment area" or that the
facility would cause or contribute to violations of ambient air quality
standards in a nonattainment or Class I area if it were forced to
utilize coal or another alternate fuel. (46 Fed. Reg. 31216; July 12,
1981.) See Appendix for detailed discussion of air quality regulations
affecting fuel cells.
3
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t3. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS OF THE CURRENT SCHEME
In the 1981 session of Congress, House Republicans announced,
but later canceled, plans to repeal PIFUA's fuel use prohibitions for
new boiler MFBIs. 24 However, during its budgeting activities, the
Congress did repeal 4301(a)(1) of PIFUA which prohibited "existing
powerplants" from using natural gas after 1990.25
The White House Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and Environ-
ment in its "Strategy Paper on Natural Gas Deregulation" (July 28, 1981)
called for the repeal of PIFUA's natural gas use restrictions for
existing and new MFBIs and electric powerplants. In the Council's
words, "(t]his proposal could be part of a broader effort to seek
repeal of [PI]FUA altogether."26 The coal industry could oppose
efforts to repeal PIFUA since the Act encourages the conversion of
facilities to coal, but the Council opined that the industry might not
do so if the Administration pushes for full decontrol of domestic gas
prices by 1985.27
It seems likely that within the next few years the Administra-
tion will push for PIFUA's repeal, whether in a broad-brush or
piecemeal fashion. Whether it will be able to attain this goal is
not clear at this point.
24 Energy Users Report, July 9, 1981, p. 1060.
25 id., August 20, 1981, p. 1321.
26 
Id., August 27, 1981, pp. 1329, 1342.
27 Id., p. 1342.
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4, IMPLICATIONS FOR FUEL CELL COMMERCIALIZATION
The previous discussion, summarized in Figure III-1, establishes
several points regarding the application of PIFUA's fuel use prohibitions
t
to fuel cell systems:
A fuel cell standing alone, irrespective of the magnitude of its
generating capacity, is not subject to PIFUA.
Certain multimegawatt fuel cell cogeneration systems with supple-
mental-fired boilers (or possibly waste heat recovery boilers) which are t
classifiable as "new boiler MFBIs" may be subject to PIFUA's prohibitions 	 s
on the use of natural gas or petroleum-derived fuels. However, these facil-
ities generally should be able to obtain permanent exemptions as "cogen-
eration facilities" on "public interest" grounds. To qualify, fuel cell
operators must restrict electrical energy sales to others (e.g., local
electric utilities or industrial purchasers) to 50 percent or less of
their facilities' electrical output: this restriction will tend to
cause potential operators of fuel cell systems to down-size the planned
capacity of their facilities. Some operators, however, can escape this
restriction on electricity sales, if they can qualify for a permanent
exemption from PIFUA's prohibitions on an alternative ground such as
environmental restrictions on the use of coal or another non-oil or -gas
fuel in their area.
The possible legislative or regulatory abrogation of PIFUA fuel
use restrictions on "new MFBIs" prior to the initial commercialization
phase for fuel cells would obviate the need for operators of fuel cell
cogeneration systems utilizing natural gas, naphtha or other petroleum
products to apply to ERA for permanent exemptions.
40
1i
FIGURE III-1
i
PIFUA APPLICATION TO FUEL CELL SYSTEMS
1
S
i
i
No	 Does system use natural gas or
petroleum (e.g., naphtha)?
PIFUA does not apply.	 Yes
Does fuel heat input rate equal or
No
	
	 exceed 1.056 X 10 11 joules (100 MMBtu)
per bour (11 MW) for a single unit, or
5.28 X 10 joules (50 MMBtu) per hour
PIFUA does not apply. 	 (5.5 MW) for each unit in combination
aggregating 2.64 X 10 joules (250 MMBtu) ?
1 
Yes
No	 Does system include attached
boiler?
PIFUA does not apply.
	 Yes
No	 Is boiler supplemental-fired with
1	 natural gas or petroleum?
PIFUA does not apply. 	
1 
Yes
No	 Does system qualify for permanent
"cogeneration facility" exemption?
Does system qualify for
	 Yes
some other exemption
(e.g., inability to
comply with environmental
	
System is exempt if operator sells
requirements)?
	
less than 50% of electrical out-
put ("downsizing" effect).
No	 Yes	
System is exempt.
System may be subject to PIFUA's
prohibitions on natural gas and
petroleum use in "new boiler MFBIs."
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B. FEDERAL NATURAL GAS PRICING AND CURTAILMENT POLICIES
(NGPA TITLES I, II, AND IV)
1. DECONTROL AND INCREMENTAL PRICING iNGPA TITLES I AND II)
a. BACKGROUND
In 1978, the Congress enacted Title I of the Natural Gas Policy
Act (NGPA) to reverse the decline in domestic production and reserves
of natural gas. NGPA Title I substantially modified pre-existing
price controls on domestic gas which were perceived to present economic
disincentives for exploration and development (E6D) efforts. Gas
producers would henceforth be able to obtain substantially higher
prices for newly produced domestic gas as a reward for expanded E6D
activities. As of 1985, the price of this "new gas" would be decon-
trolled and allowed to reach market clearing levels.
At the same time, Title II of NGPA was enacted to ensure that
high-priority gas customers such as -esidential and commercial gas users
would be at least partially shielded from the domestic gas price
increases that would result inevitably from the implementation of the
phased price decontrol schedule in Title I. Title II called for a
surcharge to be imposed upon certain industrial gas users so that their
gas supplies would be priced incrementally higher than those of
high-priority gas users.
The following sections describe the workings of the current
NGPA Title I and Title II programs, review proposed modifications to
these programs, and suggest their implications for fuel cell commer-
cialization.
1
i
3
4
42
b. DECONTROL OF DOMESTIC WELLHEAD PRICING OF NATURAL GAS
(NGPA TITLE I)
i. Current Price Decontrol Schedule
Title I establishes a schedule for the phased decontrol of
wellhead prices paid by gas pipeline operators to domestic producers
for certain categories of natural gas. 28	 Specifically, the act
gradually deregulates the wellhead price of categories of domestic
natural gas produced after 1977 ("new gas"). Starting with a base
price of $1.75 per MMBtu in April 1977, the price of such categories
of new gas is permitted to rise at a rate tied to the annual rate of
inflation. 29	 On January 1, 1985, these price controls are scheduled
to be completely removed, 30 and new gas would be permitted to command
whatever price the market would bear.
NGPA continues the pre-NGPA price controls on categories of
natural gas produced prior to 1977 ("old gas"), but permits an annual
upward adjustment linked to the general rate of inflation. 31
	 These
price controls on old gas, unlike those on new gas, will continue
indefinitely after 1985. These restrictions on old gas prices were
designed by the Congress to prevent windfall profits to producers of
old gas which would have resulted if gas produced prior to the NGPA's
28 NGPA 11101 et seq.; 18 CFR parts 270-272.
29 NGPA 11102 and 103.
30 Id., 1121. However, the President or the Congress has the
authority to reimpose price controls in 1985. Id., 1122.
31 Id., 11104 and 105.
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renactment could receive the higher price of new gas. Congress believed
that gas producers should only be rewarded with higher prices for gas
resulting from new, risky capital investments in exploration and devel-
opment efforts.
t
1
ii. Proposals to Accelerate Decontrol
A key purpose of the NGPA approach to decontrol of new gas
prices was to ensure that ,just prior to the lifting of price controls
for such gas in 1985, its controlled price would approximate its decon-
trolled or free market price. 32	 Since the passage of NGPA, however,
the decontrol of domestic petroleum prices coupled with OPEC oil price in-
creases has resulted in a situation whereby decontrol in 1985 would produce
a sharp spike in new gas prices. Current estimates for the 1984 controlled
and decontrolled prices (current 1984 dollars) of new gas are roughly $3.50
per 1.056 X 109 joules (1 MMBtu) and $7.00 per 1.056 X 109 joules, respectively.
The White House Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and Environ-
ment, chaired by Interior Secretary James Watt, is concerned that the
}
occurrence of such a price spike for decontrolled new gas in 1985 could
lead to the reimposition of price controls thereafter. 34	 On July 28,
1981, the Council submitted, for internal review by the Administration, a
strategy paper on natural gas deregulation proposing the complete
decontrol of both new and old gas prices by 1985, with a phase-out
j
32 Energy Users Report, July 23, 1981, p. 1121.
33 Id., September 3, 1981, p. 1358.
34 Id., July 23, 1981, p. 1121.
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of price controls during 1982-85 designed to avoid price spikes.35
The strategy paper proposes that old gas prices be increased
relatively uniformly over a 36-month period until old gas attains a
target price in 1985 pegged to 70 percent of the average U.S. refiner
acquisition cost of crude oil, at which time price controls would be
eliminated. 36
 In short, the historically low, controlled price levels
for old gas would be lifted to approach the market price of petroleum
by 1985.
As to new gas, the Council suggests three options for the
accelerated phase-out of price controls, permitting specified cate-
gories to immediately receive the target price tied to refiners'
petroleum acquisition costs. 37
 With each of the three options, full
price decontrol of all new gas (post-1977) would occur in 1985. The
strategy paper reports that, in 1982, average new gas prices (constant
1980 dollars) for three options would range from $2.70 per 1.056 X10 9 joules
(1 MMBtu) (Option 3) to $3.50 per 1.056 X 10 9 joules (Option 1), as com-
pared with a fully decontrolled price of $4.70 per 1.056 X10 9 joules. By
1985, for all three options, the average price of new gas would exceed
$5.00 per 1.056 X10 9  joules (constant 1980 dollars). 38
35 id., August 27, 1981, pp. 1338-1343.
36
id., pp. 1338-1339.
37 UnderOption 1, gas from all wells drilled after 1977 receives
the target price in 1982. Under Option 2, only gas from certain classes
of these wells receives the target price in 1982. Under Option 3, only
gas from wells drilled after January 1982 receives the target price.
(Id., P. 1339)
38 id., p. 1342.
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While the final form of an Administration decontrol proposal
and its prospects for success in the Congress are open questions,39
at a minimum new gas prices will be deregulated by 1985 under
the current NGPA scheme, and will dominate domestic gas pricing as
supplies of old gas decline. In short, the average price of domestic
natural gas will eventually reach parity with the market price of
petroleum and will rise in response to OPEC pricing decisions and other
events on the global petroleum market. While some of the implications
of these developments seem clear enough on their face, their meaning
for fuel cell commercialization can be better understood in the full
context of NGPA's incremental pricing provisions and their possible
repeal, discussed in the following sections.
i
39 TheCabinet Council recognizes that an Administration proposal
for immediate price decontrol of all domestic natural gas could face
insurmountable opposition within the Congress unless a windfall profits
tax accompanied it. (Id., July 23, 1981, p. 1121) As a result, the
President may propose some form of phased price decontrol following one
of the options outlined in the Council's strategy paper. (Id., October 1,
1981, p. 1451) Sen. James McClure, Chairman of the Senate Energy Commit-
tee, has indicated that Congress probably would not enact any decontrol
proposal until after the 1982 election year because of the potential
political fallout of the decontrol issue. (Id., September 24, 1981,
p. 1432)
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c. INCREMENTAL PRICING OF INDUSTRIAL NATURAL GAS (NGPA TITLE II)
I. Current Incremental Pricing Scheme
As noted earlier, NGPA Title 11 40 was enacted partially to
shield high-priority natural gas customers (a.g., residential and small
commercial customers) from the price increases under the phased decontrol
schedule, by passing through, v'a surcharge, a portion of the wellhead
	 A
price increases to certain industrial facilities utilizing natural gas
as a fuel to produce steam or electricity.
Industrial Gas Surcharge
The surcharge imposed by a gas distribution utility upon
certain industrial customers is computed as follows. NGPA specifies
an incremental pricing threshold ($1.48 per 1.056 X10 9  joules (1 MMBtu)
as of March 1978, adjusted upward periodically for inflation). 41 A
utility's acquisition costs for domestic new gas and for imported natural
gas which exceed this threshold become a surcharge, which is passed
through to operators of most "industrial boiler facilities .,,42 However,
the surcharge may not cause such a facility's natural gas costs to exceed
a regional "alternative fuel cost" determined by FERC based on the regional
price of high sulfur residual (No. 6) fuel oil. 43 The following list
40 NGPA 11201 et seq.
41 NGPA1203(c).
42 NGPA 11201(a)-(c), 203(a). See below for a discussion of types
of facilities (including fuel cell systems) deemed to be "industrial
boiler fuel facilities."
43 NGPA 1204(c), (3); 46 Fed. Reg. 38912 (July 30, 1981).
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illustrates the current regional variability in "alternative fuel
costs": 44
STATE/REGION	 ALTERNATIVE FUEL COST
($/1.056 X l09 joules)($/MHBtu) (October 19811
Texas 2.99
Colorado 3.43
California 3.47
Illinois 3.70
New Jersey 3.82
New England 4.00
Industrial Boiler Fuel Facility
"Industrial boiler fuel facilities" subject to the surcharge
are generally industrial plants, mills, refineries or other industrial
complexes utilizing natural gas in boilers to generate steam and/or
electricity. 45
	
The definition of "boiler fuel use" is, however,
sufficiently open-ended so as to potentially include as well nonboiler
43NGPA 4204(c), (3); 46 Fed. Reg. 38912 (July 30, 1981).
'Energy Users Report, October 1, 1981, p. 1458.
45 Relevant terms are defined as follows:
"Industrial boiler fuel facility": "any industrial facility, as
defined by the Commission [FERC], which uses natural gas as a boiler fuel
and which is not exempt under [NGPA] 4206." (NGPA 1201(c)(1))
"Boiler fuel use": "the use of any fuel for the generation of
steam or electricity." (Id., J201(c)(2))
"Industrial facility": "any facility engaged primarily in the
extraction or processing of raw materials, or in the processing or
changing of raw or unfinished materials into another form or product."
(18 CFR 282.103(d)(1))
"Facility": "all buildings and equipment located at the same
geographic site which are commonly considered to be part of one plant,
mill, refinery or other industrial complex." (18 CFR 282.103(c))
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equipment located at industrial facilities, which utilizes natural gas
to generate steam and/or electrical energy. A natural gas
-fired fu el cell
standing alone at an industrial site possibly could be considered an
industrial boiler fuel facility under the terms of NAPA Title II,
At a minimum, a cogeneration system located at an industrial site and
consisting of a fuel cell and a (supplemental-fired or waste heat
recovery) boiler would technically be considered an industrial boiler
fuel facility, at least with respect to the boiler's use of natural
gas (and perhaps with respect to the fuel cell's use of natural gas
as well).
Exempted Facilities
Natural gas used for specified purposes and/or by specified
end-users is expressly exempted from the incremental pricing provisions
of NGPA Title II and therefore escapes, the surcharge. Gas used by the
following facilities is or can be exempted; 46
- Electric utilities, for electricity generation
- "Small industrial boiler fuel facilities"
- "Qualifying cogeneration facilities"
- Schools, hospitals and similar institutions
- Agricultural uses lacking alternative fuels or feedstocks
Electric utilities can obtain exemptions for natural gas used
for electricity generation, and therefore should have no trouble securing
an exemption for a fuel cell standing alone which produces electricity
46 18 CFR 282.203; NCPA 6206.
49
but no usable thermal output. If an electric utility -owned fuel cell
system also produces usable thermal output, it is conceivable that this
exemption would be limited to the portion of its natural gas input used
to produce electricity, and would not extend to that used to produce
thermal energy in a waste heat recovery or supplemental -fired boiler
attached to the fuel cell — an issue which FERC has not yet had occasion
to address.
"Small industrial boiler fuel f acilities" are those with average
daily natr sl gas usage of 8.5X 10 3
 cubic meters ( 300 Mcf) or less. 47
A fuel cell system otherwise deemed an industrial boiler fuel facility
but which meets this criterion could obtain an exemption from the indus-
trial gas surcharge. Assuming a heat input rate of 9.5 X 10 6 joules
(9,000 Btu) per KWH, such a system could have a maximum operating capacity
of up to 1.4 megawatts. 48
Some industrial fuel cell applications are expected to have
capacities exceeding 1.4 megawatts. However, many of these multimegawatt
systems should be able to avoid the surcharge under Title II's exemption
for "qualifying cogeneration facilities" meeting the criteria established
by 4201 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) and its
implementing regulations (discussed in section W.B., infra). 49 Industrial
fuel cell systems which cannot qualify for this exemption — either
47 18 CFR 282.203(a)(1), (b)(2).
48	 8.5 X 10 3 m'	 1	 1.056 X 109 joules	 da___1,4	 ►^
[	 day	 ] [ 3.8 X 10- joules ] (	 2.83 X 10 m"	 ] [ 24 h. ]
(_ [ 300 Mcf ] [ KWH ] [ MMBtu ] [ dam_ ])
day	 9 MBtu	 Mcf	 24 h.
49NGPA 1 206(c); 18 CFR 282.202(e).
50
because they do not cogenerate or because their ratio of electrical and
thermal outputs does not satisfy PURPA's criteria — would be subject to
the gas surcharge. Fuel systems owned more than 50% by electric utilities
are not "qualifying" facilities under PURPA rules, and could not obtain
exemption on this ground.
Fuel cells may or may not be deemed to be "industrial boiler
fuel facilities." Even if they are, most fuel cell systems probably will
be eligible for a surcharge exemption under one of the exemption categories,
including "small industrial boiler fuel facilities," "qualifying cogener-
ation facilities," or electric utility power generation systems. Only
electric utility fuel cell cogeneration systems and certain industrial
fuel cell noncogeneration and cogeneration systems larger than 1.4
megawatts seem likely to encounter some difficulties escaping a surcharge.
If imposed, the surcharge would cause natural gas fuel costs for such
systems to rise to a maximum level equivalent to the regional price of
high-sulfur residual (No. 6) fuel oil.
ii. Proposed Repeal of Incremental Pricin
The incremental pricing program has not been effective in
shielding high-priority natural gas customers from price increases due
to phased decontrol. Currently, only 1500 industrial facilities nation-
wide, or 7 percent of the interstate gas market, are not exempt from
the industrial gas surcharge. 50 Consequently, gas price increases (due
50Energy Users Report, July 30, 1981, pp. 1169, 1170.
A
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to phased decontrol) which are in excess of allowable surcharges levied
on nonexempt gas users are being passed through-to exempt gas users,
including high-priority gas customers such as residential and commercial
users.
A rule proposed by FERC in 1980 which would have expanded to more
than 50,000 the number of industrial facilities subject to incremental
pricing was vetoed in the Congress. 
51 
This veto reflected Congressional
discontent with the pricing program. Indeed, FERC's own current chairman,
C.M. Butler III, recently declared that "incremental pricing is a failure"
and called for complete deregulation of the domestic natural gas market. 52
The White House Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and
Environment included in its recent "Strategy Paper on Natural Gas
Deregulation" a recommendation to the Administration to repeal outright
the NGPA Title II incremental pricing program. 53 The U.S. Department
of Energy has indicated that the Administration is in fact leaning
toward endorsing this proposal.54
Questions remain as to whether and when the incremental pricing
program will be substantially modified or totally repealed. Its
5145 Fed. Reg. 31622 (May 13, 1900); NGPA 5202; Energy Users
Report, May 22, 1980, p. 3.
52Energy Users Report, July 30, 1981, pp. 1173, 1174.
531d., August 27, 1981, pp. 1338-1339.
541d., p. 1329.
52
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apparent failure as a price-shield suggests that the program's continu-
ation would do little in any event to mitigate the severity of price
increases borne by high-priority gas customers in the late 1980s and
thereafter, even under the current domestic gas wellhead price decontrol
program.
d. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUEL CELL COMMERCIALIZATION
The following two plausible alternative scenarios for domestic
natural gas pricing in the late 1980s and thereafter, while substan-
tially different in regulatory t-_.rs, appear to converge to the same
ultimate result:
Scenario 1: Indefinite continuation of the current NGPA
Title I and Title II programs (Status Quo
Scenario)
Scenario 2: Decontrol of all domestic gas wellhead pricing
as of 1985 and repeal of NGPA Title II (Decon-
trol Scenario)
In the "Status Quo Scenario," pricing of domestic new gas
(post-1977) will be decontrolled in 1985, while price controls on
old gas (pre-1977) will be maintained indefinitely. Domestic old
gas supplies will, however, decline naturally, and new gas supplies
priced at market clearing levels will elevate the average price of
domestic gas to parity with world market prices for petroleum after
1985. The open question is not whether the current phased decontrol
program will cause domestic gas prices to approach petroleum market
price levels, but rather when this will occur. In any event, the
53
A
-W Ak-
current incremental pricing program will not shield high-priority
gas customers such as residential and commercial gas users from
these price increases.
In the "Decontrol Scenario," both domestic new gas and old
gas prices are completely decontrolled in 1985 (following a gradual
phase-out of controls during 1982-85), and the incremental pricing
program is repealed. The only real difference between this scenario
and the "Status Quo" one is the time period in which domestic gas
prices reach parity with global oil prices. In the "Decontrol
Scenario," parity will be attained in 1985, rather than at some
indefinite time during the late 1980s or early 1990s.
The implications for fuel cell commercialization are clear cut.
Assuming that fuel cells begin to reach the commercial market in the
mid- to late 1980s, all potential fuel cell operators — be they resi-
dential, commercial, industrial or other — considering natural gas
as a fuel will be facing natural gas prices which are equal to, or
approaching in the near term, the decontrolled price of petroleum.
Domestic gas prices in the late 1980s and thereafter will be inextri-
cably linked with OPEC oil pricing decisions and other events in the
global petroleum market. The resultant premium prices for natural
gas (and petroleum products such as naphtha and distillate and
residual fuel oils as well) can be expected to adversely affect the
economics of fuel cell system operation.
Since these prices will also affect conventional generation
and cogeneration technologies using; natural gas or petroleum fuels,
a central issue for fuel cell commercialization will continue to be
54
-.41k V-
 
	
the relative impact of these developments on fuel cells via I via
competing fossil-fueled options. To the extent that the Administra-
tion ' s decision to reduce federal support for commercialization
activities or other factors cause fuel cell schedules to slip beyond
current target dates. comparisons already undertaken in this area
are likely to be less and les ,^ useful, and will need to be reviewed
and updated in any event as the current Administration ' s actions in
this area begin to take more concrete shape and their consequences
become clearer.
The economic consequences of decontrol under either scenario also
underscore the need, already recognized by DOE, NASA/Lewis, fuel cell
manufacturers and utility users groups, to develop capabilities for opera-
tion on fuels such as methane which can be derived from nonfossil sources.
Although this study has not attempted to quantify the "special credits"
theoretically available from fuel cells, it seems clear from our work
that the absolute and relative values of particular "credits" (e.g.,
modularity, response times, or air quality benefits) will vary greatly
among different types of users, so that in many cases the fuel cell
will be competing largely on the basis of cost and energy efficiency
alone. Where this is true, a nonfossil fuel capability may be a more
powerful inducement to fuel cell use than any of the unique features
characteristic of the technology.
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2. NATURAL GAS CURTAILMENT (NGPA TITLE IV)
a. INTRODUCTION
In 1973, the Federal Power Commission (FPC) utilized its authority
under the Natural Gas Act (15 U.S.C. 5717 et seq.) to institute a natural
gas curtailment priority scheme governing the allocation of natural gas
supplies to customers of interstate pipelines during serious natural gas
supply shortfalls (generally occurring in winter heating seasons). The
FPC scheme ranked natural gas end users as high-priority or low-priority
based on the importance of gas used to protect health, safety and other
human needs; the operational difficulty of curtailing service to various
customer classes; and the costs that different kinds of end users would
experience in converting to an alternative fuel.55
The present natural gas curtailment scheme is similar to that
originally promulgated by the FPC, although it is somewhat more elaborate
and reflects a shifting of certain priority categories under the terms
of NGPA Title IV. The following discussion first describes the classes
of natural gas users within each gas curtailment priority category,
starting with the highest priority (Priority One or P1) category, and
relates each priority category to particular types of fuel cell appli-
cations. It then reviews proposed modifications in the current scheme
as well as the Administration's position on the need for a priority
scheme. Finally, it suggests the implications of the curtailment
priority scheme for the marketability of fuel cells utilizing natural
gas among different priority classes of natural gas users.
55 EnergyUsers Report, July 2, 1981, p. 1040. The Economic Regu-
latory Administration (ERA) within the U.S. Department of Energy has the
current responsibility for reviewing and modifying the curtailment priority
scheme according to the terms of Title IV of the Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978 (NGPA) (15 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.). The FPC's successor agency, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) presently administers and
implements the curtailment policies promulgated by ERA.
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b. EXISTING CURTAILMENT PRIOLRITY SCHEME
	 OF POOR QUALITY
The present natural gas curtailment priority scheme is summarized
in Table III-1. During a natural gas supply shortfall the gas requirements
of all customers in the P1 category are completely satisfied before those of
P2 and lower priority categories, and so forth, through the lower priorities
(P3, P4, etc.).
TABLE III-1
FERC NATURAL GAS CURTAILMENT PRIORITY SCHEME FOR DIRECT SALE,
LOCAL DISTRIBUTION COMPANY AND INTERSTATE PIPELINE
CUSTOMERS OF INTERSTATE PIPELINE SUPPLIERS
PRIORITY ONE (P1):
• Residences
• Small commercial establishments (including institutions and local/state
federal government agencies ): < 1.42X 10 1 m' (50 Mcf) per day (peak) and
natural gas for purposes other than those involving manufacturing or
electric power seneration
• Schools
• Hospitals (including nursing and convalescent homes)
• Police; fire; sanitation and correctional facilities
PRIORITY TWO (P2):
• Essential agricultural use requirements (as determined by Secretary
of Agriculture)
PRIORITY THREE (P3):
• Large commercial requirements (> 1.42 X 10 3 m 3 (50 Mcf) per day (peak))
• Firm industrial requirements for plant protection, feedstock and
process needs
• Pipeline customer storage injection requirements
PRIORITY FOUR (P4):
• All industrial requirements not specified in Priorities 3, 5, 6,
7, 8, 9 or 10
PRIORITY FIVE 05):
• Firm industrial requirements for boiler fuel use at < 8.5X 10"m 3
(3,000 Mcf) per day, but > 4.25 X le m 3 (1,500 Mcf) per day where
alternate fuel capabilities can meet such requirements
PRIORITY SIX (P6):
• Firm industrial requirements for large volume (> 8.5X 10 4 m3 (3,000 Mcf)
per day boiler fuel use where alternate fuel capabilities can meet
such requirements
PRIORITIES SEVEN- TEN (P7- P10) :
• Interruptible requirements of > 8.5 X 10 3 m 3 (300 Mcf) per day, where
alternate fuel capabilities can meet such requirements.
r
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i. Priority One KP1)
The highest priority or P1 natural gas end users include
residences, small commercial establishments, schools, hospitals, police
and fire protection, and sanitation and correctional facilities.56
For purposes of our analysis, the P1 users of central interest are
residences, small commercial establishments, schools and hospitals.
Residences
The current scheme defines "residence" as "a dwelling using
natural gas predominantly for residential purposes such as space heating,
air conditioning, hot water heating, cooking, clothes drying, and
other residential uses, and includes apartment buildings and other
multi-unit buildings."57 The definition of "residence" does not differ-
entiate between natural gas utilized directly for "residential purposes"
(e.g., by direct combustion of natural gas in a household appliance such
as a gas stove or gas-fired furnace) and natural gas utilized indirectly
for "residential purposes" by conversion into an intermediate energy
form (e.g., by combustion of natural gas in a .,team turbine-generator
or gas turbine-generator to produce electricity for electric household
appliances).58
Accordingly, reading the definition of "residence" by itself,
56 10 CFR 281.203(a)(5); Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA)
Wl(f)(2).
57 10 CFR 281.203(a)(8); emphasis added).
58 The old FPC definition of "residential" gas service applied
only to "direct natural gas usage in a residential dwelling." 18 CFR
2.78(c)(1); emphasis added).
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one may conclude that fuel cells operating on natural gas in an apart-
ment building or other residence should be accorded P1 curtailment
priority status, so long as they utilize the natural gas "predominantly
for residential purposes" on the site. If granted P1 status, this
type of residential fuel cell application would b
conceivable natural gas shortfalls.
As noted below, pre-NGPA regulations still
utility service to natural gas customers "engaged
the generation of electric power" as low-priority
e insulated from most
in effect define
primarily in .. .
"industrial" service
(18 CFR 2.78(c)(3). According to FERC staff, this language does not
refer to the output mix of a particular facility — i.e., "primarily"
electric power rather than steam or other thermal output — but to the
customer's "primary" business activity. Specifically, FERC interprets
this provision to refer to the primary business activity of generating
power for sale and distribution off-site. 59 Thus, this provision could
result in reclassification of high-priority residential or apartment
usage to low-priority industrial usage only where the latter criterion
is met, independent of the facility's output mix.
Small Commercial Establishments
P1 status is also granted to "commercial establishments"
(including institutions anal local, state and federal agencies) with peak
59 Personalcommunication from FERC staff member Mr. James Keily,
October 1981. This interpretation is consistent with FERC's interpre-
tation of similar language in PURPA 1201 and 18 CFR 1292.206.
59
daily gas requirements less than '.4 X10 I  m3 (50 Mcf). 60
 However, these
entities may not include in their P1 requirements natural gas utilised for
manufacturing or electrical generation. 61 Consequently, these entities'
fuel cell requirements are ineligible for P1 gas allocations and will
be curtailed as P4 (or lower) end uses during a natural gas supply
shortfall.62
Schools and Hospitals
Schools53 and hospitals64 are also designated as P1 natural
gas users. Unlike "small commercial establishments," schools and
hospitals are not explicitly precluded from utilizing P1 natural gas
6010 CFR 281.203(x)(9). As a point of reference, a 230-KW fuel
cell system with a heat rate of 9.5 X 10 6 joules (9,000 Btu) per KWH would
use 1.4 X 10 3 m^ (50,Mcf) per day of natural gas (1.056 X 10 9 joules/2.83 X
10 m3 )(or, 1MMBtu/Mcf) operating at full capacity.
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"Commercial" service is service to natural gas customers 	 i
"engaged primarily in the sale of goods or services including institutions
and local, state, and federal government agencies for uses other than
those involving manufacturing or electric power generation." (18 CFR
2.78(c)(2); emphasis added.)
62 1n fact, it is possible that a "small commercial establishment"
using a fuel cell in addition to other gas-fired equipment could lose
its P1 status entirely, if FERC were to interpret the 1.4 X 10 9 m9 (50 Mcf)
per day ceiling as applying to its aggregate gas requirements (fuel cell
plus non-fuel cell requirements).
63
"'School' means a facility, the primary function of which is to
deliver instruction to regularly enrolled students in attendance at
such facility. Facilities used for both education and noneducational
activities are not included under this definition unless the latter
activities are merely incidental to the delivery of information."
(10 CFR 281.203(a)(11)) FERC has ruled that dormitories, administration
buildings and laboratories at a facility that satisfies the definition
of "school" are also entitled to P1 priority status for gas requirements.
(44 Fed. Reg. 61338, 61344 (October 25, 1979))
o4 "'Hospital' means a facility, the primary function of which
is delivering medical care to patients who remain at the facility,
F including nursing and convalescent homes. Outpatient offices or doctors'
offices are not included in this definition." (10 CFR 281.203(x)(10))
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allocations for electrical power generation purposes, nor are they
subject to an upper limit on the quantity of P1 natural gas available
to them. It therefore appears that schools and hospitals can utilize
P1 natural gas in their fuel cells to generate electricity and/or
heat, both to serve their own needs and to sell to other entities
irrespective of the latter's curtailment priority statuses, so long as
their primary business activity does not become power generation for
distribution and sale off-site (as discussed above in connection with
residential usage).
ii. Priority Two (P2): Essential Agricultural Uses
"Essential agricultural uses" as determined by the U.S.
Secretary of Agriculture are accorded the second highest or P2 natural
gas curtailment status. 65 For these uses, the law does not restrict
natural gas use for electric power generation as it does in connpzt:on
with commercial establishments. Thus, fuel cells serving these uses
	 +
should be entitled to P2 status, and could sell power to others subject
to the limitations already noted for P1 users.
65,,The term 'essential agricultural use,' when used with respect
to natural gas, means any use of natural gas--
(A) for agricultural production, natural fiber production,
natural fiber processing, food processing, food quality
maintenance, irrigation pumping, crop drying, or
(B) as a process fuel or feedstock in the production of ferti-
lizer, agricultural chemicals, animal feed, or food,
which the Secretary of Agriculture determines is necessary for full food
and fiber production." (NCPA f401(f)(1))
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iii. Priority Three (P3): Large Commercial Users
The P3 natural gas uses of central interest to this study
are "large commercial requirements." Included within this priority
status are commercial firms, institutions, and public agencies, with
peak daily gas requirements equaling or exceeding 8.5 X 10" m' (50 Mcf).66
These entities may not include natural gas utilised for electrical
generation within their P3 requirements. 67
As a result, natural gas usage in fuel cells operated by entities
otherwise deemed to be P3 customers would be curtailed as P4 (or lower)
during a natural gas supply shortfall sufficient to trigger curtail-
went in their region.
iv. Priority Four (P4^ - -Priority Ten (P10):
Industrial Users
The categories of P4 through P10 include most types of "firm"
and "interruptible" "industrial" natural gas requirements. 68 These
66 Also included within P3 are: firm industrial requirements for
plant protection, feedstock and process needs; pipeline customer storage
injection requirements.
67 See definition of "commercial" service at note 61 , supra.
68 "Industrial" service is service to natural gas customers
"engaged primarily In a process which creates or changes raw or unfin-
ished materials into another form or product including the generation
of electric power." (18 CFR 2.78(c)(3); emphasis added.)
"Firm" service is "service from schedules or contracts under
which seller is expressly obligated to deliver specific volumes within
a given time period and which anticipates no interruption, but which
may permit unexpected interruption in case the supply to higher prior-
ity customers is threatened." (18 CPR 2.78(c)(4))
"Interruptible" service is "service from schedules or contracts
62
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categories include the lowest priority natural gas uses and are subject
to fuel curtailment before P3 and higher priority users are affected
during a natural gas shortfall. A review of Table III-1 indicates
that a particular type of industrial natural gas requirement will
rate a higher or lower priority status within the P4-P10 range depend-
ing upon the following factors:
Higher Priority
Firm requirement
Nonboiler fuel use
Small gas requirement
No alternate fuel capability
Lower Priority
Interruptible requirement
Boiler fuel use
Large gas requirement
Alternate fuel capability
As an illustration, electric utilities' multimegawatt steam electric
generating facilities are among the lowest priority natural gas users
because of their inte rv!)tible service, large boiler fuel requirements,
and alternate fuel capabilities (e.g., No. 6 fuel oil).
Included within the P4-P10 range will be not only fuel cells
operated by utilities and industrial users, but also those operated by
certain entities that are generally treated as high priority gas cus-
tomers, including small commercial establishments (Pl) and large com-
mercial customers (P3), but would be subject to reclassification to
the extent of their gas use for electric power generation.
under which seller is not expressly obligated to deliver specific
volumes within a given time period, and which anticipates and permits
interruption on short notice, or service under schedules or contracts
which expressly or implicitly require installation of alternate fuel
capability." (18 CFR 2.78(c)(5))
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c. FUTURE MODIFICATIONS OF THE EXISTING SCHEME
i. ERA Alternatives
ERA has undertaken a review of alternative approaches for
allocating natural gas supplies during severe supply shortfalls and
is proposing a rule which continues the present curtailment priority
scheme with only minor modifications. 69
One option which ERA considered and rejected is a pro-rata
curtailment scheme which would curtail all high and low priority gas
users' supplies during a natural gas supply shortfall by an identical
percentage reduction based upon the severity of the s:iortfall.70
ERA also has rejected a pricing or bidding approach for
distributing gas supplies during a shortfall, in lieu of the current
rationing approach. 71 It expressed the opinion that a pricing approach
is infeasible at the interstate gas pipeline company level and would
work, if at all, only at the end-user/distribution company level.
ERA indicated that additional studies would be needed to determine the
particular circumstances under which a pricing approach might make
s .se.
69 EnergyUsers Report, July 2, 1981, pp. 1040-1043.
701d., p. 1041.
71 
rd., p. 1042.
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ii. Administration Position
The White House Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and
Environment has recently drafted a document entitled "Strategy Paper
on Natural Gas Deregulation," which is currently undergoing internal
review by Administration officials. 72 The document proposes a number
of legislative changes regarding natural gas pricing and use restric-
tions, but recommends that no legislative changes in curtailment
policies be pursued. The cabinet council believes that "the need for
a curtailment policy should decline over time as we approach full
decontrol [of domestic natural gas wellhead prices] ." 73 Their optimism
appears to be founded upon the belief that natural gas price decontrol
will improve domestic gas supplies to the point that regional sas
supply shortfalls will cease to be a significant problem necessitating
a curtailment policy.
In short, at the present time, it does not appear that either
the Administration nor responsible federal agencies will substantially
alter the current natural gas curtailment policy.
72 EnergyUsers Report, August 27, 1981, pp. 1338-1343.
73 id., p. 1339.
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d. IMPLICATIONS FOR FLEL CELL COMMERCIALIZATION
The possibility of natural gas curtailments can be expected to
affect decisions by prospective fuel cell manufacturers, marketers and i
users, respectively, concerning technical specifications, marketing
3
options and the viability of particular applications. Depending on
i
the participants' assessments of the likelihood, breadth and severity
5I
of future curtailments, rational responses might range from total
disinterest in natural gas-fired cells, to modest changes in specifica-
tions, market selection criteria or fuel suppl y arrangements.
Our analysis suggests that the effects of present curtailment
policies will vary by region and by type of application. In regions
of the country historically subject to natural gas shortfalls, certain
classes of natural gas users accorded a low-priority status may expe-
1
rience curtailments which could preclude the use of fuel cells without 	 a
fuel-switching capability and ready access to alternate fuels such as
naphtha or propane.
Regional gas curtailments have occurred in the past during
winter heating seasons. Figure III-2 shows the regional occurrence
of such curtailments for the actual 1976-1977 heating season, expressed
as a percentage of gas customers' requirements--that is, the gas sup-
plies they would have been able to receive fn the absence of curtail-
ments. The figure is useful primarily to illustrate that curtailments
are likely to vary substantially from one region of the country to
another (largely as a function of the ability of regional pipeline
companies to secure adequate supplies), and that in some regions,
66
itheir effects will be large enough to exert real influence on user
choices among available energy technologies.
FIGURE III-2
1976 - 1977 WINTER HEATING SEASON (NOVEMBER - MARCH)
CURTAILMENTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF NATURAL GAS
REQUIREMENTS BY DOE REGION
SOURCE: National Energy Information Center, U.S. Department of Energy
19711-1978 Heating Season: Projected Natural Gas Curtailments and Potential
Neeu^ for Additional Alternate Fuels (DOE/ElA-0015), November 1977, Table 1,
pp. 15-16.
For fuel cell manufacturers, this merely confirms recommendations
already made by the electric utility Users' Group and others to concen-
trate on developing a multi-fuel capability, specifically incorporating
methane or other non -natural gas capability.
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For those interested in identifying early entry markets, the
regional occurrence and variability of gas curtailments should be
considered among the factors likely to influence user choices. In
addition to monitoring the occurrence of future curtailments from this
perspective, it would be useful to develop long-term regional supply
and demand forecasts for natural gas, naphtha and other fuels feasible
for fuel cell operation. If properly disaggregated by region and by
class of potential fuel cell owner (e.g., residential, commercial and
industrial) according to gas curtailment priority status (see Table III-2
below), these forecasts should assist in the identification of types
of potential fuel cell owners in certain regions who may face a sub-
stantial risk of natural gas curtailments and who may not have ready
access to naphtha or other alternative fuels. These forecasts would also
serve to allay the fears of potential fuel cell owners who are in no
foreseeable danger of natural gas curtailments in areas where gas
supply shortfalls are not expected.
Table III-2
NATURAL GAS CURTAILMENT PRIORITY SCHEME
BY
CLASS OF POTENTIAL FUEL CELL OWNER
Owner
	
Natural Gas Priority Status
Residential Users (privately-owned
apartment buildings; condominiums;
cooperatives) P1 High
Schools (public or private) P1 High
Hospitals (public or private) P1 High
Essential Agricultural Uses P2 High
Commercial Users P4 Low
Federal/State/Local Agencies P4 I.ow
Industrial Users (including utilities) P4 Low
68
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It is perhaps worth noting that if the Administration's view-
point is borne out by these forecasts, the federal curtailment policy,
at least, will have little bearing upon fuel cell commercialization
once potential fuel cell owners accept the premise of continued natural
gas availability.
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IV, INCENTIVES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR
FUEL CELL USE:
PURPA AND AIR OUALITY REGULATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The preceding discussion of fuel use regulation addresses what
some have viewed as potentially critical legal barriers to commerciali-
zation of first-generation fuel cells. It suggests that, on closer
scrutiny, existing regulatory schemes would not prohibit fuel cells
using natural gas or petroleum derivatives in most applications, and
probably would not seriously discourage their use except in certain
commercial and industrial > ,jlications in regions where natural gas
shortfalls are likely and alternate fuels are unavailable. Implemen-
tation of the Reagan Administration ' s announced intentions in this area
would not alter these conclusions but would, if anything, strengthen
them by removing some or all remaining legal barriers to natural gas
use.
TI-tse conclusions can serve an important function in dispelling
industry uncertainty and narrowing concerns over the implications of
federal fuel use and pricing policies. That function is essential in
the larger commercialization effort, since uncertainty and apprehension
in themselves constitute very real barriers to proceeding. In this
sense, these conclusions can be viewed as satisfying certain necessary
but insufficient conditions for further interest in and progress toward
commercial fuel cell use. They tell us that certain widely perceived
legal barriers are less serious than some might have supposed, and will
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not prevent most fuel cell applications; it does not follow that
fuel cells will necessarily be viewed as commercially desirable
or acceptable. Thus the favorable resolution of fuel use issues
simply permits one to proceed with the basic inquiry: Assuming
that fuel cell performance and costs can meet some threshold level
of commercial interest, ghat legal, institutional and behavioral
considerations might affect further technology development and commer-
cial viability, and how can these inform the commercialization effort?
To this point, our discussion of the potential impacts of
national energy policy has focused on perceived barriers to fuel cell
use. However, national policy as expressed through existing law and
institutional arrangements also provides important incentives and
opportunities for cmerging energy technologies. For more familiar
technologies such as solar, wind and geothermal, many of these induce-
ments have been made explicit in law and regulations formulated with
these technologies in mind and expressly intended to encourage their
commercial development. For fuel cells, which have not yet captured
this kind of public or legislative attention, currently available
inducements arise from the interpretation or application of Laws or
structures designed to serve some societal interest not specifically
z
related to fuel cell development or use.
3
The following sections discuss two such areas which could have
important implications for fuel cell technical development and market
identification. The first is Title II of the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 197', which provides important incentives for indepen-
dent power production a,! cogeneration. The second is the Glean Air Act
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and related legislation, which attaches substantial economic value to
technological advances which contribute to meeting national air quality
standards.
B. PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATORY POLICIES ACT OF 1978
The omnibus legislation collectively known as the National Energy
Act of 1978, which included the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act
and the Natural Gas Policy Act discussed above, also established the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, or "PURPA." Among the various
pieces of legislation which expressed Carter Administration energy policy,
and which so far appear to have survived the current Administration's
scrutiny, Title II of PURPA has the most far-reaching implications for
the future structure of the nation's electric supply industry, and
possibly for development and marketing decisions affecting some types
of fuel cells.
Title II's purpose is to foster competition in electric genera-
tion by encouraging independent producers to undertake small-scale
generation using nonconventional fuels, and to increase fuel efficiency
through cogeneration. Since not all independent power producers will
be eligible for the benefits afforded by PURPA, the first inquiry is
whether and under what conditions fuel cell facilities might qualify.
For facilities which can qualify, the inquiry turns to the nature
and scope of benefits available under PURPA and their possible relevance
to fuel cell design and marketing decisions.
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1. ELIGIBILITY FOR BENEFITS: QUALIFYING FACILITIES
Title II's benefits are available to two types of facilities:
"small power production facilities" and "cogeneration facilities."74
Section 201 of the statute defines a small power production facility
("SPPF") as one which produces up to 80 MW of electricity using biomass,
waste, renewable resources or geothermal as its primary energy source.
It ciefines a cogeneration facility ( "CGF") as one which produces elec-
tricity and other useful energy (including steam or heat) for "industrial,
cimmercial, heating, or cooling purposes," without regard to the size
of the facility or the type of fuel used. 75 In order to be eligible
for PURPA ' s benefits, an SPPF or CGF must he a qualifying facility ("Qr")
—that is, it must meet certain technical standards established by
FERC regulations, and it must be owned by a person "not primarily
engaged in the generation or sale of electric power" other than from 	 i
SPPFs or CGFs. /b FERC defines this to mean that the facility must be
owned not more than 50% by an electric utility or utilities, electric
utility holding company or companies, their subsidiaries or combinations
thereof. 77
74 PURPA1201 et seq.
75 Thisdefinition, as amplified in the PURPA regulations (18 CFR
1292.101 et seq.), differs in important respects from that used for deter-
mining exemptions from fuel use restrictions under PIFUA (supra, p. 22),
but is incorporated as the standard for exemption from NGPA ' s incremental
pricing scheme (supra, p. 35).
76 PURPA201.
77 18 CFR 11292 . 101(b)(1), 292.204-.206. Hereafter, all references
beginning " 1292." are to sections appearing in Title 18 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, which contains FERC regulations implementing PURPA.
74
How would these definitions apply in the fuel cell context? If a
fuel cell facility were planned to utilize only the electric output and
none of the cells' thermal potential, then it could not qualify as a
cogeneration facility, but would have to qualify, if at all, as a small
power producer. This means that it would have to satisfy the fuel use
and size restrictions indicated above for SPPF. First-generation cells
using natural gas or naphtha would not satisfy the fuel use restrictions,
and therefore would not be eligible for SPPF status, whatever their size.
Future fuel cell configurations utilizing methane or other fuels produced
from biomass or waste could satisfy the fuel use restrictions.;, and would
be SPPFs if their power production capacity were 80 MW or less. To attain
"qualifying" status, they also would have to satisfy the ownership criteria
described above and FERC technical requirements relating to the application
of the "80 MW" limitation and the determination of the facility's "primary
energy source." 78
On the other hand, if a fuel cell facility were planned to utilize
both the cells' electric and thermal output, then it would meet PURPA's
definition of a cogeneration facility, regardless of the type of fuel used
or the facility's size. 79 To attain "qualifying" status, such a facility
would have to meet the usual ownership criteria as well as certain FERC
78 See 4292.204.
79 Asnoted earlier, PURPA requires that the facility's thermal
output be used for "industrial, commercial, heating, or cooling purposes."
Although partially redundant, the quoted language is clearly in the
disjunctive, so *hat the "heating or cooling purposes" covered are not
limited to commercial and industrial applications, but would include
residential, institutional or other heating and cooling as well. See
FERC comments on Final Rule in Docket No. RM79-54 (45 Fed. Reg. 17960,
March 20, 1980).
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technical standards for operation and efficiency which appear well within
current fuel cell capabilities. e0
In short, while early commercial fuel cells probably will not satisfy
SPPF criteria. they can -meet  CGF griteria and become aualifyina facilities
when used in cogeneration applications. Consistent with Title II's intent
to encourage such activities, there are virtually no procedural requirements
for qualification: the regulations provide that a facility which meets the
statutory definition of a SPPF or CGF and matches FERC's ownership and tech-
nical criteria is a qualifying facility ("QF"). 81 This means that official
intervention in the form of certification proceedings or other formal approval
is not required82 to confer QF status and hence, eligibility for
PURPA's substantive benefits.
80 Fortopping-cycle facilities, which would include fuel cells,
these standards require a minimum of only 5% useful thermal output during
any calendar :ear period and, in relation to any oil or natural gas input,
a minimum efficiency of 42.5% (based on the useful power output plus half
the useful thermal output). See 11292.202(d) and 292.205(a).
81129?.207(x).
82 Optional certification proceedings are available at the facility
owner or operator's discretion. These might be invoked, for example, to
allay uncertainty on the part of potential investors or prospective
purchasing utilities (see text below). Short of exercising this option,
QFs are required only to provide FERC with a simple notice specifying
their location, nature, capacity and primary energy source, and the
name and address of their owner or operator. See 1292.207.
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2. NATURE OF BENEFITS: UTILITY PURCHASES AND SALES;
REGULATORY AND INCREMENTAL PRICING EXEMPTIONS
a. BACKGROUND
FEP.G's March 1980 rulemasking proceedings concisely summarise
the circumstances leading to Title 11's enactment and the nature of
the benefits it provides for qualifying facilities:
Prior to the enactment of PURPA, a cogenerator or
small power producer seeking to establish interconnected
operation with a utility faced three major obstacles.
First, a utility was not generally willing to purchase
the electric output or was not willing to pay an
appropriate rate. Secondly_, some utilities charged
discriminatorily high rates for back-up service to
cogenerators and small power producers. Thirdly, a
cogenerator or small power producer which provided
electricity to a utility's grid ran the risk of being
considered an electric utility and thus being subjected
to extensive State and Federal regulation.
Sections 201 and 210 of PURPA are designed to remove
these obstacles. Each electric utility is required under
section 210 to offer to purchase available electric energy.
from cogeneration and small power production facilities
which obtain qualifying status under section 201 of PURPA,
and to provide back-up power and other services to such
facilities on a non-discriminatory basis. For such purchases,
electric utilities are required to pay rates which are just
and reasonable to the ratepayers of the utility, which are in
the public interest, and which do not discriminate against
cogenerators and small power producers. Section 210(e)
of PURPA provides that the Commission can exempt qualify-
ing facilities from State regulation regarding utility
77
rates and financial organization, [and] from Federal
regulation under the Federal Power Act .. . and .. .
the Public Utility Holding Company Act. 84
Translation into practice of PURPA's broad mandate for power
purchases and sales and regulatory exemptions has been primarily the
responsibility of FERC, through federal rulemaking proceedings, and
secondarily the responsibility of state public utility commissions
and nonregulated (municipal and cooperative) utilities, through
state rulemaking proceedings implementing FERC regulations and through
administrative oversight of utility activities affecting QFs. FERC's
rulemaking, now virtually completed, has resulted in comprehensive
regulations defining the boundaries within which state regulatory
commissions, Ltilities and QFs must operate. State implementation
efforts are not as far along: some states have published final regu-
lations and power purchase price schedules, but many have not, and
few actual utility/QF transactions have so far occurred under PURPA.
We have reviewed the proposed actions of about half the states, many
of which remain in flux. The following discussion therefore focuses
on the overall federal regulatory scheme, rather than attempting to
8445 Fed. Reg. 17959 (March 20, 1980; emphasis added). In addi-
tion to these basic purchase/sale and exemption provisions, other sections
of Title II grant FERC explicit authority to order the physical connection
of QFs with utility transmission facilities and related actions, and to
require -tilities to p?:ovide transmission services. (PURPA §6202-204)
FERC has expressed the view that the authority and entitlement separately
coliferred by the interconnection sections is necessarily subsumed within
that granted by §210; accorringly, these sections have not been addressed
separately below. See NOPR in Docket No. RM79-55 (October 18, 1979); cf.
45 Fed. Reg. 33958 (May '1, 1960). However, see American Electric Power
Service Corp. v. FERC (note 91, infra), decided January 22, 1982 , as this
report went to publication.
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systematically catalogue state or local variations still in the process
of evolving.
b. UTILITY POWER PURCHASES AND SALES
i. In General
The electric utility power purchase requirement is at the
heart of PURPA. It virtually ensures that qualifying small power pro-
ducers and cogenerators, including fuel cell owner/operators, will have
a market for as much of their electric output as they might choose to
sell. nt the same time, it ensures that in most cases the prices paid
for this output will be substantially higher than they might have been
without PURPA.
To ensure a market for small power producers and cogenerators,
PURPA and FERC rules require electric utilities to purchase all the
electric output offered by QFs with which the utility is interconnected
(except during system emergencies and unusual lightloading situations),
and to interconnect with any QF where necessary to accomplish such
purchases. 85
To ensure prices substantially above those which independent
power producers might otherwise have commanded from monopsony purchasers,
PURPA directs that FERC shall provide for purchase rates based on the
85 $§292.303(a), (c) and 292.304(f). Any interconnection costs in
excess of those which the utility otherwise would have incurred are to be
reixbursed by the QF. See 16292.101(b), 292.306. [See, however, American
Electric Power Service Corp. v. FERC, infra, n. 91, vacating FERC's blanket
interconnection rule as of January 22, 1982.]
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"incremental cost to the electric utility of alternative electric
energy." 86 The quoted language in turn is defined to mean
the cost to the electric utility of the electric
energy which, but for the purchase from such
cogenerator or small power producer, such utility
would et,.r := . or purchase from another source. 87
This basic pricing standard is designed to allow QFs to benefit
from the fact that a utility ' s incremental or marginal costs — and hence
the prices payable to QF owner /operators — generally will represent its
highest unit costs at a given point in time. Most electric utilities
operate on the principle of "economic dispatch," which dictates that
among various types of units comprising their generating mix, those with
the highest operating costs (e.g., gas turbines for peaking) are brought
into service last and taken out of service first as load shifts occur.
This means that, at any given moment, a purchase from a QF can substitute
for costs associated with the highest-cost units the utility would other-
wise be operating. Similarly, in the long run, most electric utilities
expect t: meet projected demand growth by adding generating capacity or
purchasing power at costs likely to be far higher than those associated
with comparable capacity or purchase contracts already in place. To the
extent that assured purchases of reliable power from QFs would defer or
displace such capacity additions or purchases, they likewise would
result in the avoidance of marginal costs and in payments to QFs sub-
stantially higher than the utility's average embedded system costs
86PURPA 4210(h); ems-'-, , added.
87
PURPA 1210(d): emphasis added.
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which, without PURPA, would place a ceiling on prices paid for indepen-
dently produced power.
The following discussion examines the implementation of this
basic pricing principle by FERC and the state utility commissions, and
suggests some of its implications for fuel cell commercialization. It
is important to note at the outset that the rate provisions discussed
here govern QF/utility transactions only where the QF so chooses: nothing
in the Act or FERC regulations precludes negotiated agreements between
the parties whose terms depart from what the regulations might otherwise
require. 88 The intent is to allow QFs to retain flexibility in dealing
with electric utilities, while greatly strengthening their bargaining
position by providing clear legal rights and protections as a basis for
negotiations.
ii. FERC Implementation of "Avoided Cost" Pricing
FERC regulations substitute the shorthand term "avoided
i
costs" for PURPA's unwieldy "incremental cost" definition quoted above. 89
Thus, avoided costs are the costs which the purchasing utility would
otherwise incur to generate equivalent power itself or to purchase it
from some other generating source.
The legislation provides only that FERC shall not establish rates
for purchases from QFs which exceed the purchasing utility's incremental
88§292.301(b).
89§292.101(b)(5).
81
or avoided costs, suggesting that rates lower than avoided costs are
permissible. 90 FERC regulations implementing this legislative directive
do permit rates lower than avoided costs — but only for QFs whose con-
struction commenced before PURPA's passage in November 1978. For all other
QFs — including prospective fuel cell facilities — FERC rules require that
rates be equal to the utility's avoided costs. 91 However, these rules do
not entirely displace state law and, as FERC itself has explained, could
effectively render avoided costs the minimum standard for rates for
purchases from fuel cell and other qualifying facilities:
This Commission has set the rate for purchases
at a level which it believes appropriate to encour-
age cogeneration and small power production, as required
by section 210 of PURPA. While the rules prescribed
under section 210 of PURPA are subject to the statutory
parameters, the States are free, under their own author-
ity, to enact laws or regulations providing for rates
which would result in even greater encouragement of these
technologies. However, State laws or regulations which
would provide rates lower than the federal standards
would fail to provide the requisite encouragement of
these technologies, and must yield to federal law. 92
90 PURPA210(b).
91 292.304(b). NOTE: On January 22, 1982, as final revisions of this
report were completed for publication by NASA/LeRC, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia vacated FERC's "full avoided cost" rule and its
blanket rule requiring interconnection, and ordered FERC to reconsider these
issues. See American Electric Power Service Corp., et al. vs. FERC, U.S.Ct.
App. (D.C.Cir.), No. 80-1789.
92 45 Fed. Reg. 12221 (February 25, 1980; emphasis added). Among some
25 states whose recent implementation efforts we have reviewed, only New Hamp-
shire so far appears to have clearly provided for rates exceeding avoided costs,
and then only with respect to purchases under the state's own Limited Electrical
Energy Producers Act. This rate can be applied only to facilities of 5 MW or
less (New Hampshire PUC, DE 79-208, Fifth Supplemental Order No. 14,280, June 18,
1980).
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An important feature of FERC's rules is that a new QF is
entitled to be paid avoided cost rates for its entire output even
where the utility is simultaneously selling electricity to the QF for
use in its own operations. 93	This is true notwithstanding that the
rules generally limit utility charges for electricity sales to QFs
to the rates which would apply to comparable utility customers without
their own generating capacity — i.e., rates based on conventional
average costing principles. 94	 As the Idaho Public Utility Commission
commented in relation to this "simultaneous purchase and sale" feature
of PURPA,
Cslimply put. it means that a utilitv must purchase
the entire output of a cogenerator or small power
producer at the utility's own avoided costs and, at
the same time, must supply the cogenerator or small
power producer its entire electric requirement under
non-discriminatory rate schedules. In short, the
utility must buy at the margin and sell at retail 95
Stated from the opposite perspective, the QF may purchase all
of its electric requirements at average-cost retail rates and sell
all of its electric output at marginally-priced avoided cost rates. If
a QF can receive higher prices for the electricity it sells than it must
pay for the electricity it buys, it may be better off to buy all of its
931292.304(b)(4).
44 See 1292.305.
95 Idaho Public F .city Commission Case No. P-300-12, Order
No. 15746, p. 6 (June 13, 1980).
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electric requirements from the utility and sell all of its electric output
to the utility than to use any of that output for its own needs. This
t
prospect could have important implications for cogeneration installations
1
in general and for fuel cell systems in particular.
In general, 'At should provide greater flexibility for configuring
cogeneration systems, since it means that the optimum system need not
be solely a function of the relation of electric and thermal needs of the
facility itself. Where the cogenerator's production cost for electricity
is less than the purchasing utility's avoided cost, the cogenerator has
an incentive to configure its system to maximize electric output for
sales to the utility. So long as the thermal energy made available for
industrial or commercial processes or used in heating or cooling is at
least 5% of the facility's total energy output during any calendar year,
and so long as it meets FERC's minimum efficiency standards, the facility
can qualify as a CGF under PURPA however great its electrical output. 96
The fuel cell's special characteristics may offer competitive
advantages over other cogeneration technologies in this context. For
most technologies, the option to "scale up" to increase electric output
for sales to the utility is likely to be independently limited by
factors such as manufacturing constraints, noise levels, air quality
concerns and siting considerations. By contrast, the fue cell's
96 See15292.205(a) and 292.202(h). As noted previously, the cri-
teria for a "cogeneration facility" exemption from PIFUA's fuel use
restrictions for new MFBIs are different from and more stringent than
these requirements, and would limit the freedom of multi-megawatt fuel
cell cogenerators using natural gas or petroleum fuels to maximize elec-
tric output for utility sales. (See supra, pp. 22 et sett.)
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modularity, silent operation, negligible emissions and siting advantages
offer great flexibility in scaling the size of a facility to achieve
optimum returns under PURPA, and could make fuel cells quite attractive
in comparison with other technologies for PURPA-inspired applications.
I
s
s
Opportunities to profit from FERC's simultaneous purchase and sale
rule may be enhanced in areas where QFs are among the customer classes
	 s
which an electric utility serves under time-of-day (TOD) rates. Unlike
rates historically charged by utilities in this country, TOD rates vary
according to the time that electricity is provided to the customer. This
variation may occur either in demand charges (the amount charged for the
maximum power in kilowatts consumed at any point in a given period), or
in energy charges (the amount charged for the total energy in kilowatt-
hours consumed during a given billing cycle), or in both.
TOD rate schedules typically contain two (peak and off-peak) or
a
three (peak, shoulder and off-peak) periods. The length and timing of
these periods and the ratio of peak to off-peak prices vary widely among
different utilities. To illustrate, Figure IV-1 shows the timing and
length of TOD rate periods used by California's largest utility, Pacific
Gas and Ele.tric Company, and Table IV-1 shows this information for
other utilities as well as the relation among peak, shoulder and off-peak
energy charges.
Because TOD rate schedules usually omit or drastically reduce the
demand charge for off-peak and/or shoulder-peak periods, the effect of
TOD service on QFs is to create a period during which electricity purchases
the QF from the utility can be made at very low rates. Except for
QFs served by utilities with minimum demand charges, TOD rates permit
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FIGURE IV-1
PGtaoE WEEKLY TIME OF USE
ENERGY GUIDELINES
PERIOD "A"	 OF POGTR 	 ^TMAY 1 THRU SEPT. 30
(SUMMER)
PERIOD "B"
OCT. t THRU APRIL 30
(WINTER)
_ ON PEAK - MAXIMUM CONSERVATION EFFORT
Limit power use to essential needs.
SOURCE: Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Time of Use Rates for Very
86	 Large Customers, Third Ann.al Report (March 31, 1980).
W
PARTIAL PEAK - MAXIMIZE CONSERVATION EFFORT
by restricting power use whenever possible.
OFF PEAK - NO RESTRICTION ON POWER USE
Conserve whenever possible
Do not waste energy
TOD RAT! DIFFUSION AND ENERGY CHARGE RATIOS IN 1978
A. Mandatory Rates
RATIO OF
DATE ENERGY CHARGESI
UTILITY EFFECTIVE PEAK PERIOD (On-Peak:Off-Pak)
Pacific Gas b 7/19/77 May-September May-Sept.
Electric (CA) 12:30p- 6:30p 1.98:1.32:1
Weekdays
October-April Oct.-April
4:30p- 8:30p 1.98:1.32:1
-	 -	 -	 -	 - - - - -	 -	 Weekdays	 -	 - -	 -	 -	 -	 -
San Diego Gas May-September 3.92:1.99:1
b Electric (CA) 4/12/78 10:00&- 5:00P
Weekdays
October-April
5:00p- 9:00P
-	 -	 -	 -	 -
- -
	 -
Weekdays
-	
-	 -	
-	 -	 -	
- -	 -	 -	 -	
-
Southern California 10/14/77 Nov. - April 1.27:1.14:1
Edison 5:00p- 10:00p
Weekdays
May- October
12:00n-6:00p
Weekdays
Cosmonwealth 11/23/77 9:00a - 10:00p See note 2.
Edison (IL) Weekdays
Public Service 6/01/78 $:OO& - 10:00p 1.33:1.24:1
Electric b Gas Weekdays
(NJ)
Long Island 8/01/77 June-Septmber 1.85:1.53:1
Lighting I0:00& - 10:00p
"cept Sundays
Consumers 8/08/78 October-February 1.15:1
Power (MI) 5:00p- 9:00p
March-September
10:00&- 5:00P 
Madison Gas b 4/12/77 10:008- 9:00p June-Sept.
Electric	 (WI) Weekdays 2.53:1
Oct.-May
-	 -	 -	 -	 - -	 -	 - -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
2:1
-	 -	 -	 -	 -
Wisconsin Elec- 1/16/78 8:000- 8v00p 2:1
tric Power
-	 -	 -	 -	 - -	 -	 -
Weekdays
-	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 - -	 -	 -	 -	 -
Wisconsin Power 10/10/77 8:00&- 10:00p 2:1
b Light Monday-Saturday
* SOURCE:	 ICF Corporation. 1979, Technical, Institutional and Economic Analysis
of Alternative Electric Rate Designs and Related Regulatory Issues in
Support of DOE utility Conservation Programs and Policy; Vol. I:
Domestic Rate Survey. HCP/88681-01/1, U.S. 	 DOE, Washington, D.C.
P
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i. Voluntary Raas
RATIO OF
DATE ENERGY CHARGESI
UTILITY EFFECTIVE PEAK PERIOD (On-Peak:Off-Peak)
Connecticut Light 11/28/77 91006- 8100p 1.6511
6 Power and EST
Hartford Electric
Light
-	 -
Delmarva Power 3/01/78 10:00a -10-OOP 1.27:1
6 Light Weekdays
Florida Power 9/18/75
Tampa Electric 10/05/77
-
-Iowa Southern 6/78 8:00a - 8:00p 1.21:1
Utilities
-	 -	 -	
-	 - -	 -	
-	 - -	 -	 -	 -	 - -	
-	 -	 -	 -	 -
Northern States 1/24/78 9:00a - 9:00p 1	 ':1
Power (MN) Weekdays
Northern States 6/07/76 9:00a - 9:0Op 1.45:1
Power (ND) Weekdays
Northern States 7/01/76 9:00a - 9:00p 1.45•.1
Power (SD) Weekdays
Central Vermont 6/20/77 3 hours between January-April
Public Service 7:00a b 12:00n 3,83:1
plus
4 hours between May-December
4:00p b 10:00p 1:1
-	 -	 -	 -	 - -	
-	 -	 -
daily
-	 -	 -	 -	 -
-	 -	
-	 -	 -	 -
Green Mountain 7/01/77 8 hours per day 2.42:1
Power (VT)
-	 -	 -	 -	
- -	 -	
-	 - -	 -	 -	 -	 -
-	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
Massachusetts 3/29/79 8:00a - 9:00p Nov.-June
Electric Weekdays 14.38:1
July-Oc!oter
16.54•i
8:00a - 9:OOp Nov.-.,,.:..
Weekdays 6.02:1
July-October
-	 -	 -	 -	 - -	 -	
-	 - -	 -	 -	 -	 -
6.92:1
-	 -	 -	 -	
-	 -
Western Massa- 9/01/78 8:00a - B:OOp 2.73:1
chusetts Electric Weekdays
NOTES
1 Three entries indicate on-peak: shoulder peak: off-peak. Ratios do not
include fuel adjustment charges. In many cases, such charges a.e applied
equally to all KWH and thus may reduce the ratio of on-peak to off-peak
charges.
i Under this tariff, a "Basic Energy Charge" is calculated from a declining
block schedule. The total energy charge is then determined by adding
.394 cents/on-peak KWH to the basic energy charge and by subtracting
.40 cents/off-peak KWH from the basic charge. To determine the ratio of
on-peak to off-peak charges, one must know the monthly level of usage.
3 Connecticut Power b Light and Hartford Electric Light are both part of
Northeast Utilities. The ratio of energy charges shown is based on CL6P's
tariffs. HE'.'s rates are similar.
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a QF to avoid what is ordinarily a major component of electricity costs
by using self-generated electricity during peak periods. By tailoring
on-site electricity demand to occur during off-peak periods or by storing
excess electricity for sale to utilities during peak periods, these QFs
can take advantage of both the lower cost of utility-provided off-peak
electricity and the highe- avoided cost price paid for QF-provided
on-peak electricity.
TOD rates are not available everywhere. They were first imple-
mented in this country in 1977 for large commercial and industrial
customers served by utilities in Wisconsin and California. Utilities in
other states have been slow to adopt them. To accelerate their diffusion,
PURPA Title I included TOD rates among ratemaking standards which state
regulatory authorities and nonregulated utilities are required to consider.
As a result, increasing numbers of states are either adopting TOD rates
or studying their effectiveness more closely, and some utilities which
have implemented them have extended them to commercial and industrial
customers with lower monthly demands than the large customers served under
earlier programs. Table IV-2 indicates the types and approximate numbers
of customers currently served under TOD rates nationwide.
Although the future of Title I is somewhat clouded at this point,
even prior to its passage utility commissions in several states had decided
to adopt TOD rates as part of an effort to promote more efficient energy
use. Thus, while Title I's repeal would remove the federal legal require-
ment for commissions to evaluate TOD rates, the institutional desire for
methods to achieve greater energy efficiency and conserve premium fuels
is likely to remain.
P9
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TABLE IV-2
CATEGORY NUMBER GWAI
Utilities covered by PURPA 326 2,571.000	 3
Utilities offering TOD rates 56 1,121,000
Commercial/Industrial Customers served 6,973.000 1.640.000
by utilities covered by PURPA
Commercial/Industrial Customers served 2.700.000 (app.) 713,000
by utilities offering TOD rates
Commercial/ Industrial Customers served
by utilities offering TOD -:A 577.000 N/A
eligible to be served under them
Commercial/Industrial as above, 11,800 101,900
served under TOD rates
C/I served voluntarily 6.600 31,400
C/I served mandatorily 5,200 70,500
Residential customers served 70.775.000 779,300
Residential customers served by utilities 33.220,000 N/A
with TOD rates of any kind
Residential customers served under 99,600 946
TOD rates
1 GWHR consumed or generated as appropriate.
NOTE: A'.% figures are approximate. Utilities operating in more than
on* state are treated as *operate utilities for each state. so
the number of utilities is overstated.
N/A - Not Available
SOURCE: John Hoffman, U.S. Department of Energy (personal communica-
tion).
In any case, the existence of TOD rates introduces another variable
into the decision calculus of prospective nonelectric utility fuel cell
users. Instead of facing a single cost for purchased electricity, such
users are faced with a number of costs which must be balanced against
avoided cost receipts which may also be time-differentiated. Ultimately,
TOD rates may improve the profitability of fuel cells, and may lead to
changes in optimal fuel cell configurations so as to increase the availa-
bility of peak electricity.
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Determining Rates for Purchase
In order to decide whether particular prospective fuel cell
facilities or other cogeneration or small power production systems present
attractive business opportunities under PURPA, potential investors need
l
to be able to determine or at least to estimate rates for purchases based
on the costs which the participating electric utility will avoid by reason
of such purchases from the proposed facility. PURPA and FERC regulations	 s
recognize this need and provide for it in several ways.
To begin with, FERC has made clear that a purchasing utility's
avoided costs may include the costs of "electric energy or capacity or
both."97
Energy cos*.s are the variable costs associated with the
production of electric energy (kilowatt-hours). They
represent the cost of fuel, and some operating and
maintenance expenses. Capacity costs are the costs
associated with providing the capability to deliver
energy; they consist primarily of the capital costs
of facilities.
If, by purchasing electric energy from a qualify-
ing facility, a utility can reduce its energy costs or
V
can avoid purchasing energy from another utility, the
f	 rate for a purchase from a qualifying facility is to
be based on those energy costs which the utility can
thereby avoid. If a qualifying facility offers energy
of sufficient reliability and with sufficient legally
enforceable guarantees of deliverability to permit the
purchasing electric utility to avoid the need to
97 1292.101(b)(6); emphasis added.
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construct a generating unit, to build a smaller, less
expensive plant, or to reduce firm power purchases from
another utility, then the rates for such a purchase will
be based on the avoided capacity and energy costs.
t
The regulations provide that each QF shall have the option to 	 k
provide energy "as available" (i.e., nonfirm energy provided when the
QF chooses) or "pursuant to a legally enforceable obligation" (i.e.,
firm energy or capacity provided when the purchasing utility requires
it). For nonfirm energy, the rates for purchases are to be based on
the utility's avoided costs calculated at the time of delivery. For
firm energy or capacity, rates are to be based, at the QF's option,
either on avoided costs calculated at the time of delivery or on
avoided costs calculated at the time the obligation is incurred. 99
Although this option (where available) necessarily will be based on
estimates and forecasts, it will result in a contract price fixed at
the outset and therefore useful in providing the rate-of-return
certainty needed by many potential investors. As one state utility
commission wrote in a related context:
The qualifying facility may provide power either
under a cost-estimate option (with predetermined
numbers that vary only periodically to reflect long-
term escalations in 0 6 M expenses) or under a
valuation-at-time-of-delivery option (with prices
tracking fluctuations in energy costs and varying
9845 Fed. Reg. 12216 (February 25, 1980; emphasis added).
991292.304(d); see also 1292.304(b)(5).
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upon [short] notice to the qualifying facility).
Cautious investors may prefer the former option.
High rollers will choose the latter. .. . 100
Whether rates are to be based on avoided costs estimated in advance
or calculated at the time of delivery, there must be some mechanism for
identifying these costs. The electric utilities themselves should be best
situated to determine their own actual and projected costs. Accordingly,
FERC regulations require them to make available to state regulatory
commissions and to the public detailed data from which their avoided
energy and capacity costs can be derived. Such data, which is subject
to utility commission review, must include among other things the
utility's own estimates of avoided energy costs during peak and off-peak
periods, its plans for capacity additions, and their estimated costs. 101
This data in itself does not represent the utility's rate for purchases
from QFs, but is intended to provide a starting point for arriving at
such a rate.
100 IdahoPublic Utility Commission Case No. P-200-12, Proposed
Order, p. 16 (July 1980). For anyone contemplating capital-intensive
fuel cell facilities, it is worth noting that FERC has expressly sanc-
tioned certain contractual arrangements which might assist QF financing:
A facility which enters into a long term contract to
provide energy or capacity to a utility may wish to
receive a greater percentage of the total purchase price
during the beginning of the obligation. For example,
a level payment schedule from the utility to the quali-
fying facility may be used to match more closely the
schedule of debt service of the facility. So long as
the total payment over the duration of the contract
term does not exceed the estimated avoided costs,
nothing in these rules would prohibit a State regulatory
authority or non-regulated electric utility from approv-
ing such an arrangement. (45 Fed. Reg. 12224; February 25,
1980)
101§292.302.
93
For QFs with a design capacity of 100 KW or less —which could
include many potential commercial and residential fuel cell systems —
state regulatory authorities and nonregulated utilities must put into
effect standard rates for purchases; for QFs with a capacity over
100 KW they may, but need not, do so. 102 These standard rates will
not necessarily reflect the supply characteristics of a particular QF,
but are intended to minimize the transaction costs of negotiating individ-
ualized rates for small facilities (and in some states, for larger
facilities as well 103). In any case they must reflect the purchasing
utility's avoided costs, including, where practicable, the individual
and aggregate value of energy and capacity provided to the utility by
dispersed small systems. 104 In other words, even where any single QF's
contribution by itself would not permit the utility to defer or avoid
capacity additions, if the aggregate contribution of QFs on the system
would, then the standard purchase rates should include pro-rata shares
of the utility's avoided capacity costs. 105 Technologies such as fuel
102 §292.304(c)(1) and (2).
103 Forexample, among some 25 states whose implementation efforts
were i viewed, Connecticut, Idaho, New Hampshire, North Carolina, South
Caroli a and Vermont have ordered their utilities to make standard rates
avails le to qualifying facilities larger than 100 KW. Although the
California PUC has not yet adopted final rules under PURPA, qualifying
facilities of any size are eligible for standard rates published pursuant
to an earlier CPUC decision. The same would be true under rules proposed
by the New York PUC staff, but not yet adopted by that Commission.
104 1292.304(c)(3)(i) and (e)(vi).
105 Absentempirical performance data, few state commissions have
been able to come to grips with this regulatory directive. Among the
few that have tried, Texas has directed its utilities to "evaluate" and
report every two years on the usefulness of energy and capacity, including
aggregate capacity, from interconnected intermittent facilities. (Texas
PUC, Substantive Rule 052.02.05.058, August 20, 1981) Idaho requires its
utilities to include a minimum "capacity deferral" value of 2 to 3 mills
in their rates for non-firm energy. (Idaho PUC, Case No. P-200-12, Order
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ecells which are expected to offer reliable, predictable energy supplies
i
or meet specified criteria (noted below) for energy availability may be
able to derive additional benefit from a provision of the rules permitting
standard purchase rates to differ based on the supply characteristics
of different technologies. 106
Additional Rate Factors and Leveraging Opportunities
For QFs for which standard purchase rates are unavailable
(or appear unattractive), rates for purchases will be determined in
negotiations with the purchasing utility, buttressed on the QF's side
by PURPA's basic requirements and FERC's regulations interpreting them.
In this connection, the regulations specify a variety of factors in
addition to the electric utility's data to be considered in determining
avoided costs in individual cases.
Some of these factors are related to technical characteristics
of the particular QF, and could have implications for fuel cell design
decisions. For example, the regulations attach value to the availability
of energy or capacity from QFs during peak periods and system emergencies,
measured by such factors as the QF's dispatchability, reliability and
ability to separate its load from its generation. 107 How much "added
value" might result from these characteristics can be expected to vary
No. 15746, August 8, 1980) California's Commission staff has recommended
interim capacity oevments to OFs orovidine nonfi.rm enprev, computed at
50% of the avoided capacity cost which would be available to such a
facility under a long-term contract. (California PUC, Order Instituting
Rulemaking No. 2, January 20, 1981) And Colorado's Commission staff has
proposed a "reliability adjustment" based upon the characteristics
of particular classes of QF in the aggregate. (Colorado PUC Decision
No. R81-801, Case No. 5970, May 6, 1981).
1066292.304(c)(3)(ii).
107 See$292.304(e)(2).
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history to predict how these values might work out in practice, but if
they turn out to be significant as experience under the Act accumulates,
then they may warrant recognition and attention in future fuel cell
design specifications.
Other factors to be considered in arriving at avoided costs are
related more directly to the pur i^.a;ing utility's situation, and could have
important bearing on fuel cell marketing decisions. For example, the regu-
lations specify that the relationship between available QF energy and
capacity, on the one hand, and the utility's ability to avoid costs, on
the other, should be taken into account. 108 Among other things, this can
mean that where a purchasing utility has excess capacity and/or has no
plans to add capacity, the availability of QF capacity will not enable
it to avoid capacity costs, and will not result in capacity -related
payments to the QF. 109 Although payments representing avoided energy
108 See 6292.304(e)(3).
109Utility commissions in Vermont, New Hampshire and Connecticut
have accepted the arguments of some or all of their utilities that exist-
ing excess capacity renders it unnecessary for these utilities to
include any capacity payments in their current price offerings to QFs.
(See Vermont PSB General Order No. 65, June 18, 1981, and Recommendations
and Comments of the Department of Public Service on Proposed General
Order No. 65, April 4, 1981; New Hampshire PUC, DE 79-208, Fifth Supple-
mental Order 14,280, June 18, 1980; Connecticut PUC Docket No. 800601,
"Application of the United Illuminating Company to Increase Its Rates,"
Supplemental Decision II, August 20, 1981) Other Commissions or their
staffs, including, for example, those of California and South Carolina,
have rejected such arguments in favor of the view that a QF's present
contribution to a utility's ability to avoid capacity costs in later
years should be reflected in capacity payments along the way, or that
certain capacity costs are actually avoided even while excess capacity
situations prevail, and than some capacity value accordingly must be
part of the utilities' current price offers. (See South Carolina PSC,
Docket No. 80-125-E-Order No. 81-214, March 20, 1981, and California
PUC, Order Instituting Rulemaking No. 2, January 20, 1981)
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costs will still be appropriate, a QF capable of offering firm, reliable
power will forego the "added value" for capacity which would be availa-
ble if it were dealing with a differently situated purchasing utility.
Again, this value will vary according to the situation, and its
significance will become clearer as PURPA unfolds in practice. For
now, the point to emerge from these provisions is that the purchasing
utility's demand situation and planning .framework can affect the capacity
value available to qualifying fuel cell facilities. Thus, the same
facility may be able to command more attractive returns from utilities
with high projected capacity growth than from those with excess capacity
or stagnant demand: this prospect can and should be factored into
fuel cell marketing strategies.
This point, illustrated here in relation to capacity value, can
be expanded to PURPA's power purchase scheme in general, and probably
offers the most useful way of thinking about PURPA's relevance to fuel
cell commercialization. Because of their potential flexibility in
terms of fuel use, size and energy output, and because of special charac-
teristics such as silent unattended operation and low pollutant emissions,
fuel cells can be suitable for an unusually wide variety of applications.
More than for less versatile technologies, their economic value to
prospective owners, operators and other beneficiaries will depend on
the particular circumstances in which they are used. The circumstances
determining this "value-in-use" include not only internal technical
and engineering considerations related to the users' process needs,
load factors and the like, but also possible "external" values created
by PURPA. PURPA thus affords the opportunity to leverage the value
97
of fuel cells-- perhaps by incorporating design features which capitalise
on PURPA's structure; perhaps by placing fuel calls in the service
areas of electric utilities with especially high avoided costs in
relation to fuel cell production coats; perhaps by targeting new markets
for which PURPA makes cogeneration an option; most likely by some
combination of these.
Simply to illustrate the magnitude and range of values which
Could be involved for fuel cell owners in a positio.i to take advantage
of PURPA, the following section utilizes actual recent avoided cost
data to calculate sample values for sales to a local utility of fuel
cell or other cogenerated energy and capacity. It also offers a simpli-
fied look at the sensitivity of a fuel cell owner's potential payoff
to the size of the transaction and to the utility's avoided energy and
capacity costs.
f
iii. Illustrative Payoffs for Fuel Cell Avoided Cost Sales
Cozenerator Sales to Utilities with High Avoided Costs
Most state public utility commissions throughout the country
remain in relatively early stages of their efforts to implement federal
PURPA requirements, and most commissions and their utilities have so
far deve.'.3ped avoided cost data only for the current year or two.
However, the California Public Utilities Commission and its regulated
investor-owned electric utilities (Pacific Gas and Electric Company
(PG&E), Southern California Edison Company (SCE), and San Diego Gas and
Electric Company (SDG&E)) have developed projections of each utility's
avoided energy and capacity costs through the mid-1980s, which will be
somewhat more useful for illustrative purposes.
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The California utility energy and capacity cost data for the
years 1981 and 1984, presented in Tables IV-3 and IV-4 below, are instruc-
tive for two reasons. First, the data demonstrate the current magnitude
of avoided costs for utilities such as PG&E, SCE and SDG&E, whose
generating resources depend heavily on facilities requiring costly petro-
leum fuel.	 Second, the data illustrate the potential spiraling (in
nominal terms) of these avoided costs over time. Unless they can
substantially reduce their reliance upon oil-fired facilities, these
and similarly situated utilities will almost certainly continue to
experience increasing avoided costs throughout the coming decade. As
they do, cogenerators located in their service areas nationwide should
encounter greater economic incentives to sell electrical energy and
capacity to their local electric utilities in the late 1980s and early
1990s, a time frame which comports with the commercialization schedule
for fuel cells.
In order to underscore several trends, Table IV-3 presents
several variants for the California utilities' 1981 and 1984 energy
price offers, stated in cents-per-kilowatt-hour (C/KWH). The price
data for utility energy purchases during April 1981 includes both a flat
rate (non-time-of-day or "non-TOD") and a range of time-of-day ("TOD")
rates for off-peak and on-peak energy purchases. Not surprisingly,
on-peak sales by cogenerators command the highest prices. The projected
1984 annual average non-TOD energy price data illustrate the potential
escalation in avoided energy costs for the three utilities during 1981-
1984. The projected 1984 summer on-peak price data demonstrate the
seasonal variability in future Avoided energy costs for a summer-peaking
electric utility heavily dependent upon oil-fired facilities.
A
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TABLE IV-3
CALIFI)MIA If: Er".'OR-OWNED UTILITY _1 7AXENT AND PROJECTED
At ' ):MA ENERGY COST SCHEDULES
UTILITY OIRCY PRICE OFFERS (clKWH)
L„ril 1481	 1984*
Non-TOD	 TOD	 Ion-TOD Sumer
toff- on- ask	 (annual average) On-Peak	 y
Pair 6.0	 5.6	 6.6	 7.4 8.0 t
SCS 6.0	 5.8	 6.6	 9.2 10.6
6. ,	 6.2	 8.3	 11 .2 15.1
-pawed	 i,-an California utility projections.
Calif:#rris PUC, Susomry of Utility Rates for Purchases	 r
--m <:o"nerators and Smll Power Producers, March 1,
.^G1.
In order to rec.i-e a capacity premium in addition to an energy
payme::: for sales to a local utility, a cogenerator must provide a
specified amount of capacity on a firm basis; its value will increase
as the length of the supply contract increases. The current 1981 and
projected 1984 capacity price offers in Table IV-4, stated in dollars-
per-kilowatt -year ($/KW-yr), are listed for contract periods of five,
ten and twenty years.
TABLE IV-4
CALIFORNIA INVESTOR-OWNED UTILITY CURRENT AND PROJECTED
AVOIDED CAPACITY COST SCHEDULES
UTILITY	 CAPACITY PRICE OFFERS ($/W-YR)
Utility/Cogenerator Contract Duration
5	 yr.	 10 yr.	 20 yr.
	
1981	 1980	 1981	 1980	 1981	 1980
PG&E	 60	 69	 66	 76	 77	 89
scs	 39	 82	 64	 102	 93	 133
SX&H	 --	 30	 22	 53	 43	 78
•based upon California utility projections.
Source: California PUC, Suasary of Utility Ratan for Purchases
from Copenerators and Small Power Producers, March 1,
1981.
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In order to illustrate the potential payoff to cogenerators of
selling to utilities with currently high avoided costs, the data in
these tables have been used to compute representative examples of the
annual income which individual cogenerators could expect from sales of
firm capacity and associated energy to the three California utilities
in 1981 and 1984. The computations are based upon the alternative
assumptions that the utility purchases firm capacity in the amounts of
10 KW, 100 KW and 1 MW --figures which might be thought of as represent-
ing one-fourth of the total output of fuel cell cogenerations systems
with nameplate capacities of 40 KW, 400 KW and 4 MW, respectively.
The results of these calculations are set forth in Table IV-5.
A
TABLE IV-5
SRA)RLRS OF COOENCRATORIUTILITY TRANSACTIONS
MR UTILITISS WITH CURRENT AND ►ROUCTRD MOM AVOIND COSTS
Coaenerator's Annual Income (t1,0003)-
Utility: Site of Firm a. b. C.
Capacity (and Associated Energy* Capacity** Total (a. ♦ b.)
Eneray) purchase 1951 1964 1951 1914 1941
Mat	 10 KW S 7 <1 <1 6 7
100 KW 53 65 7 6 60 73
1 MW 526 648 66 76 592 724
SCE:	 10 KW 5 6 < 1 1 6 9
100 KW 53 81 6 10 59 91
1 MW 526 806 64 102 590 906
5DO6E:	 10 KW 6 10 < 1 < 1 6 10
100 KW 59 96 2 5 61 103
1 MW 587 "1 22 53 609 1,034
Assumptions: *Utility's Horsy acquisition costs are computed fro g its April 1961 am-TOO rata
and from its 1964 (manual average) son-TOD rate.
**Utility purchases fire capacity and associated energy for 10-year contractual term.
Source: Tables IV-3 and IV-4.
For example+ a cogenerator who contracts to sell 10 KW of firm capacity and
associatel energy for a 10-year period commencing in 1984 to one of the three
California utilities can expect to receive annually $7,000 to $10,000. Cor-
responding values for sales of 100 KW and 1 MW are $73,000 to $103,000 per
,
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Ayear, respectively. 114 If avoided cost trends currently projected by the
California utilities continue beyond 1984, comparable figures could be
significantly higher in subsequent years when fuel cells are expected to
be commercially available.
Cogenerator Sensitivity to Avoided Cost Rates
The avoided cost calculations above demonstrate the "high side
of potential profitability for fuel cell power sales to local utilities
in certain parts of the country, based upon currently available utility
data. However, utilities in other parts of the country less reliant on
petroleum fuels or facing slower demand growth curr•_-tly have significant-
ly lower avoided energy and/or capacity costs. Moreover, each utility's
avoided costs will be continually in flux through the 1990s, based on
changes in the utility's resource plans and operations driven by changing
costs of labor, materials, fuels, capital and other external and internal
economic and financial considerations. Thus it seems useful to consider
a more generalized approach to computing potential payoffs from cogenerator/
utility transactions which can at least suggest the effects on cogenerators
of variations in avoided costs.
For illustrative purposes, we analyzed a cogenerator's annual income
from utility purchases of firm capacity and associated energy in the
amounts of 10 KW, 100 KW and 1 MW, utilizing a range of combined energy/
capacity avoided coat rates (stated in c/KWH). We chose 1c/KWH as the low
end of the range to reflect the possibility (probably unrealistic in view
of secular inflationary trends in the nation's economy) that some utilities
UO
Columns a. and b. of Table IV-5 reveal that the sale by a cogener-
ator of firm capacity (in addition to energy) to an electric utility may add
52-15% to the cogenerator's annual gross income from PURPA sales.
102
MM MWERIMM MOP
t
may succeed in achieving only nominal energy and capacity avoided costs
by the late 1980s. We selected 150/KWH as the high and of the cost range,
to cover the contingency that at least some utilities (for example, SDG&E,
A
which is currently projecting this value as its avoided energy cost for
on-peak electrical energy in the summer of 1984 (see Table IV-3)) may be
unsuccessful in their attempts to turn around anticipated avoided cost
increases by the conclusion of this decade. The results of this analysis
are shown in Table IV-6.
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C0 _MAT06't ANNUAL 11=2 ($1000s) r60M UTILITY rill WACITY
(AND ASSMIATO DMICY) PUR M	 IS
AT 01►►iNM AVOI69D COST PAM
S/a• •I
Utillly
ruTChsSSS ! XM	 UAW	 kAw	 t i WN	 IOC/NMM	 1 ftm
10 KM 0.9	 2.6	 4.4	 6.1	 6.6	 13.1
100 KM 6.6	 26.7	 43.6	 61.1	 67.6	 111.4
i MM 67.6	 262.1	 436.0	 613.2	 676.0	 1214.0
Using the figures from Table IV-6, Figure IV-2 generalizes the rele-
tionship of a cogenerator's annual income from sales to the utility of firm
capacity and associated energy, on the one hand, and the utility's combined
avoided energy/capacity rate, on the other. Thus, for example, a cogener-
ator's annual income from the sale of 500 KW of firm capacity and associated
energy at utility avoided cost rates of lC/KWH and 1SC/KWH would yield
roughly $50,000 and $650,000 of annual income, respectively. Although these
are gross figures presented in their simplest form, they do reveal substan-
tial differences in the income which a fuel cell or other cogeneration facil-
ity can expect depending upon the situation of the purchasing utility. Even
accounting for the probability that fuel tell power production costs may
vary with some of the same factors as the local utility's costs, these
figures confirm that careful analysis of utility markets may identify
leveraging opportunities which can make essentially the same manufactured
fuel cell far more valuable in some settings than in others.
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Although the range of avoided cost values used in these calculations
was chosen for illustrative purposes, it is not unrealistic in relation to
avoided cost figures appearing in actual utility price offers published to
date under PURPA. Tables IV-7 and IV-8 present published energy and capacity
prices recently offered by utilities to qualifying facilities in a number o
states representing various regions of the country. As noted earlier, at
this writing many states still have neither adopted final rules implementing
PURPA 210, nor required the publication of firm avoided cost offers, and
many utilities accordingly have not made comparable figures available. Tt.ase
tables nevertheless reprevent a fair sampling of actual prices available at
this writing to small power producers and cogenerators under PURPA.
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TABLE IY-7
SWWRY OF ENERGY PRICE OFFERS WKWH)
(Hourly and aeaaooal seek and off-peak tim
periods vary by utility within each state.)
STATE	 PEAK	 OFF-PEAK	 NON-Tm
ALA&W (rate update not specified)
ALARAHA POWER COMPANY
- 
June 
through October	 2.61	 1.88	 1.88
- November through May	 2.20	 1.77	 1.77
(Rates available to QFs 100 KW or less)
CALIFORNIA'	 (updated quarterly)
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON
- August through October 1981 rate 7.7 6.9
[Available from
PACIFIC CAS AND ELECTRIC SCE i FGiE)
- August 6 September 1"1 rate 8.07 6.69
- October 1961 rate 7.75 6.54
SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC
- August 6 September 1981 rate 10.16 7.77 8.42
- October 1961 rate 10.55 7.88 8.42
(TOD rates available to all QFs;
non-TOD rates available to QFs 100 KW or less)
IDAHO 2
WASHINGTON WATER POWER
- Rates revised as appropriate - - 2.7
UTAH POWER AND LIGHT
- Rates revised as appropriate - - 2.4
IDAHO POWER COMPANY
- Rates updated annually - - 2.67
(Rates available to QFs 10,000 KW or less that provide energy on an
so-available basis.)
NEW HAMPSHIRE 3
Statewide rate - - 7.7
(Rate available to all QFs)
NEW MEXICO 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW MEXICO
- Primary Voltage Level
June through August 3.522 1.620 2.107
September through May 3.564 2.680 2.461
Secondary Voltage Level
June through August 3.868 1.860 2.299
September through May 3.872 2.961 2.646
[Rates available to QFs 100 KW or less]
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NEW YORK 4 (rseomeaded rate update not
specified)
CONSOLIDATED EDISON (proposed rate)
- Primary Voltage Level
Sumer 9.98 2.5	 -
Winter 4.1 2.2	 -
- 
Secondary Voltage Level
Sumer 11.15 2.6	 -
Winter 4.6 2.4	 -
(Rates available to all QFsj
NORTH CAROLINA
CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT
- Annul rate (updated every
2 years)	 2.80 2.07	 -
DUKE POWER COMPANY
- Annual rate (updated every
2 years	 2.12 1.60	 -
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
- Annual rate (updated annually) 	 5.203 3.132	 -
NANTAHALI POWER AN'	 IGNI
- Annual rate	 - -	 2.253
[ Rates available to all QFsj
VERMONT	 (rates in effect till June 1982)
Option 1 (statewide rate)	 - -	 7.8
Option 2 (statewide rate)	 9.0 6.6	 -
[Rates available to all QFsj
WISCONSIN (proposed rates)
WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION
(propose to revise each December)
- Nonfira Energy 1.85 1.32	 -
- Firm Energy 1.85 1.32	 -
WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY
(revision Gate not specified)
- Nonfirm Energy 2.90 1.45	 -
- Firm Energy
July through October 3.65 1.45	 -
Novenber through June 3.45 1.45	 -
[Rates available to all QFsj
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ENERGY PRICES
CQN E1^ CTICUT PEAK
(Utility-proposed rates expressed as % of
average fossil fuel cost per fossil fuel
KWN )
C0101ECTICUT LIGHT MD MAR 0"ANY (Proposed)
- Nonfirs rate, available to all QFa 1142
- Fire rate, available to QFs 100 KW or leas 1172
HARTFORD ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY (proposed)
- Nonfirs rate, available to all QFs 114%
- Fire rate, available to QFs 100 RY or leas 1172
UNITED ILLUMINATING COWANY
- Nonfirs rate, available to QFs 1000
or less 1092
- 'Firs rate, available to QFs 1,000 KY
or less 1171
OFF-PEAK
NOTES
1. The California Public Utilities Commission has not yet issued final rules
_	 implementing PURPA. These rates were published under Commission Decision
No. 91109 (December 19, 1979) and subsequent resolutions requiring regulated 	 t
utilities to publish price offers and contract tares equivalent to their
full avoided costs for purchases of electricity from qualifying cogener-
stors and small power producers.
2. Price offers listed are annual averages. These include a payment toward
capacity deferred by nonfirs energy 0 mills for Washington hater Power
and Idaho Power; 2 sills for Utah Power and Light). Refer to Table IV-6
for the energy component paid to firm suppliers.
3. Minimum rate for QFs activated between June 1960 and initial generation
of next scheduled baseload plant ( Seabrook I) around 1983.
4. Primary voltage represents high voitaRe side of transformer. Secondary
voltage represents low voltage or load -supplying side. Rates adjusted
by transformer and line loss factors (the lower the voltage, the greater
the energy losses).
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'KCALIFORNIA I
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC .75 .83 .82 .90 .88 .97
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON .73 .99 .90 1.18 1.06 1.35
SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC .25 .47 .39 .62 .49 .73
-	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
* IDAHO 2
-	 - -	 - -	
- -	 - -	 - -	 -
UTAH POWER AND LIGHT 1.28 1.52 1.52 1.84 1.77 2.15
IDAHO POWER COMPANY 1.63 1.97 1.91 2.31 2.19 2.65
WASHINGTON WATER POWER 1.39 1.68 1.64 1.99 1.91 2.31
a These rates have been changed from KW/yr figures to the C/KWH figures shown here.
NORTH CAROLINA	 FIXED LONG-TERN RATES
5 yr.	 10 yr.	 15 Yr.
(or longer)
CAROLINA POWER AND
	 LIGHT3
- Peak Sumer (July -October)
	 1.49	 1.49 2.39
- Peak Nonsummer (November- June)	 1.29
	 1.29 2.08
DUKE POWER COMPANY3
- Peak Months (July- October.
January -April)
	 1.11	 1.11 1.17
- Nonpeak Months (All other
months)	 0.66	 0.66 0.69
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
- Peak KWH:	 0.803 if contract is for 5 years
1.253 if contract is for more than 5 years
NAK AHALA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
- Specifies only an annual rate of 2.6900/peak KWH
CONNECTICUT
- No capacity payment offered because excess capacity present.
NEW HAMPSHIRE 
- Statewide rate:	 .5C/KWH (except where excess capacity present)
VERMONT
- No capacity payment offered because excess capacity present.
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MOTES
1. The California Public Utilities Commission has not yet fesuad final rules
ipleteating PURPA. These rates were published under Cemaissies Decision
No. 91109 (December 19, 1979) and subament resolutions requiring regulated
utilities to publish price offers and contract tarts equivalent to their
full avoided coats for purchases of electricity from qualifying cngeserators
and small power producers.
Purchase price for firm "era includes capacity component and anergy
component (see Table IV-5). Contracted-for capacity credits fixed over
contract tan. Bates updated approximately every two years in utilities'
rate cases to apply to QFs which begin operation or recontract during
that period. Separate capacity price offers for QFs smaller than 100 KW.
QFs my select from several capacity payment options.
2. Capacity price offers shown are superseded by any higher offers currant
at date of QF's initial operation. Purchase price ofr fin energy to
Include both capacity compesest shwa here and energy component. Cost
figures for this energy component vary from 1.2 to 1.6C/KWH depending
on the uti ity.
3. Capacity credits for long-term contracts fixed at initial level for contract
term. Rates updated every two years to apply to QFs which begin t oduction
or recontract during that period. Duke and CP4L also offer annual capacity
rates equal to 5-year contract price offers. Capacity credits for annual
contracts fixed at initial level for contract term. Rates updated every
five years to apply to QFs which begin production or recontract during that
period.
4. Minimum rate for QFs presently operating and those activated between
June 1960 and initial generation of next scheduled baseload plant (Seabrook 1)
around 1963.
SOURCES FOR TABLES IV-7 AND IV-8
ALABAMA: Alabama Power Company - Rate PAE, March 1981.
CALIFORNIA: (CPUC) "Summary of Utility Rates for Purchases from Cogenerat-
ors and Small Power Producers," March 1, 1979, File No. 303; San Diego
Gas and Electric: Appendix A, "Energy and Capacity Purchase Price Schedules,"
effective August i through October 31, 1961; Pacific Gas and Electric:
"Power Sales Agreement." February 2, 1960 and Appendix B. August 1, 1981;
Southern California Edison: "Interim Proposed Policy for Cogeneration
and Still Power Production," August 1981.
CONNECTICUT: Northeast Utilities, Nonfin Power Purchase Rate 980 and
Firm Power Purchase Rate 981 for Connecticut Light and Power Co. and
Hartford Electric Light Company, January 21, 1981; United Illuminating
Self-Generator Rates, September 1, 1981.
IDAHO: Idaho PUC, Case No. P-300-12-Order No. 15746, August 1980; Idaho
Power Co. "Power Sales Agreemant for Cogeneration and Small Power Production,"
Appendix A. Tables 1 and 2, January 17, 1981; Washington Water Paver Co..
"Power Sales Agreement for Cogeneration and Small Power Production."
December 31, 1981; Utah Power and Light Co., 'Power Purchase Agreement,"
Appendix 8, Table 1, February 28, 1981.
NEW HAMPSHIRE: New Hampshire PUC, DE 79-308-Fifth Supplemental Order
14,280, June 18, 1960.
NEW MEXICO: Public Service Co. of New Mexico: Schedule No. 12, "Cogeneration
and Small Power Production - 100 KW or Less," May 27, 1981.
NEW YORK: Now York $PC: Case No. 27574, "Consolidated Edison Co. of Nw
York, On-Site Generation," Staff-Proposed Buyback (late, Exhibit 75.
NORTH CAROLINA: North Carolina UC, Docket E-100, Sub 41 and Appendix A.
September 21, 1981.
VERMONT: Vermont PSI, General Order No. 65, June 18, 1961 and "Recommenda-
tions and Comments of the Department of Public Service on Proposed Order
No. 65," April 7. 1981.
WISCONSIN: Wisconsin Public Service Corp.. Nonfirm (No. PG-2) and Firs
(No. PG-3) Power Purchase Tariffs. April 4, 1960; Wisconsin Electric Power
Co., Firm Surplus Energy Purchase Tariff (No. FP 1-1.2) and Nonfirs Surplus
Energy Purchase Tariff (No. NFP
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Several points appearing in these tables are worth highlighting.
Table IV-7 confirms that energy price offers differ dramatically among
different utilities in different states and regions (largely as a
function of utility reliance on petroleum fuels over coal, nuclear,
hydroelectric or other lower-cost fuels). The table on its face suggests
that fuel cell values related to income potential from PURPA power sales
s
will differ accordingly. The table also notes that utility energy
price offers are continually updated, making QF investment planning
difficult in the absence of carefully negotiated long-term contracts
that may have to sacrifice price to certainty of return. Finally, the
table suggests that substantial premiums may be available to technolo-
gies such as fuel cells which are capable of providing reliable energy
at peak periods.
Table IV-8 again shows substantial variation in avoided capacity
costs among utilities, with similar implications for fuel cell
marketing. It also establishes that capacity payments will typically
be a relatively small portion of total avoided cost payments to QFs
(although not necessarily of their net income from sales to the utility).
And the table serves as a reminder that in some states, existing excess
capacity will altogether preclude capacity payments from some utilities.
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c. EXEMPTIONS FROM REGULATION AND INCREMENTAL PRICING
i. Exemptions from Certain Federal and State Utility
Regulation
In keeping with PURPA's overall intent to encourage cogenera-
tion and small power production, 4210(e) of the statute directs FERC to
prescribe rules exempting qualifying small power producers of up to
30 MW capacity (or 80 MW in the case of geothermal or biomass-fueled
facilities) and all qualifying cogenerators from the major burdens of
federal and state utility regulation. The rationale for these exemp-
tions appears from the Conference Report accompanying the 1978 legis-
lation:
The conferees wish to make clear that cogen-
eration is to be encouraged under this section and
therefore the examination of the level of rates which
should apply to the 	 purchase by the utility of the
cogenerator's or small power producer's power should
not be burdened by the same examination as are
utility rate applications.. .. The establishment
of utility type regulation over them would act as a
significant disincentive to firms interested in
cogeneration and small power production. Ili
In accordance with Congressional intent, FERC has adopted regu-
lations providing liberal exemptions for QFs. In relevant part, 1292.601
III ConferenceReport No. 95-1750 (to accompany H.R. 4018),
October 10, 1978; p. 98.
111	 -
exempts qualifying SPPFs of up to 30 MW and all qualifying CGFa from
almost all provisions of the Federal Power Act (the basic federal
utility regulatory legislation), including those reflecting traditional
rate regulation and securities regulation ordinarily attendant on
public utility status. Section 292.602 exempts the same facilities
and small power producers of up to 80 MW using biomass as a primary
energy source from the federal Public Utility Holding Company Act
and from state laws and regulations respecting electric utility rates
and financial and organizational matters.
Although PURPA 6210(e) is not explicit on the point, FERC
interprets its exemption authority as to state regulation to extend
only to regulation of wholesale sales, and not to retail sales over
which FERC itself has no jurisdiction. 112 Retail sales of electricity
and, in some states, of steam and/or hot water, are subject to regula-
tion by state utility commissions. 113 Thus, although a qualifying fuel
cell facility would be exempt from most federal and state regulation
as to any sales of electricity for resale which it might make to an
electric utility under the avoided cost scheme described earlier, exemp-
tion for retail sales of electricity or heat to nonutlity purchasers
112 Personal communication from FERC staff member Mr. Michael
Kessler, March 20, 1981; cf. PURPA 5210(a), expressly limiting FERC's
authority to prescribe rules governing QF power sales for purposes
other than resale.
113 FERC has taken the position that it ;gas no authority to
exempt cogenerators from state regulation as steam utilities. See FERC
Staff Discussion, 44 Fed. Reg. 38865, note 5 (July 3, 1979).
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wuuld Le a matter of state law. 114
 As the Congressional Conference Report
indicated, and as one of the authors of this report has explained
in detail in the geothermal context,115 the prospect of regulation
can be a serious disincentive to undertaking the risks associated with
a new energy technology, and at the least is likely to discourage
distribution activities which might otherwise contribute to efficiency
and economy. For these reasons, further fuel cell commercialization
efforts should include a careful examination of relevant state law in
this area; 
116 
the formulation of policies to ensure that the fuel
cell's potential will be fully utilized through distribution systems
where appropriate; and a vigorous program of action with individual
state legislatures and utility commissions in a position to respond
to such policies.
114For detailed discussion of the jurisdiction of Western state
utility commissions over steam or hot water in the geothermal. context,
see John T. Nimmons, Overview of State Public Utility Regulation Impact
on Geothermal Direct Heat Applications and State-By-State Analysis of
Public Utility Laws Affecting Geothermal Direst Heat Applications
(Earl Warren Legal Institute Energy Studies Project, April and June 1979).
115 SeeNimmons, Utility Policy and Geothermal Heating: Toward
Rational Regulation (Earl Warren Legal Institute Energy Studies Project,
December 1980).
116 Anexcellent start in the context of integrated community
energy systems in general is Community Energy Systems and the Law of
Public Utilities, a multi-volume, state-by-state study by Ross, Hardies
O'Keefe, Babcock 6 Parsons, One IBM Plaza, Suite 3100, Chicago, IL.
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ii. Exemptions from Incremental Pricing
In addition to federal and state utility regulatory exemp-
tions, FERC rules provide exemptions from the current scheme of incre-
mental pricing for natural gas used in qualifying cogeneration facili-
ties. For present purposes, the relevant provision is 1292.205(c)(1),
which establishes the exemption for any topping cycle cogeneration
facility which qualifies under the minimum operating and efficiency
standards and ownership criteria discussed previously. For a discussion
of the meaning and implications of incremental pricing for fuel cells
in general, see section III.B., above.
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C. AIR QUALITY REGULATORY REGIMES PROMOTING FUEL
CELL COMMERCIALIZATION
1. INTRODUCTION
In the familiar litany of benefits or "special credits" accruing
from fuel cells, their extremely low levels of pollutant emissions are
virtually always cited. Fuel cell proponents would universally agree
that this is an attractive characteristic and contributes to the versa-
tility and siting flexibility of the technology. What is not widely
understood is that the fuel cell ' s non-polluting characteristics not
only can permit electric generation and cogeneration where it might
otherwise be prohibited, but can translate into very real and very tan-
gible economic value under conditions defined by existing federal and
state air quality regulations. Where such conditions obtain, these
regulations can provide the opportunity for potential fuel cell owners
or operators to realize substantial savings and/or income which would not
accrue from the use of competing generation or cogeneration equipment.
These possibilities arise under the regulatory regime established
pursuant to the Clean Air Act of 1953 and related legislation. This
regulatory scheme is extremely intricate and complex. Because of its
potential importance to fuel cell commercialization, it is described
in detail in the Appendix to this report. The following discussion
summarizes its basin features and their relevance to the comerciali-
zation effort, and provides references to the more detailed treatment
contained in the Appendix.
115
-	
_	
-	 - --	 -
of
^g
Z. STATIONARY SOURCE REGULATION IN NONATTAINMENT AND
ATTAINMENT AREAS
a. NONATTAINMENT AND ATTAINMENT AREAS
Pursuant to the Clean Air Act of 1963, as amended, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) has promulgated national standards for
air quality. These standards, known technically as "national ambient
air quality ,standards" or "NAAQS," establish allowable levels for each
of various pollutants, including sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen dioxide
(NO2), carbon monoxide (CO), E,„rticulate matter (PH), and ozone (03).
Air quality control regions, and portions of such regions, which
presently fail to meet these standards as to any of these pollutants
are designated as "nonattainment areas” as to each such pollutant.
Areas which do meet applicable standards are classified as "attainment
areas." As to all of its nonattainment areas, each state must submit
for EPA's approval a state implementation plan (SIP) to attain NAAQS by
the end of 1982 or 1987, depending upon the pollutant. As to all areas
presently classified as attainment areas, the SIP must set forth plans
to maintain NAAQS.117
b. MAJOR EXISTING SOURCES
As to both nonattainment and attainment areas, SIP* contain
emissions limitation schedules. These limitations apply to "major
existing sources"- -i.e., presently operating industrial facilities or
117 See Appendix A, section H.A.
116
other "stationary sources" which actually or potentially emit 9.072 X10" kg
per year (kg/y) (100 tons per year (tpy)) or more of a regulated pollutant. lie
Operators of regulated existing sources are required to control their source's
emissions to bring them within these limitations.
To !rinimize compliance costs, the EPA has abandoned an earlier policy
requiring strict compliance at each emissions point (stack, vent, port,
etc.) within a facility, in favor of a policy permitting the operator to
place an imaginary "bubble" over its facilities (or several operators to
"bubble" their combined facilities) and reduce emissions below required
levels at points with low control costs in lieu of equivalent reductions
at points with high control costs: so long as the source's aggregate
i3
emissions satisfy the SIP limitations, the facility is in compliance.
c. MAJOR MODIFICATIONS AND MAJOR NEW SOURCES
Existing major sources undergoing "major modifications" (those
resulting in net emissions increases of 2.268-9.072 X10" kg/y (25-100 tpy)
depending upon the pollutant), and "major new sources" (9.072 X le kg/y
or more in nonattainment areas and 9.072 X10 4  kg/y - 2.268 X10 5 kg/y
(100-250 tpy) or more, depending upon the type of source, in attainment
areas) are subject to stricter pollution control technology requirements
than existing sources. 119
118 See
Id., section II.B. Generally, only large-scale industrial
facilities generate 9.072 X10 4 kg/y (100 tpy) or more of any pollutant.
119 SeeId., section II.C.
117
__	 1
In nonattainment areas, operators of these new or modified major
sources generally must comply with a "nonattainment offset policy" or a 	 j
"growth allowance policy."120 Nonattainment offset policies require the	 f
source cnerator to obtain surplus emissions reductions from an existing
source or sources in the area to "offset" (on at lust a one-for-one
basis) the incremental emissions of a particular pollutant iron the new
or modified source. State growth allowance policies reserve in the SIP
an emissions allowance for uch pollutant to permit the construction
and operation of major new sources and major modifications. These
allowances can then be allocated among operat ors of such sources to off-
set their incremental emissions.
In attainment areas, operators of new or modified major sources
must ensure that federally prescribed maximum increases in pollutant
concentrations ("PSD increments") are not exceeded. If the incremental
emissions of these sources cause or contribute to the violation of a
PSD incrxment, the operator must secure offsets from existing sources
in the area sufficient to prevent or correct the violation.121
d. MINOR SOURCES
In areas with intractable air pollution problems. sources other
than those defined as existing sources and major new and modified sources
120See Id., section III.B.l.a. for a list of states with non-
attainment offset and/or growth allowance policies. Currently, 41
states hAve none form of nonattainment offset policy.
121 See Id., section II.C.3.b.
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I(i.e., "minor sources") may be subject to similar air pollution control
requirements as their major source counterparts, including offsets. 122
3. CREATION, TRADING AND BANKING OF OFFSETS
a. SOURCES AND USES OF OFFSETS
Only existing source operators can create surplus emissions reduc-
tions which can serve as offsets. 123 They can create these in various
ways, including the addition of pollution control equipment; the modifi-
cation, replacement or shutdown of equipment, processes or an entire plant
or facility; or changes in process or product inputs.
Existing source operators can keep the offsets they have created
for their own present or prospective needs. They can use these "internal
offsets" for "bubble" applications in an existing source, or for "netting"124	 +
emissions increases and decreases at a major existing source to avoid
offset and/or other requirements for a major modification at the source.
Alternatively, existing source operators can transfer their off-
sets by sale, exchange or donation to others for the latter's present or
prospective use. These "external offsets" will be needed by new or modi-
fied major source operators who do not control sufficient internal
122 See
Id., section III.B.I.a.
123 See id., section III.A.
124 See Id., section 1I.C.l.c.
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zoffsets from other nearby sources, in order to satisfy regulatory
requirements for nonattainment offsets (in nonattainment areas) or
for PSD increment exceedance offsets (ia attainment areas).
b. OFFSET TRANSACTIONS TO DATE
Nonattainment offset transactions so far have constituted the
overwhelming majority of all types of offset transactions, due largely
to a lag in development and implementation of regulations for other types
of offsets. 125 Within this group of nonattainment offset transactions,
internal offset transa {^.tions have outpaced external ones by a factor
of twenty. Of the relatively few external offset transactions, only a
small portion have involved the payment of money by the recipient of
the offsets. California has approved the lion's share of all nonattain-
ment offset transactions approved nationwide.
c. FORMAT., OFFSET BANKING AND TRADING PROGRAMS
EPA is encouraging states and local air pollution control agen-
cies to develop formal programs for banking and trading of offsets.
Under these schemes, a state or local agency develops a central registry
where emissions reductions credits are certified at the time they are
created (for example, when a process is shut down or additional pollution
control equipment is installed at an existing source). Certified credits
are recorded as public information and stored for future use as offsets.126
` See Id., sections III.B . 1. and 2.
126 See Id., section III.B . 3.b. for identification of state and
kcal agencies with formal banking systems in place or under consideration.
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not realized the potential market value of external offset transactions,
due to the paucity of such transactions and the inaccessibility of infor-
mation on offset prices and availability. 127 With formal banking, market
prices for offsets within areas should become more predictable as more
external offset transactions occur and information on these transactions
is widely disseminated.
Subject to EPA's review and approval of their SIPS, states and
local air quality agencies are vested with broad discretion to determine
the types and sizes of sources subject to offset requirements, as well
as geographical, temporal and other limitations on offset transactions.
Offset policies accordingly vary widely in their overall scope, their geo-
graphical coverage, and the nature of the restrictions they impose on
offset transactions. For example, some state and local agencies have
specified time limits for the retention of credits, to prevent hoarding
by credit owners which can impede free trading in offsets. others have
reserved the right to confiscate a portion of banked credits in the event
that stricter emissions requirements are needed to ensure successful air
cleanup efforts. These restrictions, which vary significantly from agency
to agency, may promote or impede offset banking and trading. 128
127 See
Id., section III.C.I.d.
128 See Id., sections III.B.I.a. and 3.c.
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4. OFFSETS AS AN IMPETUS FOR FUEL CELL COMMERCIALIZATION
a. FUEL CELLS AS SOURCES OF EMISSIONS REDUCTION CREDITS
The fuel cell ' s significantly lower emissions levels of regulated
air pollutants can be a key selling point vis a via conventional genera-
tion and cogeneration technologies.
Operators of existing sources can utilize fuel cells (preferably
in a cogeneration mode for economic efficiency) to replace their existing
polluting on-site energy-generating equipment--for example, diesel gener-
ators and oil -or gas-fired boilers--and thereby create emissions reduction
credits. They can use these credits as internal offsets, sell them to
others as external offsets, or bank them for future internal or external
use.
Operators of new sources with external offset requirements could
purchase fuel cell systems in lieu of conventional generating or cogenera-
ting equipment to meet the on-site electrical and/or thermal energy
requirements of such sources, in order to minimize the cost of external
offsets required for on-site emissions. Alternatively, they could pur-
chase fuel cell systems for one or more existing sources within the area
of the new sources as offsets for the new sources' incremental emissions.
The operator of an existing source would get a " free ride" by modernizing
(and perhaps expanding) its energy generating capability at someone else's
expense.
122
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Assuming the continuation of the current regulatory regime, prime
targets of opportunity for fuel cell marketing in terms of air quality
leveraging possibilities should include operators of existing and new major
sources -- generally, utilities and large-scale industrial facilities 128 --
in areas with significant demands for "bubble," "netting," nonattainment
and/or PSD increment exceedance offsets. Except for unusually large facil-
ities or those in poor air quality regions with particularly
 stringent regu-
lations affecting even minor sources, commercial and residential operations
are far less sensitive to air quality regulation, and on-site fuel cell
installations in these situations can benefit correspondingly less from air
quality leveraging under existing schemes.
Projections developed by the National Commission on Air Quality
(NCAQ), empowered by the Congress to study existing and alternative air
quality regulatory schemes, indicate that a significant number of non-
attainment areas are expected to continue to have ozone and particulate
matter violations of NAAQS after 1987, necessitating ozone precursor
(hydrocarbons and nitrogen dioxide) and particulate matter offsets.
Certain source types in attainment areas may also require offsets in
this time frame.129
 "Bubble" applications in these nonattainment and
attainment areas could continue to occur, insofar as existing sources
are subjected to tightening of emissions limitations.
128 See section II.C.I.b. of Appendix A for a list of industrial
facilities generally deemed to be major sources.
129 See section III.C.I. for a discussion of specific nonattain-
ment areas where offsets may be required in the late 1980s, as well as
a description of source types in attainment areas for which offsets may
be required.
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Ongoing market research will be needed to identify particularly
attractive areas and entities. Within this group of potentially attrac-
ti-.m market areas, those areas which have active offset trading and
banking programs with relatively few restrictions should be slated for
early marketing activities.
c. REGULATORY PROPOSALS IWEDING FUEL CELL COIMRCIALIZATION
NCAQ has proposed, and the Administration is evaluating, several
options for substantially modifying the current provisions of the federal
Clean Air Act which must be reauthorized for fiscal year 1982 and there-
after in the current session of the Congress. 130 It remains to be seen
whether these options are formally proposed in legislation and, if so,
whether they survive the ensuing political battle. Enactment of some of
these modifications could remove the substantial impetus provided by the
current regime to source operations to replace existing equipment with
less polluting equipment, and to install equipment with low emissions
levels in new sources. In that event, a key marketable advantage of
fuel cells over conventional generation and cogeneration technologies
would be effectively neutralized.
Ongoing monitoring of proposed or implemented changes in the air
quality regulatory regime will be needed to assess whether the fuel cell's
air quality benefits persist as a marketable feature of the technology
throughout its initial commercialization phase in the mid-to-late 1980s.
130 See section III.C.2. of Appendix A for an expanded discussion
of these proposals.
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR KEY PARTICIPANTS IN
FUEL CELL COMMERCIALIZATION
A. INTRODUCTION	 'i
This chapter recapitulates and augments the discussions of
Chapters II through IV. It is divided into four sections reflecting
	
A
key groups of participants in the fuel cell commercialization process:
fuel cell manufacturers, fuel cell distributors, fuel cell end users,
and the federal government. Each section reviews specific issues of
interest to the particular participant group confronting the problem
of commercialization, including matters relevant to those interested
in promoting the technology and to those interested in acquiring it.
The manufacturers' section posits that "state-of-the-art" fuel
cell technology must compete against "off-the-shelf" technologies, and
suggests marketing considerations which may help overcome behavioral
resistance. The distributors' section considers issues relating to
both gas and electric utility distributors, and to nonutility distrib-
utors. The end users' section includes gas and electric utility and
nonutility end users. Finally, the section on the federal government's
role suggests research and monitoring activities, technical information
programs and legislative involvement which could facilitate commerciali-
zation efforts.
1
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B. MANUFACTURERS
1. "OFF-THE-SHELF" AND "STATE-OF-THE-ART" TECHNOLOGIES
Fuel cell manufacturers face an obstacle common to
promoters of new technologies: potential consumers generally prefer
"off-the-shelf" technologies with easily ascertainable technical
and economic performance characteristics to "state-of-the-art" technolo-
gies about which they know little or nothing. During its initial
commercialization phase in the latter half of this decade, the fuel
cell will be competing with conventional fossil fuel-fired generation
and cogeneration technologies. Industrial, commercial, residential
and other consumers will have ready access to information about the
processes, performance characteristics, costs, payoffs and reliability
of the conventional technologies. By contrast, the fuel cell will
employ a novel electrochemical technique for electrical and thermal
energy production, and it will have a limited track record in terms
of technical and economic performance. Fuel cell manufacturers
therefore must strive to overcome the behavioral resistance of poten-
tial fuel cell users to the technology due to its novelty and atten-
dant uncertainties, and to communicate to them the salable features
of fuel cells in comparison with conventional energy technologies,
including low air and noise pollutant emissions, modularity, minimum
site requirement-3 and so on. 131 This effort can be greatly
 assisted by
131 rhese arguments about consumwsr resistance to fuel cell
marketing efforts appl y with less force to electric and gas utilities.
The gas and electric utilit y industries have been actively interested
in the development of commercially available fuel cell units since
126
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factoring into any marketing efforts the findings and conclusions of
the kind of legal analysis presented here.
Z. MARKET RESEARCH
This report has identified several types of markets which might
be targeted for initial fuel cell commercialization efforts.
a. PURPA
Section IV.B. of the report has described the economic benefits
which Title II of PURPA affords to non-electric utilit y fuel cell
i
operators who can qualify as cogenerators or small power producers
under the Act. Generally, the higher an electric utility's "avoided
costs" of producing or purchasing electricity , are in relation to a
fuel cell's production costs, the more attractive are sales of all or
a portion of the fuel cell's output to the utility. A fuel cell
operator may optimize the economic benefits of such sales by selling
all of the fuel cell's output to the utility at the utility's avoided
costs and purchasing on-site electrical requirements at the utility's
average tariff rate; moreover, the operator may wish to oversize the
fuel cell system relative to on-site electrical demand to maximize
the t,ayoff from such sales to the local utility.
the inception of commercialization efforts.	 The levels of activity
of utility research groups (GRI and EPRI) and of utility users groups
reflect the commitment to fuel cell development by the two utility
industries.	 Entities in the nonutility sectors to which substantial
economic benefits might accrue from fuel cell use appear to be relatively
unrepresented, and are appropriaLe candidates for increased involvement.
,A
in-
It would be in the interests of fuel cell manufacturers to
sponsor, as part of their market research, ongoing studies of utility
"avoided cost" trends nationwide. These studies should seek to identify
specific electric utilities whose avoided energy and/or capacity costs
are anticipated to be especially high in the latter half of the 19808
and thereafter. Section IV.B. of the report discusses characteristics
of electric utilities which contribute to high avoided costs and offers some
examples of utilities with currently high avoided costs. The service
areas of such electric utilities could be targeted in the manufac-
turers' initial market penetration strategies, and particular classes
of potential fuel cell users within those areas identified as attractive 	 ?
candidates to acquire fuel cells (by virtue of their ability to capi-
talize on PURPA sales to utilities).
b. CLEAN AIR ACT
Section IV.C. of the report has delineated economic benefits
which fuel cell operators may derive from the low emissions character-
istics of the fuel cell in comparison with the high emissions rates
of conventional generating and cogenerating technologies.
Operators of "existing sources" can utilize fuel cells to replace
their existing on-site generating equipment and thereby create "emissions
reduction credits." They can use these credits for present "internal"
offset requirements, sell them to others to satisfy the latter's "exter-
nal" offset requirements, or "bank" the credits for future sale or
internal use.
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Operators of "new sources" subject to external offset require-
meets can purchase fuel cells in lieu of conventional generating or
cogenerating equipment to meet on-site electrical and/or thermal energy
requirements, in order to minimize the external offsets which they would
	
1
otherwise need to acquire. Alternatively, they can purchase fuel cells
for existing sources within the area as offsets for their own incre-
mental emissions.
Prime targets of opportunity for manufacturers' initial fuel cell
marketing efforts should, therefore, include operators of existing and
new sources subject to offset regulations — generally utilities and large-
scale industrial facilities — located in areas with significant offset
demands. 132 The report indicates specific nonattainment areas which are
expected to require hydrocarbon and nitrogen dioxide offsets and particulate
matter offsets after 1987, and suggests certain types of sources in
attainment areas which may require offsets in the same time frame. 133
Within this group of potentially attractive market areas, the most desir-
able will be those which have active and ongoing formal offset trading
and banking programs with a minimum of "red tape," and in which external
offset transactions command the highest prices (on a dollars-par-kg/y
(dollars-per-tpy) basis).
132A list of large-scale industrial facilities generally deemed
to be "major sources" subject to offset regulations is presented in
fII.C.l.b. of the Appendix. "Minor sources" in certain areas with
intractable air pollution problems may also be subject to offset require-
ments. (Id., 11 H .B.I.a.)
133 See fIII.C.l. of the Appendix for a detailed discussion.
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3. FUEL CELL DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS
During the course of their product development activities, the
manufacturers will optimize the design specifications of first-genera-
tion fuel cell units offered commercially to dovetail them to specific
markets which market research indicates will afford opportunities for
early market penetration. This section suggests factors to include
in the design optimization process.
a. OPTIMAL MODULE SIZING
One factor which the manufacturers will consider in the design
of fuel cells is the optimal sizing of commercially available modules.
Different fuel cell sizes will undoubtedly be offered for different
applications: the 40 kw and 5-11 MW commercial prototypes being
studied by gas and electric utilities, respectively, underscore this
point. As an example, this report suggests that operators of very
large industrial facilities may derive a combination of significant
econcmic benefits from operating fuel cell systems, including: the
energy and economic efficiency of operating a fuel cell system in a
cogeneration mode to meet on-site electrical and/or thermal energy
dert, ds; the PURPA economic benefits of electricity sales to electric
utilities; and the economic benefits of internal and external offset
transactions involving fuel cells. Accordingly, manufacturers may
wish to consider marketing different sizes of fuel cell modules designed
to meet the on-site (electrical and/or thermal) energy requirements of
different sizes and types of industrial facilities, and/or their
requirements for electricity sales to electric utilities. Sizing
S
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requirements will, of course, vary both within and across classes of
industries and should be one element of market research examining the
N t.ntial needs of large industrial facilities in different Standard
Industrial Classification codes.
b. DISPATCHABILITY, RELIABILITY AND LOAD-SHEDDING CAPABILITY.
The report suggests that the PURPA requirements governing "quali-
fying facilities" (QFs) may have additional ramifications for fuel cell
design decisions by the manufacturer. Insofar as the Act and its
implementing regulations attach economic value (reflected in the rates
that the QF can charge a utility) to physical characteristics of a QF
such as its dispatchability by the electric utility, its reliability,
and its ability to separate its load from its generation during a utility
system emergency, manufacturers should give thought to optimizing fuel
cell design for these types of physical characteristics so as to facili-
tate PURPA sales by fuel cell operators to electric utilities.
c. ALTERNATE FUEL CAPABILITIES.
Section III. B. of the report has described the impacts of
current regulations implementing NGPA Titles I, II and IV which govern
the pricing of domestically produced natural gas and the feoeral cur-
tailment priority scheme used during regional natural gas shortfalls.
The analysis details how prices for domestic natural gas, by
no later than the late 1980s or early 1990s, will attain rough parity
with decontrolled prices for petroleum products (such as naphtha) set
in large part by OPEC pricing decisions and other events in the global
131
petroleum market. One implication of this for fuel call commerciali-
sation is that, as the prices of natural gas and naphtha become more dear,
the prices of alternative fuels such as biomass-derived gas which cannot
I
presently compete with conventional fuels will become more competitive
with these fuels for fuel cell operators.
i
The analysis also posits the open question of whether the even-
tual decontrol of domestic natural gas prices will materially Improve
the domestic gas supply picture. Certain regions of the country have
experienced natural gas supply shortfalls which have necessitated gas
t
curtailment practices designed to protect "high-priority" gas end-users
(such as residences, schools and hospitals) by curtailing "low-priority"
ones (particularly industrial facilities with alternate fuel capabili-
ties and interruptible gas requirements). If natural gas pricing
decontrol does not significantly improve the availability of natural
gas in these regions, gas curtailments will continue to be a fact of
life. In see regions, only certain industrial gas customers may be
affected, and in others, high priority residential and other gas users
may also be impacted.
Accordingly, several implications merit consideration: First,
manufacturers' current efforts to expand alternate fuel capabilities
to include not only natural gas, naphtha and other liquid petroleum
products, but also furls derived from other feedstocks such as biomass
and coal should help to promote fuel call acceptance in areas of the
country historically susceptible to natural gas and naphtha supply
shortfalls. Such efforts might be supplemented by periodic regional
supply and demand forecasts (disaggregated by class of potential fuel
cell owner such as residential, commercial, industrial, etc.) for
132
natural gas, naphtha and other fuels feasible for fuel cell operation,
E
in order to identify particular areas in which shortfalls of a specific
fuel may be sxpected to occur, and which therefore may not be ideal
starting points for initial fuel cell marketing efforts.
4. MARKETING AND DISTRIBUTING
At this stage .- fuel cell development and demonstration,
business planning for actual commercial marketing and distribution
activities is obviously premature, and in any case is beyond the scope
of this report. While the selection of entities and strategies for
marketing and distribution is ordinarily the manufacturers' prerogative
and may vary from firm to firm, a variety of entities appear to be
logical candidates for involvement in one way or another. These would
include the manufacturers themselves, independent firms operating as
manufacturers' representatives, gas utilities, electric utilities,
architect-engineering firms, and perhaps others. The participation of
gas and electric utilities in these efforts seers most likely to raise
legal and institutional issues requiring attention. Some of these are
suggested in the following section.
C. DISTRIBUTORS
Distribution of fuel cells to end users might take a number of
forms. The distributor might sell the fuel cell outright to the end
user, it might lease it, or it might retain control of the fuel cell
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facility and sell the energy produced by it to the end user (fuel cell
energy service). Some of the issues likely to arise in these settings
are reviewed below.
1. UTILITY DISTRIBUTORS
a. GAS UTILITIES
Natural gas distribution utilities, GRI and their fuel cell users
group have evidenced an interest in examining the possible benefits of
distributing fuel cells. To date, they have not expressed a categorical
preference for any one of the options of fuel cell sales, leases or
energy services. Most likely, different gas utilities will prefer
different distribution options based on their own economic, financial,
and organizational considerations. Some will sell or lease fuel cells
and sell natural gas to fuel them; others will own and operate fuel cells
and sell the electrical (and possibly thermal) outputs.
One issue to be evaluated by each gas utility considering these
roles is whether the activities contemplated will be regulated as public
utility functions. Sales of electrical energy from fuel cells (energy
service) other than by contract to selected users would be treated as a
public utility activity in most states, whereas sales or leasing of fuel
cells (probably through a subsidiary) may not be. Public utility laws
and regulations vary substantially from state to state. Their impact
can substantially affect the structuring of gas utility activities in
this area, and should be the subject of careful research by GRI or
Individual gas utilities.
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Assuming that utility status attaches to energy service arrange-
ments, another question is whether a gas company providing such services
would be compelled or permitted to establish a rate base for the costs
of owning and operating fuel cells separate and apart from its general	
i
rate base for gas distribution activities. This question also requires
	 j
careful examination of specific states' public utility statutes and
	
1
regulations.	 {
Perhaps the most important and far-reaching issue in this area is
the possible conflict between gas and electric utility-provided energy
services in areas covered by electric utility franchises. This will
require analysis of court and commission interpretations governing the
scope of such franchises, as well as examination of specific franchises
in particular cases. Franchise gas utility restrictions might take the
form of geographical limitations on service or explicit prohibitions on
engaging in the generation of electrical energy for purposes of sale;
electric utility franchises might or might not preclude the particular
gas utility activities contemplated in a given situation. Resolution
of these questions requires careful attention by GRI and/or individual
gas utilities in the reasonably near future, so that any legislative or
regulatory changes which might be needed could be initiated in a time
frame consistent with gas utility plans for commercial participation.
b. ELECTRIC UTILITIES
To date, electric utilities have tended to focus on their own
ownership of fuel cells at central station and substat-,.i locations to
supply electricity to their transmission and distribution systems, rather
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than on the prospects for marketing and distributing fuel cells to others,
Over time, however, some electric utilities may perceive potential eco-
nomic and financial benefits in such activities similar to those perceived
by some gas utilities.
These electric utilities will encounter the same kinds of public 	 j
utility regulatory questions regarding fuel cell distribution subsidiaries
and rate basing, and will need to undertake the same ty pes of legal
a
research. Franchising questions relating to z1ae sale of electrical 1
1
energy from dispersed fuel cells may need to be addressed, along with
questions of the allowable scope of any distribution activities.
2. NONUTILITY DISTRIBUTORS
As noted above, fuel cell manufacturers may decide to rely on
nonutility entities as distributors, including themselves, manufacturers'
representatives, or architect-engineering firms.
These nonutility distributors could encounter institutional
problems in the area of fuel cell energy services. A nonutility dis-
tributor who sells the electric output of a fuel cell may be regulated
as a public utility with its rates subject to the approval of a public
utility commission. As mentioned previously, public utility regulations
vary among states, and the treatment of specific nonutility distributors
in particular situations will be determinable only through the review
of specific state laws and regulations governing public utilities.
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D. END USERS
This section discusses findings of the report relating to both
utility and nonutility fuel cell end users.
1. GAS UTILITIES
In addition to questions of franchising and rate treatment dia-
cussed above, several other issues deserve attention in the specific
context of gas utility ownership or energy service-related activities.
PURPA's limitations on electric utility ownership of "qualifying
facilities" do not apply to gas utilities. 134 Thus, PURPA permits gas
utilities which otherwise satisfy QF criteria to sell the electric
output of fLel cells operated by them to local electric utilities at the
latter's avoided costs, a potentially lucrative activity where the
electric utility has high avoided costs. Gas utilities interested in
this prospect would additionally need to examine whether the terms of
their state or local franchises might preclude such electricity sales.
If it supplied thermal energy to others, a gas utility could,
in some states, be subjected to public utility regulation of such
activities and might be required to seek an amendment of its franchise
in order to engage in them.
Gas utility-operated fuel cell units standing alone (without
connection to a supplemental-fired boiler) would not be subject to PIFUA's
use restrictions on natural gas.
134See FERC Docket No. RM79-54, Order No. 70-B, 45 Fed. Reg.
52779 (August 8, 1980).
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In areas subject to periodic gas shortfalls, curtailment priorities
for on-site fuel cells owned and operated by gas utilities providing energy
services should be determined, as in other cases, by the type of activity
and purpose for which the gas is used, independent of fuel cell ownership.
2. ELECTRIC UTILITIES
To the extent that they follow the lead of gas utilities in
examining the provision of fuel cell energy services to service area
customers, electric utilities will face similar rate-basing, franchise
and other public utility regulatory issues mentioned above for gas
utilities, with the notable exception that PURPA limits their partici-
pation in QF ownership to 50%, and thus suggests somewhat different
questions in this area (relating to structuring relationships with pos-
sible joint venture partners and insulating their QF activities from
e
their other activities).
PIFUA has several implications for electric utilities operating
1
fuel cells on natural gas or petroleum products (including naphtha).
i
Fuel cell units operated by them without connection to a gas-fired
supplemental-fired boiler will not be subject to PIFUA's restrictions
on oil or natural gas usage. Certain multimegawatt fuel cell cogeneration
systems (with attached boilers) owned by them may arguably be subject to
PIFUA's prohibitions on oil or gas usage in "new boiler MFBIs," and they
would therefore need to secure a Permanent exemption from fuel use
restrictions governing these t ypes of facilities. Insofar as they have
focused on central station applications for fuel cells, electric utilities
have generally not been overly interested in recovering thermal energy
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from fuel cells for cogeneration purposes and would not be expected to
design fuel cell cogeneration systems which include supplemental-fired
boilers. They could, in any event, recover useful thermal energy from
a fuel cell (in the event that they wish to cogenerate) without resort
to a supplemental-fired boiler, by using a waste heat recovery boiler
without supplemental firing; this latter type of fuel cell system would
4
probably escape PIFUA's prohibitions.
Electric utilities will find the air quality benefits of fuel
cells to be attractive for two reasons. In areas where they operate
existing polluting, inefficient generation equipment, they can retire
these existing sources and replace them with fuel cells: surplus
emissions reduction credits created in these internal offset transactions
can be sold or banked. In areas where they have no existing sources,
their "new source" fuel cells would probably need to have capacities of
at least 100 MW to emit the pollutant levels which would result in their
classificaticn as "major sources" subject to new source review. Even in
areas where offsets are required for "minor new sources" as well as major
ones, only nominal external offsets woule be required for fuel cell
systems, whereas significant offsets would be needed -or conventional
electrical generating equipment such as steam turbine, gas turbine and
combined cycle units.
Other attributes of fuel cells such as minimum site requirements,
load following capability, silent operation, and spinning reserves,
among others, are well documented in EPRI literature.
Electric utilities operating fuel cells with natural gas in areas
of the nation susceptible to periodic shortfalls of natural gas will be
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This subsection treats issues common to all or most classes of
nonutility fuel cell users.
NGPA
All nonutility fuel cell users face the prospect, in the late
1980s or early 1990s, of prices for natural gas and naphtha and other
light petroleum products which are in rough parity and which are tied
to OPEC pricing decisions and other events in the global energy market.
Consequently, these fuel cell fuels will become more costly, and alter-
nate fuels such as biomass gas and synfuels which are not presently
cost-competitive may become more so.
In areas of the country which have experienced natural gas shortfalls,
fuel cell operators using natural gas may be subject to curtailment. Depend-
ing upon the severity of a shortfall, curtailments may exten%Al only to "low-
priority" gas users such as utility and industrial facilities or may include
"high priority" gas users such as residential fuel cell users.
PIFUA
Federal oil and gas fuel use restrictions will not apply to
nonutility-operated fuel cells standing alone, regardless of their size.
Certain multimegawatt fuel cell cogeneration systems employing supplemental-
fired boilers may be subject to PIFUA's prohibitions on oil and natural gas
usage, but generally will be eligible for permanent exemptions as "cogenera-
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tion facilities,"provided that less than SOX of their net electric output is
sold or exchanged. Where no other ground for exemption (e.g., environmental
or logistic requirements) is available, and oil or gas fuels are contemplated,
this restriction may influence operators of these large fuel cell systems to
down-size their units to a level consistent with on-site energy demands so as
to operate them efficiently at a high capacity factor. This down-sizing effect
contrasts with PURPA's oversizing effect described below. Although PIFUA's
50% ceiling on electric sales by facilities seeking cogeneration exemptions
would limit possibilities for "scaling up" to maximize PURPA sales to elec-
tric utilities, it would affect only the largest nonutility installations.
PURPA
Most fuel cell cogeneration systems operated by nonutilities should
satisfy PURPA's "qualifying facility" criteria. They will be able to sell
all or a portion of their fuel cell's electrical output to an electric
utility at the utility's "avoided costs" without being subjected to state
public utility regulation. Fuel cell owners may wish to oversize their
fuel cells so as to maximize the profitability of their electricity :;ales
to a local utility, while purchasing back from the utility their on-site
electrical requirements at the utility's average tariff rate.
Public Utility Regulation
In many states, nonutilities may be exposed to public utility
regulation for sales of electrical energy or usable thermal energy to non-
utilities such as co-located industrial facilities, commercial establish-
ments or apartment buildings. In general, regulation will be triggered
only by energy sales offered to the general public, but state definitions
in this area vary widely.
l
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Clean Air Act
As described in greater detail in the prior section on fuel cell
manufacturers, operators of "existing sources" and "new sources" subject
to offset regulations -- at d minimum, large-scale industrial facilities
and other sources deemed to be "major sources," and, in certain areas with
poor air quality, "minor sources" as well — located in nonattainment and
attainment areas will find the fuel cell effective to minimize the costs
of offset requirements (in the case of both new and existing sources)
and to maximize the economic benefits of emissions reduction credits for
internal use, banking or sale (in the case of existing sources only).
The following subsections describe particular characteristics of
specific categories of nonutility fuel cell end users which may make
them attractive candidates and examine issues of special importance to
them.
t
b. INDUSTRIAL END USERS
Generally, industrial firms which have one or more of the following
attributes may find the economic benefits of fuel cell ownership attrac-
tive to them:
• they have significant on-site electrical and/or thermal
energy demands;
e they currentl y generate (but do not cogenerate) all or a
portion of their electrical and/or thermal energy require-
ments, or are sophisticated in the use of high technology
equipment, and therefore have a technical orientation which
might encourage generating their own energy;
• they purchase all or a substantial portion of their elec-
trical needs from a local electric utility, but face the
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prospect of severe energy cost escaiation;
s they are in the business of undertaking risk-oriented
ventures and may view acquisition of fuel cells for pur-
poses of PURPA sales to electric utilities as an attractive
investment;
s they are a "new" or "existing" source facing costly
external or internal offset requirements, in view of plans
to build new industrial facilities or modify existing ones, 	 OP
or because of tightening local pollution control require-
meets.
Since industrial firms tend to prefer investments with higi, rates
of return and short payback periods, the payoffs of utilizing a fuel cell
to cogenerate, engage in PURPA sales and/or benefit from emissions offset
transactions will need to be substantial. Interested industrial entities
may include not only firms engaged in heavy industrial production, but 3
also owners or developers of industrial parks who see a profit in pro-
viding electrical and/or thermal energy services to park lessees.
As previously stated, industrial end users who utilize natural
gas in their fuel cells will be subject to curtailment as "low priority"
gas users in areas subject to gas curtailments and will need to secure
arrangements for a backup fuel such as naphtha.
c. COMKERCIAL END USERS
Certain types of commercial end users may find fuel cells to be
attractive.
Twenty-four hour foodstores, restaurants, hotels and motels will
have round-the-clock electrical and thermal energy loads and may find
i
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the fuel cell's electrical and low-quality thermal output characteristics
to be appealing.135
Operations of private commercial centers (for example, office
parks and shopping malls) may find fuel cells to be useful for providing
electrical and thermal energy services to their lessees.
Commercial entities' electricity generation activities will not
be treated as "high priority" gas uses, and their fuel cell systems will
be susceptible to curtailment in regions experiencing severe gas short-
falls.
d. RESIDENTIAL END USERS
Attractive residential fuel cell applications may include multi-
family dwellings such as apartment buildings, condominiums, and coopera-
tives. From a behavioral viewpoint, very large multifamily dwellings
probably will be the most attractive applications, since their owners
or operators will be more likely to have the technical and entrepreneurial
orientation to be attracted to the full range of fuel cell benefits
(including PURPA sales to electric utilities) outlined for industrial firms,
and many will alreadv be in the business of Providing space heating and
domestic water heating services to residents. An illustrative example is
Coop City in New York City, a high-rise residential building complex operated
by a cooperative association, which is exploring the possibility of utilizing
135National. chains of these types of commercial establishments
may be particularly attractive candidate markets for fuel cell manu-
facturers and distributors, insofar as they provide centralized pro-
curement points for potentially large fuel cell markets. These chains
should be included in market research.
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natural gas from a local landfill to operate cogeneration equipment which
will serve the on-site electrical and thermal energy requirements of its
50,000 cooperative embers.
Residential fuel cell owners generally will be classified as
"high priority" gas customers and therefore generally insulated from gas
curtailments.
e. SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS AND SIMILAR INSTITUTIONS
Schools, hospitals and similar institutions such as prisons say
find fuel cells attractive for meeting on-site energy needs. Residential
colleges and hospitals may have round-the-clock electrical and thermal
loads (e.g., space and water heating) which can make full use of a fuel
cell system's outputs. Hospitals, in particular, are accustomed to using
high technology equipment. The administrators of these facilities would
probably not view the payoff of PURPA electrical energy sales in the sae
light as more entrepreneurial entities; they would take a more conserva-
tive approach by focusing on on-site benefits as a deciding factor.
Consequently, the economics of fuel cell ownership might not appear as
attractive as in the case where PURPA sales are factored into the
decisionmaking process.
Schools, hospitals and similar institutions are treated as "high -
p.4.ority" gas users.
f. GOVERNIIUNT OFFICE BUILDINGS
Government office buildings would be able to utilize the electrical
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and thermal outputs of a fuel cell cogeneration system during daylight
hours, but would need to sell electricity to a local utility during off-
peak hours to maintain the system at a high capacity factor. Those
public entities which have taken a public leadership role in promoting
energy efficiency may view the fuel cell as a technology worthy of
promotion..
The U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) which is the
federal agency respons-Lble for the operation of federal office buildings
could play a significant role as central procurer for a large fuel cell
market. GSA could publicly demonstrate the benefits of fuel cell opera-
tion (including air pollution emission reductions by displacing electricity
from conventional fossil-fuel-fired power plants) and help to lower the
unit costs of first-generation fuel cell units.
g. U.S. MILITARY FACILITIES
Military bases contain facilities similar to those found in
civilian institutions such as residential colleges and hospitals, which
contribute to round-the-clock electrical energy and thermal energy
demands. These facilities include mess halls, dormitories, PXs and other
facilities.
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), which has already shown
strong interest in fuel cells for military installations, could play a
major role as a central procurer for a very large potential fuel cell
market. As is the case with C;A, DOD could contribute to the demonstration
of first-generation commercial fuel cell units and to the lowering of their
unit costs.
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The previous subsection noted potentially significant roles that
federal agencies (GSA and DOE) can play in demonstrating the benefits of
fuel cells and lowering their unit costs by large central procurements (as
has occurred, deliberately or otherwise, with other new high technologies
such as aviation, computers and telecommunication equipment). Insofar as
net social benefits result from efficient utilization of fossil fuels and
protection of air quality, these actions are readily ,justifiable in terms
of the national interest.
As discussed earlier in Chapter II, federal agencies such as NASA and
DOE could usefully perform a variety of other functions to further facilitate
fuel cell commercialization. These agencies can, of course, continue direct
1
support for technology research and development addressing issues such as
multi-fuel capability and other performance characteristics to which PIFUA,
NGPA, PURPA and Clean Air Act regulations attach particular value. They
can also sponsor some of the nontechnological research and demonstration
activities which we believe must be pursued, including ongoing monitoring
of regulator y_ changes in PURPA 136 and the Clem Air Act, and regional
i
trends in utility avoided costs and offset banking and trading.
x
Either agency could then serve a vital role as a central repository
of information for manufacturers, distributors and prospective users of fuel
cells (as well as for promoters of other state-of-the-art technologies in
a position to benefit from the results of such work), and could sponsor
136 Seenote 91, supra, illustrating the potential for major alter-
ations in regulatory requirements and the need for constant monitoring in
this rapidly developing field.
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technical symposia and workshops to disseminate this kind of information to
interested participants, while providing an ongoing forum for the communica-
tion of private sector needs and perceptions to government agencies in a
position to respond.
:E
Finally, based on these kinds of activities, NASA, DOE and other
interested federal agenc ,a c,-.x.d actively initiate and sponsor legislation
to reduce prevailing uccertainties, remove unnecessary legal, institutional
and regulr " ory barriers. and pro-Tide incentives where necessary to assist
fuel cells through the trankittou from the laboratory to the cooimercial
arena.
f
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VI, SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this study has been to identify and assess legal and
institutional factors likely to affect the development and commercial diffu-
sion of phosphoric acid fuel cells, and to help define issues for future
research and action. The study has addressed matters relevant to both
central and dispersed utility operations and to on-site applications. It has
examined both perceived barriers and potential opportunities for fuel cell
commercialization. Key issues are discussed from the viewpoint of various
participants in the fuel cell commercialization process: the fuel cell
manufacturers, fuel cell distributors, fuel cell end users, and the federal
government.
Major federal legislation analyzed for this study includes the
Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 (PIFUA), the Natural Gas
Policy A.-, t (NGPA), the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA),
and the Clean Air Act.
In general, the study concludes that the potential barriers to fuel
cell commercialization presented by PIFUA and NGPA are not as serious as
some have supposed and should not seriously deter fuel cell use except in
certain commercial and industrial applications in regions where natural gas
shortfalls are likely and alternate fuel are unavailable. Perhaps even more
importantly, the analysis of PURPA and the Clean Air Act reveals attractive
opportunities for fuel cells in certain setting-.
The specific findings of this study have fundamental implications for
demonstration and market assessment activities as well as for the design
and sizing of fuel cell systems, and can affect each of the participants in
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the commercialization process differently. More specific conclusions which
emerged from this study are summarized below.
PIFUA was enacted by the U.S. Congress to restrict the use of petro-
leum and natural gas in "electric powerplants" and "major fuel burning instal-
;
lations," and accordingly has been perceived as a potential deterrent to the
commercialization of fuel cells using these fuels or their derivatives.
However, analysis of the Act reveals that most fuel cell applications will
6
a
not be subject to PIFUA's restrictions at all, and those which arguably could
i
be generally should be able to obtain exemptions from these restrictions.
i
Specifically:
1
(a) A fuel cell standing alone should not be subject to the Act's
fuel restrictions, irrespective of the magnitude of its generating capacity.
(b) Certain multimegawatt fuel cell cogeneration systems with
supplemental-fired boilers (or possibly waste heat recovery boilers) may be
subject to PIFUA's prohibitions on the use of natural gas or petroleum-derived
fuels. However, these facilities generally should be able to obtain permanent
exemptions as "cogeneration facilitie%" on "public interest" grounds. To
qualify, fuel cell operators must restrict electrical energy sales to others
(e.g., local electric utilities or industrial purchasers) to 50 percent or
less of their facilities' electrical output. Some operators, however, can
escape even this restriction if the y can qualify for a permanent exemption
on an alternative ground such as environmental restrictions on the use of
coal or other non-oil or -gas fuels in their area.
Like PIFUA, the NGPA has heen perceived to establish significant
disincentives for prospective fuel cell users. Here again, analysis reveals
that these disincentives are less serious than frequently perceived, although
SOMV of the provisions of this Act can impact on fuel cell marketing strategy.
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For the purpose of this study, Titles I, II, and IV of the Act were analyzed.
Title I establishes a schedule for the phased decontrol of wellhead
prices paid by gas pipeline operators to domestic producers for certain
categories of natural gas. Specifically, the Act gradually deregulates the
wellhead price of categories of domestic natural gas produced after 1977
("new gas"). Starting with a base price of $1.75 per MMBtu in April 1977,
the price of such categories of new gas is permitted to rise at a rate tied
to the annual rate of inflation. On January 1, 1985, these price controls
are scheduled to be completely removed, and new gas would be permitted to
command whatever price the marke< <.juld bear. NGPA continues the pre-NGPA
price controls on categories of natural gas produced prior to 1977 ("old
gas"), but permits an annual upward adjustment linked to the general rate
of inflation. These price controls on old gas, unlike those on new gas,
will continue indefinitely after 1985.
NGPA Title II was enacted partially to shield high-priority natural
gas users (e.g., residential and small commercial customers) from the
effects of wellhead price increases permitted under Title I's phased
decontrol schedule, by passing through a portion of these increases, via
surcharge, to certain lower-priority industrial facilities utilizing natural
gas as a fuel to produce steam or electricity. Industrial fuel cell facilities
may or may not be subject to such surcharges in the first instance under
NGPA's existing regulations, but even if they are, many should qualify for
exemption as "small" facilities, qualifying cogeneration facilities, electric
utility generation systems or other expressly exempted users; only certain
systems exceeding 1.4 MW seem likely to encounter difficulty in escaping a
Although both Titles I and II are considered can,iidates for repeal or
modification, as discussed in the report, it appears that in any case
natural gas prices will approach petroleum market price levels and that the
incremental pricing provisions (if retained) will not shield high-priority
gas customers from these price increases. Assuming that fuel cells begin
to reach the commercial market in the mid- to late 19809, all potential
fuel cell operators — residential, commercial, industrial or other — Consid-
ering natural gas as a fuel will be facing natural gas prices which equal
or approach decontrolled petroleum prices. By the late 1980s, domestic gas
prices will be inextricably linked with OPEC oil pricing decisions and other
events in the global petroleum market. The resultant premium prices for
natural gas (and petroleum products such as naphtha and distillate and
residual fuel oils as well) can be expected to adversely affect the economics
of fossil-fueled fuel cell systems in relation to nonfossil-fueled technologies.
These prospects underscore the need to develop capabilities for opera-
tion on fuels such as methane which can be derived from nonfossil sources:
for some users, a nonfossil fuel capability may be a more powerful inducement
to fuel cell use than any of the unique features characteristic of the
technology. However, since decontrolled prices will also affect conventional
generation and cogeneration technologies using natural gas, a central issue
for fuel cell commercialization will continue to be the relative impact of
these developments on fuel cells vis a vis competing fossil-fueled options.
In addition to decontrol and incremental pricing, NGPA Title IV
establishes a curtailment priority scheme governing the allocation of natural
gas supplies to interstate pipeline customers during serious natural gas
shortages. Under this scheme, the highest priority (P1) natural gas customers
include residences, small cormercial establishments, schools, hospitals,
police and fire protection, and sanitation and correctional facilities.
152
i
i
Second highest priority (P2) is accorded to essential agricultural uses.
These are followed by large commercial users (P3) and industrial users,
including electric utilities (P4-P10).
Title IV defines "residence" as "a dwelling using natural gas predomi-
nantly for residential purposes such as space heating, air conditioning,
hot water heating, cooking, clothes drying, and other residential uses, and
includes apartment buildings and other multi-unit buildings." The current
definition does not differentiate between natural gas utilized directly (e.g.,
in a gas stove or gas-fired furnace) and natural gas utilized indirectly
(e.g., in a steam or gas turbine to produce electricity); so long as it is
used predominantly for "residential purposes" on the site, it will be
accorded high priority status.
"Commercial" service is service to natural gas customers "engaged
primarily in the sale of goods or services including institution:, and local,
state, and federal government agencies for uses other than manufacLuring or
electric power generation." (Emphasis added.) Although commercial customers
generally are accorded either P1 or P3 status depending en the size of their
peak gas requirements, gas used in fuel cells for electric generation would
not be eligible for such priorities, and would be curtailed as P4 or lower
during severe shortages. Unlike commercial establishments, Title IV does
not preclude schools and hospitals or "essential agricultural uses" (as
determined by the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture) from utilizing natural gas
allocations for electrical generation purposes, nor does it impose ceilings
on the quantity of high priority natural gas available to them.
If higher gas prices resulting from Title I's decontrol program in
fact lead to reduced demand and/or increased domestic gas production, then
shortages should be ameliorated and curtailments should be minimized or
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forestalled. until then, however, the possibility of natural gas curtail-
meats can be expected to affect decisions by prospective fuel cell manufac-
turers, marketers and users, respectively, concerning technical specifica-
tions, marketing options and the viability of particular applications.
Depending on the participants' assessments of the likelihood, Breadth and
severity of future curtailments, rational responses might range from total
disinterest in natural gas-fired cells. to modest changes in specifications,
market selection criteria or fuel supply arrangements.
The effects of present curtailment policies will vary by geegraphical
region as well as by type of application. In regions of the country histor-
ically subject to natural gas shortfalls, low-priority gas customers could
experience curtailments which would preclude the use of fuel cells without
fuel-switching capability and ready access to alternate fuels such as naphtha
or propane. For those interested in identifying early entry markets, the
regional occurrence and variability of gas curtailments should be considered
among the factors likely to influence user choices.
In addition to monitoring the prospects for curtailments from this
perspective, it would be useful to develop long-term regional supply and
demand forecasts for natural gas, naphtha and other fuels feasible for fuel
;ell operation. If properly disaggregated by region and by class of poten-
tial fuel cell owner (e.g., residential, commercial and industrial) accord-
ing to curtailment priority status, these forecasts should help identify
types of potential fuel cell owners in certain regions who mdy face a
substantial curtailment risk and who may not have ready access to naphtha
or other alternative tuels. These forecasts could also serve to allay any
concerns of potential fuel cell owners who are in no foreseeable danger of
natural gas curtailments in areas where gas shortages are not expected.
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The analysis of PIFUA and NGPA summarized here suggests that these
regulatory schemes would not prohibit fuel cells using natural gas or petro-
leum derivatives in most applications, and probably would not seriously dis-
courage their use except in certain commercial and industrial applications
in regions where natural gas shortages are likely and alternate fuels are
unavailable. These conclusions can serve an important function in dispelling
industry uncertainty and narrowing concerns over the implications of federal
fuel use and pricing policies. That function is essential in the larger
commercialization effort, since uncertainty and apprehension in themselves
constitute very real barriers to proceeding. In this sense, those conclu-
sions satisfy certain necessary
 but insufficient conditions for further
interest in and progress toward commercial fuel cell use. Beyond this, it
remains to examine positive legal and regulatory inducements which can
encourage prospective fuel cell users to invest in this new technology.
Both PURPA and the Clean Air Act provide such inducements.
Title II of PURPA is intended to foster competition in electric
generation by encouraging independent prcducers to undertake small-scale
generation using nonconventional fuels, and to increase fuel efficiency
through cogeneration. The arrangements mandated by PURPA have far-reaching
implications for the future structure of the nation's electric supply
Industry, ind possibly for development and marketing decisions affecting
some types of fuel cells.
Title II's benefits, reviewed below, are available to two types of
facilities: "small power production facilities" and "cogeneration facilities."
A small power production facility is defined as one which produces up to
80 M1^ of electricity using; biomass, waste, renewable resources or geothermal
as its primary energy source. A cogeneration facilit y
 is one which produces
electricity and other useful energy (including steam or heat) for "industrial,
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commercial, heating, or cooling purposes," without regard to the site of
the facility or the type of fuel used. To qualify for PURPA benefits,
facilities must meet certain technical standards and must be owned by a
person or persons not primarily engaged in the generation or sale of	 F
i
electric power," which means that the facilities must be owned not more
than 502 by an electric utility or utilities, electric utility holding
company or companies, their subsidiaries or combinations thereof. FBRC
rules permit gas utilities to own qualifying facilities eligible for
Title II's benefits, including "avoided cost" sales to electric utilities.
If a fuel cell facility were planned to utilize only the electric
output and none of the cells' thermal potential, then it could not qualify
as a cogeneration facility, but would have to qualify, if at all, as a
small power producer. This means that it would have to satisfy the fuel
use and size restrictions indicated above. First-generation cells using
natural gas or naphtha would not satisfy the fuel use restrictions, and therefore
would not be eligible whatever their size. Future fuel cell configurations
utilizing methane or other fuels produced from biomass or waste could satisfy
the fuel use restrictions, and would qualify if their power production
capacity were 80 MW or less and if PURPA's ownership criteria were met.
On the other hand, if a fuel cell facility were planned to utilize
both the cells' electric and thermal output, then it would meet PURPA's
definition of a cogeneration facility regardless of the type of fuel used
or the facility's size, subject only to ownership criteria and certain
technical standards which appear well within current fu:.l cell capabilities.
For qualifying fuel cell installations, PURPA virtually ensures a
market for as much of their electric output as they might choose to sell.
As interpreted by FERC, the Act also ensures that in many cases the prices
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paid for this output will be substantially higher than they might have been
without PURPA.
To ensure a market for small power producers and cogenerators,
PURPA and FERC rules generally require electric utilities to purchase all
the electric output offered by qualifying facilities with which the utility
is interconnected and (subject to the outcome of litigation now pending) to
interconnect with any qualifying facility where necessary to accomplish such
purchases. To ensure prices above those which independent power producers
might otherwise have commanded from monopsony purchasers, FERC rules (also
under challenge) require purchase rates equal to the purchasing utility's
incremental or "avoided cost" of power, typically exceeding the utility's
average embedded costs which might otherwise limit power purchase rates.
These rules provide that qualifying facilities are entitled to be
paid avoided cost rates for their entire output even where they are simul-
taneously purchasing electricity from the utility at its lower average
cost for use in their own operations. Under this scheme, which so far has
withstood legal challenges, qualifying facilities may purchase all of their
electricity requirements at average-cost retail rates and sell all of their
electric output at marginally-priced avoided cost rates. Opportunities to
profit from FERC's simultaneous purchase and sale rule may be enhanced in
areas where qualifying facilities are among the customer classes which an
electric utility serves under time-of-day rates. Design decisions which
take into account technical characteristics valued under PURPA can further
enhance fuel cell economics and marketability.
In addition to these power purchase requirements, FERC rules exempt
qualifying small power producers of up to 30 MW capacity (80 MW for geothermal
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or biomass-fueled facilities) and all qualifying cogeneratios from the major
burdens of federal and stat ,° utility regulation governing wholesale power
sales (though not from those governing retail sales of electricity or heat
to nonutility purchasers, which typically will be regulated under existing
state laws unless they involve limited distribution systems based on indi-
vidually negotiated contracts).
Apart from PURPA's benefits, other legal and regulatory inducements
for the deployment of fuel cell powerplants arise from their benign environ-
mental characteristics. Specifically, the fuel cell's nonpolluting charac-
teristics can translate into very real and very tangible economic value
under conditions defined by the federal Clean Air Act and regulations and
by state air quality regimes in furtherance of the federal scheme. Where
such conditions obtain, these regulations can provide the opportunity for
potential fuel cell owners or operators to realize substantial savings and/
or income which would not accrue from the use of competing generation or
cogeneration equipment.
Operators of existing polluting generating sources (for example,
diesel generators and oil- or gas-fired boilers) can replace them with fuel
cells and thereby create "emissions reduction credits." These credits,
which have actual dollar values, can be applied as offsets to reduce pollu-
tion control or other costs otherwise associated with plant renovations or
expansions; they can he sold to others for similar purposes; or they can be
"banked" for future internal or external use. "New source" operators can
acquire fuel cells to meet on-site needs and minimize external offset require-
ments and costs, or even to be used b y other, existing sources in the area
as offsets for the new source's incremental emissions.
Assuming the continuation of the current regulator y regime, prime
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targets of opportunity for fuel cell marketing in terms of air quality
leveraging possibilities should include operators of existing and new major
sources — generally, utilities and large-scale industrial facilities — in
poor air quality areas with significant demands for "bubble," "netting,"
nonattainment and/or P5D increment exceedance offsets. Except for unusually
large facilities or those in poor air quality regions with particularly
stringent regulations affecting even minor sources, commercial and residen-
tial operations are far less sensitive to air quality regulation, and
on-site fuel cell installations in these situations can benefit correspond-
ingly less from air quality leveraging under existing schemes.
Ongoing market research will be needed to identify particularly
attractive areas and entities. Within this group of potentially attractive
market areas, those areas which have active offset trading and banking
programs with relatively few restrictions should be slated for early marketing
activities.
While this study has evaluated the impact of several major pieces of
federal energy legislation on the commercialization of fuel cell powerplants,
it has by
 no means been exhaustive. Other legal and institutional consider-
ations, including those arising from state and local laws and regulations,
should be reviewed for possible adverse or beneficial impacts on fuel cells.
Much of the federal legislation reviewed here requires implementation and
enforcement by state regulatory agencies. The nature of their actions will
var y
 from state to state, and in some areas, these agencies remain in rela-
tively early stages of rulemaking. Continuous and systematic monitoring of
changes in controlling laws and regulations and in related developments, such
as avoided cost trends for individual electric utilities nationwide, regional
gas curtailment practices and air quality developments in different localities,
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is critical to all of the participants in fuel cell cosbssrcialization.
At the state and local level, one of the most important and far-
reaching issues for future attention is the possible conflict between gas
and electric utility-provided energy services in areas covered by electric
utility franchises. This will require analysis of court and commission
interpretations governing the scope of such franchises, as well as examirt
tion of specific franchises in particular cases. Since issues arising in
this area may significantly affect the structure of the industry affected
by commercialization efforts, they should receive early attention.
While this study has identified various factors potentially bearing
on market assessment, such as natural gas curtailment policies and antici-
pated regional supply variations, electric utility avoided costs and air
quality considerations, these factors will need to be quantified where
possible to identify specific market segments which are particularly attrac-
tive for fuel cells. Toward this end, efforts should be undertaken to:
(a) Identify specific electric utilities whose avoided energy and!or
capacity costs are anticipated to be especially high in the latter half of
the 19809 and thereafter. Section IV.B. of the report discusses character-
istics of electric utilities which contribute to high avoided costs and
offers some examples of utilities with currently high avoided costs. The
service areas of such electric utilities could be targeted in the manufac-
turers' initial market penetration strategies, and particular classes of
potential fuel cell users within those areas identified as attractive can-
didates to acquire fuel cells (by virtue of their ability to capitalize on
PURPA sales to utilities).
(b) Identify specific nonattainment areas which are expected to
require hydrocarbon and nitrogen dioxide offsets and particulate matter
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offsets after 1987, and certain types of sources in attainment areas V-hich
may require offsets in the same time frame. Within this group of potentially
attractive market areas, the most desirable will be those which have active
and ongoing formal offset trading and banking programs with a minimum of
\l
"red tape," and in which external offset transactions command the highest
prices.
(c) Identify regions of the country that have experienced natural
gas shortages which have necessitated gas curtailment practices designed
to protect high-priority gas end-users (such as residences, schools and
hospitals) by curtailing low-priority ones.
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APPENDIX A - FEDERAL AND STATE AIR QUALITY REGULATORY REGIMES
PROMOTING FUEL CELL COMMERCIALIZATION
BY
KEVIN D. SHEEHY
I. INTRODUCTION
This appendix explains the workings of the federal and state air
quality regulatory regimes impacting industrial facilities and other
"stationary sources," and describes the manner in which these regimes may
serve to foster the commercialization of fuel cells in the late 1980s and
thereafter.
Section II of this appendix differentiates the federal air quality
regulatory provisions governing "existing stationary sources" and governing
"major new sources" and "major modifications" in "nonattainment" and
"attainment" areas. It describes four methods whereby such source types
may be required, either to avoid or comply with certain state or local
air pollution control regulations, to 'offset" their air pollutant emissions:
"bubble," "netting," nonattainment, and PSD increment exceedance offsets.
Section III examines more closely the methods whereby offsets are
created, traded and banked. It describes current offset trading and banking
activities, as well as future trends in these activities based, alternatively,
on t a current air quality regulatory regime and on proposed changes in the
federal Clean Air Act.
Section IV relates future offset trading and banking trends to
fuel cell commercialization efforts in the latter part of this decade and
thereafter, and suggests several potentially attractive markets for fuel
cells in this time frame which should be the subject of future market
research.
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II. FEDERAL AIR QUALITY REGULATORY PROVISIONS
GOVERNING THE SITING, OPERATION AND EXPANSION
OF STATIONARY SOURCES
A. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF STATIONARY SOURCE REGULATION
Section II describes in broad terms those sections of the federal
Clean Air Act and EPA's implementing regulations which exert a significant
impact nationwide upon the siting, operation and expansion of air pollutant-
emitting industrial facilities and other "stationary sources," and which,
we believe, can provide a potentially significant impetus to fuel cell
marketing efforts geared to both utility and nonutility entities.
This subsection presents a brief overview of relevant features of
the federal regulatory scheme for stationary source emissions. Following
subsections provide greater detail on specific portions of the scheme.
Exercising its authority conferred by the federal Clean Air Act,1
EPA has promulgated national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for the
following criteria pollutants: sulfur dioxide (SO 2), nitrogen dioxide (NO2),
carbon monoxide (CO), particulate matter (PM), and ozone (03 ). 2 The
standards for each of these criteria pollutants have taken two forms:
primary NAAQS to protect the "public health" and secondary NAAQS to
1Clean Air Act (hereafter CAA) 1109.
2EPA has also promulgated NAAQS for lead, but this criteria pollutant
has no relevance to our analysis of fuel cells. Standards for "noncriteria"
pollutants (e.g., asbestos, fluorides, and vinyl chloride) are also beyond
the scope of this report.
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protect the "public welfare"; Phi and S0 2 are the only criteria pollutants for
which EPA has developed secondary NAAQS that exceed the primary NAAQS. 3 Air quality
control regions, and portions of such regions, which presently exceed primary or
secondary NAAQS are denominated as nonattainment areas; those regions
that comply with NAAQS are classified as attainment areas. 4 Depending upon
the relative mix of pollutants within that region, a given region may have
both a nonattainment status for one or more criteria pollutants, and an
attainment status for the remaining criteria pollutants.
The Clean Air Act generally requires each state to develop, and
submit to EPA for approval, a state implementation plan (SIP). 5
 The SIP
must be able to demonstrate attainment of the primary NAAQS for each of the
criteria pollutants in all of its nonattainment areas by December 31, 1982;
for the 03
 and CO primary NAAQS, a state which can demonstrate its inability
to meet the 1982 attainment deadline in a particular nonattainment area,
despite the implementation of all "reasonably available control measures"
(RACM), is permitted to extend its attainment deadline to December 31, 1987.6
The state's SIP must also demonstrate that secondary NAAQS will be attained
"as expeditiously as practicable" in all nonattainment areas. 7
 Finally, the
3CAA section 109.
4 Id. section 107(d). Hereafter, we will also use the term "attain-
ment area" to refer to areas for which available information is insufficient
to classify as "nonattainment." Id.
5 Id. section 110.
6 Id. section 172(a)(1), (2). A construction moratorium is placed upon
major new facility construction in states whose SIPs are deemed by EPA to
be inadequate to meet these statutory attainment deadlines. Id. section
110(a)(2)(I).
7 1d. section 172(a)(1).
1
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SIP must contain a program which ensures that NAAQS for each criteria
pollutant are maintained in all attainment areas.8
A state's SIP must impose emissions limitations on "existing" and
"new" stationary sources (and schedules for compliance with these limitations)
which ensure the attainment and maintenance of NAAQS for each region 9 The
SIP must also include provisions requiring permits for the construction and
operation of "new" and "modified" "major stationary sources" in nonattainment
areas (hereafter, Clean Air Act Part D requirements, or "nonattainment"
regulations) 10
 and in attainment areas (hereafter, CAA Part C requirements,
or Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality (PSD) regulations. 11
These terms and regulatory provisions are described more fully in the
following subsections.
8 Id. sections 110(a)(2)(B), 161.
9 Id. section 110(a) (2) (B) .
10 Id. sections 171 et seq. (Part D).
11 Id. sections 160 et seq. (Part C)
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B. EXISTING STATIONARY SOURCES
1. SIP EMISSIONS LIMITATIONS
As previously noted, "existing" stationary sources 12 in both
nonattainment and attainment areas within a particular state are subject
to specific emissions limitations (and concomitant schedules) within an
EPA-approved SIP as part of the state's overall strategy to attain and
maintain NAAQS on a statewide basis within the time frame of the Clean
Air Act.
At this point, it is useful to illustrate the workings of an SIP in
relation to an existing source within a particular nonattainment or attainment
area. A stationary source is "any building, structure, facility, or instal-
lation which emits or may emit any air pollutant." 13 One example of an
existing stationary source is an industrial facility with several produc-
tion process units emitting the same type of pollutant; a state SIP might
list different specific emissions limitations by pollutant (e.g., tons-
per-year or pounds-per-hour of hydrocarbons) for each of the process
units. As another example, the operator of a utility powerplant with
several boiler stacks might be required to comply with a uniform emis-
sions limit by pollutant (e.g., X pounds-per-hour of SO 2) at each of
the stacks.
12 The differentiation between existing and new stationary
sources hinges upon whether a source predates the publication date for
relevant air quality implementing regulations promulgated by EPA. Id.,
sections 111(a)(2), (b).
131d., section 111(a)(3)
,,
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to be major sources: that is, stationary sources which emit or have the
potential to emit 100 tpy (9.072 X le kg/y) or more of a pollutant. 14 To
the extent necessary to ensure that NAAQS are achieved and maintained,
an SIP should also include a program for enforcing emissions limitations
on existing sources which are minor sources — that is, those that emit
less than 100 tpy. In other words, some air pollution control agencies
will only need to enforce emissions limits on major sources, and others
will need to do so for both major and minor sources.
2. RACT
Operators of existing sources in nonattainment areas are additionally
required to implement reasonably available contrcI technology (RACT) at
these sources, as part of an overall SIP strategy to ensure "reasonable
further progress" toward attainment by the statutory deadlines of the Clean
Air Act. 15
3. "BUBBLE" POLICY
In December 1979, EPA implemented a bubble policy to afford
operators of existing sources in nonattainment and attainment areas a
certain degree of flexibility in complying with the emissions limitations
14 id., sections 100(a)(2)(D), 302(j). See section II.C.1. of
this Appendix for a detailed description and examples of "sources"
and "major sources."
15
1d., section 172(b)(3).
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contained in the state SIPs. 16 As previously noted, prior to this
policy's inception, SIPu required the operator of an existing facility
to comply with specified emissions reductions at each emissions point
within the facility. Now, an operator can satisfy the aggregate
required emissions reductions for a given pollutant at the facility
by placing a "bubble" over the facility's emissions points (stacks,
vents, ports, etc.), and optimizing the costs of pollution control:
that is, by instituting additional emissions reductions below required
levels at one or more emissions points with low pollution control
costs, as a substitute (on a one-for-one basis) for required emissions
reductions at one or more other points with high pollution control
costs. For example, the operator of the previously mentioned industrial
facility could undertake additional reductions of hydrocarbons at one
or more of the other units. Similarly, the utility operator of the
powerplant might be permitted to optimize the mix of low-sulfur coal
and stack cleaning controls at each of its boilers to satisfy the
plant's aggregate required emissions limitations for SO 2 , in lieu of
achieving uniform emissions limitations for SO 2 at each stack.
EPA is permitting multiplant emissions trades as well, as part of
its "bubble" policy. 17 The operator or operators of two or more existing
sources within an attainment or nonattainment area must be able to show
that application of a bubble approach to the facilities collectively will
be consistent with the attainment and maintenance of NAAQS in the area.
1644 Fed. Reg. 71780-71788 (December 11, 1979).
1744 Fed. Reg. 71782, 71783, 71788 (December 11, 1979).
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4. EXPANSIONS OF EXISTING FACILITIES
In addition to optimally deploying pollution controls at existing
emissions points, the operator of an existing facility must also consider
the incremental pollution control requirements of planned or potential
facility expansions. Generally speaking, expansions of existing facilities
are subject to the same types of SIP emissions limitations mentioned above.
Special rules govern, however, facility expansions or modifications which
are deemed by the Clean Air Act to be "major modifications." The applica-
bility of these rules ("nonattainment" and PSD regulations) to "major
modifications" (and to "major new sources" as well) is discussed in the
following subsection.
C. MAJOR NEW SOURCES AND MAJOR MODIFICATIONS
1. COMMON TERMS OF NONATTAINMENT AND PSD REGULATIONS
As we have indicated, stationary sources deemed to be "major new
sources" and "major modifications" are subject to nonattainment regulations
and/or PSD regulations. In this subsection, we define and illustrate the
terms "source," "major new source" and "major modification" as utilized
in these two sets of regulations.
Until recently, the terms "source," "major new source," and "major
modifi--ation" have had substantially different meanings in the nonattainment
and PST) regulaLlOns. In March of 1981, the EPA, putting into effect the
Reagan dminist:atiw1i's stated policy of relaxing federal regulatory regimes
to stimulate economic development, pro`^"ea to alter the definitions of
..-8
4these terms in its nonattainment regulations, in order to bring them in
line with their usage in the PSD regulations. is
 EPA staff has indicated
that these proposed definitional changes will be approved by EPA in final
form without substantial alteration during the next several months, and,
for purposes of our analysis, we assume that the PSD and nonattainment
usages of these terms will, in fact, be substantially similar (with cer- 	 P
tain exceptions enumerated below).
a. "SOURCE"
The current PSD and proposed nonattainment definition of station-
ary source is "any building, structure, facility, or installation which
emits or may emit any air pollutant subject to regulation under the Act." 19
In turn, "building, structure, facility, or installation" means "all of
the pollutant-emitting activities which belong to the same [two-digit
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) ("Major Group") code], are loca-
ted on one or more contiguous or adjacent properties, and are under the
control of the same person (or persons under common control)." As an
example, EPA would generally consider an entire industrial plant (rather
than an individual piece of process equipment located within the plant)
1845 Fed. Reg. 52676 (August
46 Fed. Reg. 16280 (March 12, 1981)
changes).
7, 1980) (current PSD regulations);
(proposed nonattainment regulation
1940 CFR 51.24(b)(5); 40 CFR 52.21(b)(5); 40 CFR 51.18(j)(1)(i);
40 CFR 52.24(f)(1); 40 CFR Part 51, Appendix S, section II.A.1.
20
40 CFR 51.24(b)(6); 40 CFR 52.21(b)(6); 40 CFR 51.18(j)(1)(ii);
40 CFR 52.24(f)(2); 40 CFR Part 51, Appendix S, section II.A.2.
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to be a "source." The implications of this regulatory approach of ajL-
&ragatin& pollutant-emitting units of a plant into one "source" will
become clearer as we illustrate the workings of the nonattainment and
PSD regulations in subsequent subsections. Each "source" is classified
by a two-digit SIC code according to itsrP imary activity (as determines
by its principal product(s) produced or distributed, or by services
rendered); consequently, supgort facilities (which standing alone could
nave different SIC codes) are lumped together with primary facilities as
a single "source". As an example, the emissions of a boiler used to
generate process steam for a pulp mill would be attributed to the mill;
if the boiler serves both a pulp mill and a plywood plant, the boiler's
total emissions are attributed to whichever of the two plants uses the
bulk of the boiler's annual output. 21
We would anticipate, therefore, that a fuel cell providing on-site
electricity and/or heat to a residential, commercial, industrial or other
facility would generally be regarded as a support activity and aggregated
with the primary activities of the facility as a single stationary source
having the facility's Major Group SIC code: for example, restaurants
(Major Group 58); operators of residential, commercial or industrial
buildings (Major Group 65); hotels and motels (Major Group 70). An open
question remains whether an on-site fuel cell at an industrial plant or
other facility would be considered a source, separate and apart from the
facility, if the bulk of the fuel cell's electrical and/or heat output
2145 Fed. Reg. 52676, 52695 (August 7, 1980).
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is sold to an electric utility or other utility. The implications of
this possibility will be treated in the next section.
b. "MAJOR NEW SOURCE"
The PSD and nonattainment definitions of "major new source" differ
somewhat, although they are based upon the same definition of "source."
For purposes of PSD regulation, a "new" source is generally con-
sidered to be a major source if it emits, or has the potential to emit,
2.268 X 105 kg/y (250 tpy) or more of any pollutant (criteria or noncriteria)
subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act. 22 The PSD definition of
of
	 source" is more inclusive for the following specific types of station-
ary sources which emit, or have the potential to emit, 9.072 X 10" kg/y (100 tpy)
or more of any regulated pollutant: 23 fossil fuel-fired steam electric plants
with heat inputs exceeding 250 million Btu per hour; coal-cleaning plants;
Kraft pulp mills; Portland cement plants; primary zinc smelters; iron and
steel mill plants; primary aluminum ore reduction plants; primary copper
smelters; municipal incinerators with potential inputs greater than 250
tons of refuse per day; hydrofluoric, sulfuric, and nitric acid plants;
petroleum refineries; lime plants; phosphite rock processing plants; coke
oven batteries; sulfur recovery plants; carbon black plants (furnace pro-
cess); primary lead smelters; fuel conversion plants; sintering plants;
2240 CFR 51.24(b)(1)(i)(b); 40 CFR 52.21(b)(1)(i)(b).
2340 CFR 51.24(b)(1)(i)(a); 40 CFR 52.21(b)(1)(i)(a).
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secondary metal production plants; chemical process plants; fossil fuel
boilers (or combinations thereof) totaling more than 2.64 X 10 11
 Joules-
(250 MMBtu-)per-hour input; petroleum storage and transfer units With a total
storage capacity exceeding 4.77 X 104 MS (300,000 barrels); taconite ore process-
ing plants; glass fiber processing plants; and charcoal production plants. 24
For purposes of nonattainment regulation, a "new" source is con-
sidered to be a major source if it emits, or has the potential to emit,
9.072 X 10 4
 kg/y (100 tpy) or more of any regulated pollutant. 25
Potential to emit means the maximum capacity of a stationary
source to emit a pollutant, taking into account air pollution control
equipment; restrictions on hours of operation; restrictions on the type
or amount of material combusted, sorted or processed; and other physical
and operational limitations. 26 In other words, a new facility whose
unabated pollutant emissiots might exceed the appropriate kg/y (tpy) level
(9.072 X 10'' kg/y (100 tpy) or 2.268 X 10 5
 kg/y (250 tpy) ) will not be considered
a "major source" for a given pollutant, if pollution control equipment and/or
other physical or operational limitations bring its potential emissions below
the appropriate kR/y (tpy) level. Normally, facilities capable of generating
24 
We have listed these facilities to suggest them as prime targets
of opportunity for future fuel cell marketi.,6 efforts directed to the
industrial sector. These types of facilities will be major contributors
to economic development in both nonattainment and attainment areas as
they are constructed and expanded. Section IV will describe in greater
detail targets of opportunity for fuel cell commercilization.
2540 CFR 51.18(j)(1)(v); 40 CFR 52.24(f)(5); 40 CFR Part 51,
Appendix S, section II.A.4.
2640 CFR 51.24(b)(4); 40 CFR 52.21(b)(4); 40 CFR 51.18(j)(1)(iv);
40 CFR 52.24(f)(4); 40 CFR Part 51, Appendix S, section II.A.3.
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at least 9.072 X 10 4
 kg/y (100 tpy) of a pollutant, after the imposition of
abatement measures, will fit within one of the categories previously listed
for PSD regulation; that is, "major sources" are generally large-scale
induatri al fsril i tisa_
The following examples illustrate the meaning of the term "major
new source" for nonattainment and PSD regulatory purposes. A firm plans
	 k
to construct and operate a new facility with potential emissions of 1.81X
10 5
 kg/y (200 tpy) PM and 4.5 X 10 4 kg/v (50 tpy) S02 . In an area designated
nonattainment for PM, the facility is a major source of PM only if it falls
within one of the previously enumerated categories of facilities (with emis-
sions exceeding 9.072 X 10 4 kg/y (100 tpy) PM); otherwise, it does not exceed
the 2.268 X 10 5
 kg/y (250 tpy) minimum and is a minor source for PM. The facility
is a minor source for SO2
 in both nonattainment and attainment areas for SO2.
Column a. of Table A-1 contains emissions data for an experimental
fuel cell (utilizing natural gas) emitting the criteria pollutants
502 , PM, NO2 , and HC (hydrocarbons: a regulated precursor of ozone).
From the high values of pollutant emissions in column a., we have calcu-
lated how large a commercial fuel cell (embodying the experimental cell's
emissions performance characteristics) would need to be, in order to
generate at least 9.072 X10'kg/y (100 tpy) of each of these pollutants; the
results of our calculations are listed in column b. of the table. A fuel
cell system producing all (or a substantial portion) of a new source'-
emissions of NO2
 or HC would need to have a capacity on the order ;,f 100 MW
to be considered a "major new source" under the nonattainment regulations;
to constitute a "major new source" under the PSD regulations, tLe comparable
capacity threshold for each of these two pollutants would be 100 MW or
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TABLE A-1
REQUIRED FUEL CELL SIZE TO PRODUCE
9.072X10 KG/Y (100 TPY)
OF A CRITERIA POLLUTANT BASED ON
CURRENT FUEL CELL EMISSIONS LATA
1
a.	 ate.
Emissions*	 Emissions*
b.
=	 Pollutant (kg/MWh)	 (lbs/MWh)
Fuel Cell
Size'	 (MW)
S02 0 - 1.36 X 10-4	 0 - 0.0003 8 X 104
PM 0 - 1.36 X 10-5	 0 - 0.00003 8 X 105
NO2 6.3 X 10
-2
 - 1.1 X.10- 1
	0.139 -0.236 102
HC 1.4X10-2 - 1.0X10-1
	0.031-0.225 102
1This emissions data is for an experimental fuel cell utilizing
natural gas.
Source: Institute of Gas Technology, Handbook of Fuel Cell Performance
(prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy, Contract No. EC-
77-C-03-1545), May 1980, p. 4.
2These values represent the minimum fuel cell size needed to produce
100 tons per year of a particular criteria pollutant. The values are com-
puted from the high values in the range of emissions listen for each pollutant
in column a. It is assumed that the fuel cell is operating at a capacity
factor of 100 percent.
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250 MW, depending upon the type of new source of which the fuel cell would
be deemed to be a part. ` With respect to S0 2 or PM emissions, no conceiva-
ble fuel cell application would be sufficiently large, standing alone, to
satisfy the nonattainment or PSD criteria for a major new source for either
of these latter two pollutants. It bears repeating, however, that the
aggregate emissions of a given pollutant by a fuel cell and other pollutant-
emitting units may be considered collectively to be a major new source,
even though the fuel cell's emissions are too low, by themselves, to
satisfy the emissions threshold for a major new source.
C. "MAJOR MODIFICATION" AND "NETTING"
As we have previuusly indicated, expansions and other modifications
to existing sources which amount to "major modifications" are subject to
the same nonattainment and PSD regulatory regimes as are "major new sources."
The explanation of a "major modification" is less straightforward than that
of a "major source." In the following paragraphs, we will describe and
illustrate the term "major modification" in a broad-brush fashion.
The term "major modification" applies only to certain modifications
of major stationary sources. These may be major sources that currently
exist, or they may be major new sources that will exist at the time a
"major modification" xs proposed to be constructed. 28 Generally, modifica-
27 Fuel cell applications of 100 MW or more would generally be
of interest only to electric utilities considering multimegawatt central
station electrical generation facilities.
28 See II.C.I.b., supra for the definition of "major source"
contained in tLe nonattainment and PSD regulations.
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tions of minor (existing or new) stationary sources are not subject to
nonattainment or PSD review. 29
A major modification is "any physical change in or change in
the method of oper.. ioa of a major stationary source that would result
in a significant net emissions increase of any pollutant [regulated by the
Clean Air Act]." 30
Net emissions increase is the sum of the increase in the source's
emissions due to the proposed modification together with any "contempora-
neous" increases and decreases in emissions from other pollutant-emitting
activities at the source. 31 The federal nonattainment and PSD regulations
deem emissions increases and decreases at the source to be "contemporaneous"
with those from the modification if the increases and decreases occur
within the time period commencing five years prior to construction of the
modification and ending on the date that the emissions increase from the
29 Oneexception under tb2 federal regulations is the modification
of a minor source, when the modification has emissions of a given pollu-
tant equal to those of a major source; in this case, the modification is,
in fact, treated as a "major new source" for regulatory purposes. Another
exception is treated more fully in section II.C.3., infra: a source
which is major for one pollutant may be subject to PSD review for minor
emissions of other pollutants which exceed certain de minimus levels.
Certain state and local agencies regulate, however, both major and minor
sources. See sections II.B.1. and ' T.B.l.a.
3040 CFR 51.24(b)(2); 40 CFR 52.21(b)(2); 40 CFR 51.18(j)(1)(vi);
40 CFR 52.24(f)(6); 40 CFR 'art 51, Appendix S, section II.A.5.
3140 CFR 51.24(b)(3); 40 CFR _1 2.21(b)(3); 40 CFR 51.18(j)(1)(vii);
40 CFR 52.24(f)(7), 40 CFR Part 51, Appendix S, section II.A.6.
i
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modification occurs; however, EPA allows each state latitude in its SIP
provisions for nonattainment and PSD regulations, to define "contemporaneous"
as any "reasonable period" prior to the date of occurrence of an emissions
increase from the modification. 32 The process of summing contemporaneous
emissions increases and decreases is called "netting" and is analogous
to the "bubble" approach for offsetting emissions from different pollutant-
emitting activities within an existing stationary source which is not
undergoing a major modifification.
To constitute a "major modification," the modification must result
in a "net emissions increase" which is both positive and "significant."
EPA has established a "de minimus" level of emissions for each criteria
(and noncriteria) pollutant, which level must be equaled or exceeded,
before the "net emissions increase" from a modification is considered to
be "significant" for that particular pollutant. The de minimus levels
for the five criteria pollutants are as follows: 33
CO	 9.072 X 10 4 kg/y (100 tpy)
NOx 3.63 X 10 4 kg/y (40 tpy)
S02	3.63 X 10 4 kg/y (40 tpy)
PM	 2.27 X 10 4 kg/y (25 tpy)
03
	3.63 X 10 4
 kg/y (40 tpy) (volatile organic compounds)
The following examples illustrate the workings of the definition of
"major modification." The operator of an industrial plant producing 2.7X105
kg/y (300 tpy) S02 (i.e., a major source) plans to modify the facility in 1987:
32
id.
3340 CFR 51.24(b)(23); 40 CFR 52.21(b)(23); 40 CFR 51.18(j)(1)(xiii);
40 CFR 52.24(f)(13); 40 CFR Part 51, Appendix S, section II.A.11.
1
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1) by adding a new production unit which will emit 2.27 X 10" kg/y (25 tpy) S02;
and 2) by increasing the hours of operation at the plant's existing production
units, thereby further increasing the source's emissions of SO2 by 1.8X10 4 kg/y
(20 tpy). Without "contemporaneous" emissions decreases at the major source,
the "net emissions increases" from the source's modifications in 1987 equal
4.1 X 10" kg/y (45 tpy) SO2 and are "significant" (i.e., greater than 3.7 X le kg/y
(40 tpy) SO2); consequently, the modifications to the plant are "major," neces-
sitating PSD review in an SO2 attainment area or nonattainment review in an SO2
attainmeut area or nonattainment review in an SO2 nonattainment area. If, how-
ever, in 1986, the operator of the major source installs additional pollution
control equipment at one or more of the plant's existing production units,
thereby reducing the plant's overall S0 2 emissions by 2.72 X 10" kg/y (30 tpy)
(to a level of 2.45 X 10 5 kg/y (270 tpy) S02), the "contemporaneous" plant
emissions decrease of 2.72 X 10 4 kg/y (30 tpy) SO2 in 1986 can be used to "off-
set" 2.72 X 10" kg/y (30 tpy) SO 2 of the planned 4.1 X 10" kg/y (45 tpy) SO2
emissions increase in 1987 from the proposed plant modifications; the resulting
it
	
emissions increase" of 1.36 X 10" kg/y (15 tpy) SO2 would be less than the
de minimus level of 3.7 X 10" kg/y (40 tpy) S02' and the proposed 1987 source
modifications would not be subject to PSD or nonattainment review. A subse-
quent modification to the plant in 1988, which would contribute 2.72 X10 4  kg/y
(30 tpy) S02 , would, however, be considered a "major modification"; the
"netting of "contemporaneous" emissions increases and decreases of SO 2 at the
plant [ ( -2.72 X 10" kg/y ) (1986) + (4.1 X 10" kg/y) (1987) + (2.72 X 10" kg/y) (1988)
- 4.1 X 10" kg/y SO2 1 1 as of 1988 exceeds the SO2 de minimus threshold of 40 tpy.
1 [(-30 tpy)(1986) + (45 tpy)(1987) + (30 tpy)(1988) - 45 tpy SO2].
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triggered in either of the following circumstances: 1) when a new source
is a major source of a pollutant for which the area (in which the source is
to be located) is designated nonattainment; 2) when a modification of a
source results in a "significant net emissions increase" of a pollutant
,j
for which the source is a major source and for which the area is designated
nonattainment. 34 Once these provisions are triggered, the operator of a
"major new source" or "major modification" must satisfy the following Clean
Air Act nonattainment requirements in order to obtain a permit to construct
and operate the new or modified major source:
a. LAER
The operator is required to install pollution control equipment that
will result in the lowest achievable emissions rate (LAER) for each
pollutant for which the source is a "major new source" or "major modifica-
tion." 35 This emissions rate must be equal to or lower than the allowable
emissions rate for the pollu--_ant resulting from the application of best
availabl- control technology (BACT) to the "major new source" or "major
modification." 36
b. IN-STATE SOURCES UNDER COMON CONTROL
The operator must additionally demonstrate that all existing major
sources within the state which are owned or operated by such person (or by
34 45 Fed. Reg. 52676, 52711 (August 7, 1980).
35 CAAsection 173(2:.
36 
Id., section 171(3).
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any entity controlling, controlled by, or under common control with such
person) ar2 in compliance, or on a schedule for compliance, with all
applicable air quality standards. 37
C, "NONATTAINMENT OFFSET" AND "GROWTH ALLOWANCE" POLICIES
The "major new source" or "major modification" must not interfere
with ongoing state efforts to attain and maintain NAAQS in the nonattain-
ment area. State and local air quality control agencies can ensure the
satisfaction of this condition through one or both of the following
approaches permitted by the Clean Air Act: an emissions offset policy
and a growth allowance policy.
Briefly, in a state with a nonattainment offset policy, the operator of
a "major new source" or "major modification" must obtain surplus emissions
reductions of a pollutant from one or more existing sources in the area to
"offset" on at least a one-for-one basis (to ensure "reasonable further
progress" toward attainment) the incremental emissions of the pollutant
from the new or modified major source. 38 We will describe the workings
of nonattainment offset policies in greater detail in Section III.
In a state with a growth allowance policy, the state has reserved
in its SIP an emissions allowance for "major new sources" and "major
modifications" in a nonattainment area. 38a The state or local air quality
371d. section 173(3).
381d. section 1730)(A).
38aId. section 173(1)(B).
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control agency can allocate emissions from the allowance to these sources
to "offset" their emissions until the allowance is completely allocated,
after which time no new construction can occur without further emissions
reductions (via offsets or emissions standards ratcheting) by existing
sources in the nonattainment area.
3. PSD REGULATIONS
Part C of the Clean Air Act mandates that each state include, within
its SIP, provisions to prevent the significant deterioration of ambient air
quality in attainment areas ("clean" areas). 39 These PSD regulations are
designed to ensure the continuation of economic development within a state's
"clean" areas, through the construction and operation of "major new sources"
and "major modifications," without permitting a "clean" area's air quality
to deteriorate below the NAAQS (and thereby become a nonattainment area).
"Clean" areas fall within one of zhr pe area designations: Class x
(generally national wilderness areas and parks); Class ii (the current
designation of all "clean" areas not deemed to be Class I); and Class iii
(areas desiring substantial economic development). 40 Each of the three
area classifications differs in the amount of air quality deterioration
(and therefore economic growth) that is deemed permissible. This allowable
deterioration is specified by a maximum allowable increase in the ambient
concentration of a pollutant (PSD increment) which may not be exceeded
by new or modified major sources within an attainment area; 41 the "baseline
39rd.,section 161.
40id.,sections 162-164.
41 
rd., section 163.
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for determining air quality deterioration within a "clean" area is
generally the ambient air quality at the time of the first PSD permit
application in the area. 42
 Class I areas have the smallest PSD increments,
and Class III areas have the largest ones: PSD increments for Class I, II,
and III areas represent 2%, 25% and 50%, respectively, of the applicable
NAAQS. 43
 Currently, PSD increments for the three area classifications
have been established only for SO 2 and PM; EPA is studying the possible
establishment of PSD increments for the other criteria pollutants as
well, together with other regulatory alternatives. 44
The PSD regulations are set in motion by the following situations: 45
1) A "major source" of any pollutant locating in an area designated attain-
went for that pollutant or any other pollutant is subject to PSD review; once
PSD review is triggered by the source, PSD review extends to each pollutant
emitted in greater than de minimus amounts (see Section II.C.l.c., above)
for which the area is designated attainment. As an example, a source which
is major only for a nonattainnent pollutant (i.e., "nonattainment" for
the area in which the source is locating) will, nevertheless, be subject
to PSD review for any attainment pollutant(s) emitted by the source in
greater than de minimus amounts. 2) A modification to a "major source"
of any pollutant which is located in an area designated attainment for
42 Id. section 169(4).
43 NationalCommission on Air Quality, To Breathe Clean Air (here-
after NCAQ), March 1981, pp. 148-149.
4446 Fed. Reg. 34044 (June 30, 1981); CAA section 166.
4545 Fed. Reg. 52676, 52710-11 (August 7, 1980).
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zthat pollutant or any other pollutant is subject to PSD review (as a
"major modification") if the modification causes a "significant net
emissions increase" of any pollutant for which the area is designated
attainment. For example, the modification of a major source for a
nonattainment (or attainment) pollutant will be subject to PSD review
for any attainment pollutant(s) emitted by the modification in greater
than de minimus amounts.	
M
Once PSD review is triggered, the operator of a "major new
source" or "major modification" must satisfy the following PSD require-
ments, in order to obtain a permit to construct and operate the new
source or modification:
a. BACT
For "major new sources," "best available control technology"
(BACT) is required for each pollutant emitted by the source in excess
of de minimus amounts. For "major modifications," BACT is required only
for modified or added units at the source which result in a "significant
net emissions increase" for a pollutant emitted by the source. 46
b. INCREMENT EXCEEDANCE OFFSETS
The PSD review process includes a determination of whether a
"major new source" or "major modification" will cause or contribute to
the violation of the PSD increment for an attainment area; if an area's
'46 
CAA sections 165(a)(4), 169(3); 40 CFR 51.24(k)(1), 52.21(k)(1);
45 Fed. Reg. 52676, 52122-23 (August 7, 1980).
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PSD increment is currently exceeded, or will be exceeded as a result of
the proposed construction, the air quality control agency may not issue
a permit for the new or modified major source. 47
In order to avoid a PSD increment exceedance, a state may require
the operator of a new source to secure surplus emissions reductions from
existing stationary sources ("offsets") within an attainment area. To
correct an existing increment exceedance, the operator of a proposed major
source or modification would need to secure sufficient offsets not only
to offset the source's emissions of an attainment pollutant, but also to
rectify the PSD increment exceedance for the pollutant (i.e., an offset/
source emissions ratio in excess of 1:1). If a proposed major source or
modification would result in a new violation of a clean area's PSD
increment for a pollutant, the operator would only need to obtain sufficient
offsets to avoid an increment exceedance (i.e., an offset/source emissions
ratio less than 1:1).
47 CAAsection 165(x)(3).
4843 Fed. Reg. 26380, 26401 (June 19, 1978).
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III, CREATION, TRADING AND BANKING OF "OFFSETS
A. SOURCES AND USES OF OFFSETS
in Section II of this chapter, we reviewed the relevant provisions
and terms of the Clean Air Act and EPA's implementing regulations which
govern the siting, operation, and expansion of stationary sources. In
Section III, we will discuss in greater detail the means whereby "offsets"
are created by, traded among, and banked by operators of stationary
sources. This section lays the groundwork for our discussion in Section IV
of the potential incentives afforded by the "offset" market to fuel cell
commercialization.
As used in this section, the term offset means any emissions
reductions of a particular pollutant at one or more pollutant-emitting
activities of an existing stationary source, which emissions reductions
are over and above those emissions limitations for the pollutant specified
for the existing source in the SIP 4 9 The key point is that onl y existingi
sources cnn c::.dte offsets. As will be made clearer below, new sources
(generally, major sources) must obtain offsets from existing sources. 50
Depending upon the type of source, existing sources (especially
44 t .re, we use the term "existing source" in a broad sense to
include sources in existence in the future for which modifications are
proposed.
50 Aswe have noted in Section II.C.2.c., states can create quasi-
offsets by establishing "growth allowances" for new or modified major
sources in their SIPs and allocating the allowances to operators of these
sources to offset their incremental emissions.
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industrial plants) can create offsets through a variety of methods includ-
ing: addition of pollution control equipment; modification, replacement
or shutdown of equipment, processes, or an entire plant or facility:
changes in hours of operation; changes in process inputs (including fuel
type)or product outputs.
The operator of an existing source may utilize these surplus
emissions reductions as internal offsets (that is, keep them for the
operat^r's own present or prospective needs) or as external offsets
(that is, transfer them by sale, exchange or donation to others for rho
latter's present or prospective use). 51 The circumstances under whim
offsets are required are described below. The process of "banking"
offsets for future internal and/or external usage is detailed in thu
following subsection.
Intra-Source Ofd sets. Operators of existing sources require antra-
source (internal) offsets in the following two situations which we have
described more fully in Section II:
1. "Bubble" applications for existing sources in attainment
or nonattainment areas to meet SIP emissions limitations.
(Sec. II.B.3.) 52
2. "Netting" to avoid nonattainment or PSD review of a propose-
modification to a major source. (Sec. II.C.l.c.)
Inter-Source Offsets. Operators of "major new sources" and It ma`ur
modifications" will need to secure inter-source offsets in the
51 44 Fed. Reg. 3214, 3285 (January 16, 1919); 40 CFR Part
Appendix S. section V.A.
52 Wherea bubble includes two or more sources ("multiplant'; tine
offsets must originate from the sources within the bubble.
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two situations:
1. Offsets to ensure "reasonable further progress" toward
attainment in nonattainment areas. (Sec. II.C.2.c.)
2. Offsets to avoid or correct a PSD increment exceedance
in an attainment area. (Sec. II.C.3)
These inter-source offsets may be internal (i.e., from sources under
common ownership or control with new or modified major source) or
external (i.e., obtained from another entity).
B. CURRENT OFFSET TRADING AND BANKING ACTIVITIES
This subsection describes current nationwide offset trading and
banking activities as background for a later discussion of possible future
trends in offset transactions and their potential impact upon fuel cell
commercialization. 53
1. NONATTAINMENT OFFSET ACTIVITIES
a. STATE NONATTAINMENT OFFSET POLICIES
According to EPA, at the present time, virtually all of the states
have incorporated some form of nonattainment offset provisions in their
53 Weare indebted to Wes Vivian of the University of Michigan
Institute for Public Policy Studies for much of the information on nation-
wide offset activities in this and the following subsections. The data
are drawn from Mr. Vivian's recent seminal study (coauthored by William
Halt) prepared for EPA, entitled: An Examination of U.S. Market Trading
in Air Pollution Offsets (University of Michigan: Ann Arbor), March 1981
(hereafter, Vivian).
I i^
A
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Subject to the Clean Air Act's requirements regarding attainment
deadlines for criteria pollutants and EPA's review and approval of their
SIPS, states and local air quality control agencies are vested with broad
discretion to determine the types and sizes of sources subject to offset
requirements, as well as geographical, temporal and other limitations upon
offset transactions. Because of this latitude, state and local offset
policies vary greatly in their relative complexity and stringency.
SIP definitions of "source," "major source," "major modifications"
and other definitions in the nonattainment provisions must be at least as
stringent as the definitions contained in the federal regulations. 55 As
a result, compared with the federal nonattainment requirements of offsets
for major new sources" (> 9.072 X 10 4 kg/y (100 tpy)) and for "major modifica-
tions" (> 2.27 X 10" - 9.072 X 10 4 kg/y (25-100 tpy) "net emissions increase" depend-
ing upon the pollutant type), at least a handful of state and local air quality
control agencies have very stringent regulations regarding the type of new
sources requiring offsets, including: 56
- Wisconsin: minor and major new sources of HC, SO 2 , CO, or PM
- Ventura County AQMD, CA: new sources > 9.072 X 10 kg/y (1 tpy)of
HC, NOx , SO2 , or PM
- Puget Sound AQMD, WA: minor and major new sources of SO2
- South Coast AQMD, CA: new sources > 6.8 X10 kg/day (150 lb/day)
HC, NOx , SO2 or PM
Other provisions of state or local nonattainment offset regulations
54 Officeof Planning and Management, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Emission Reduction Banking and Trading Status Report, June 15, 1981,
P. 1.
5540 CFR 51.18(j)(1); 45 Fed. Reg. 52676, 52743 (August 7, 1980).
56Vivian, Table 6A.1, p. 6-1.
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may also be unique. As an example, the Bay Area AQMD (San Francisco Bay
Area) in California regulates NO  and HC as precursors of ozone (for which
the Bay Area is nonattainment). The BAAQMD permits the use of inter-
pollutant offsets: HC offsets may substitute for NO  offsets when a new
source would emit NOx.57
State and local air quality control agencies also vary considerably
in the quantitative requirements and geographical limitations imposed upon
offset transactions. SIP provisions must be at least as stringent as
federal regulations which generally permit 0 3 (volatile organic compounds)
or NO  offsets from within a broad area of nonattainment, including the
new or modified major source, but urge air quality modeling for SO 2 , PM
or CO offsets to demonstrate a "net air quality benefit" when the offset
source and major source are not in close proximity. 58 In the following
illustration, one sees the different approaches of New Jersey and the
South Coast AQMD (California) in setting offset ratios — the ratio
between required offsets and emissions of a major source or modification —
as a function of pollutant type, and as a function of distance between the
offset source and the major source or modification: S9
57 id.
5840 CFR 51.18(j)(3)(f); 40 CFR Part 51, Appendix S, section IV.D.;
45 Fed. Reg. 52676, 52746 (August 7, 1980).
59 Vivian, loc. cit.
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South Coast
AQMD, CA
z
Offset Offset
Pollutant Distance Ratio
HC, NO o- 100 mi. >1	 :1
11 100 - 250	 " >1.5:1 
is 250 - 500	 " >2	 :1
S0 2 , PM, CO 0-	 0.5 mi. >1	 :1
if 	 It it
of 	 of 2	 to :1
HC, NOx , S02,
	
0- 15 mi.	 1.2:1PM, CO 
HC, NOx , S02,
	
> 15 mi.	 determined
PM, CO	 by modeling
Finally, states vary in their reliance upon the offset strategy to
improve air quality in nonattainment areas. In reviewing states' proposed
SIP submittals to EPA covering nonattainment areas, Vivian catalogued
the following data on nonattainment area clean-up strategies: 60
1. Thirty states propose both an offset policy and a growth
allowance strategy:
a. Fourteen of these states anticipate a significant demand
for offsets.
b. The remaining sixteen states regard offsets only as a "last
resort" strategy and expect growth allowance allocations to
new sources to handle most of the demand.
2. Eleven states and the District of Columbia propose only an
offset strategy.
3. The remaining states either propose only a growth allowance
strategy or propose neither strategy.
60 Id. PA. 3-5 and 3-6.
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Figure A -1 displays this information on state offset provisions.
Section IV will discuss the implications of these state-to-state variations
for fuel cell commercialization.
b. NATIONWIDE NONATTAINNENT OFFSET TRANSACTIONS
The EPA-funded Vivian study has been the only comprehensive effort
to date to catalogue and analyze the types of offset transactions nation- 	 40
wide. The study listed, as of November 1980,.
	 at least 600 internal offset
transactions approved by air quality officials, and 32 external offset
transactions approved or submitted for review, for major new sources and
modifications proposed for nonattainment areas. 61 California accounted
for more than 500 (or roughly 80 percent) of the approved internal offset
cases and five (or 15 percent) of the approved/pending external offset
cases. 
62 
Figure A -2 depicts the nationwide distribution of nonattainment
offset cases.
Vivian revealed that more than one-half of the 48 offsets transferred
from one entity to another (in the 32 reported external offset transactions)
were donated by the operator of the offset source (22) or were assigned at
no cost by the state (3). The study was able to obtain offset price data
for only eight cases in nonattainment areas within six states. 63 Figure A -3
aggregates this data on a statewide basis by pollutant. The figure is
intended to suggest the state-to-state variability in external offset prices:
for example, particulate matter offsets ranging from $8.70 per 10 3
 kg/y ($8 per tpy)
61 
Id. Table 7B.1, pp. 7-1 ff.
62 
Id.
63 
Id. pp. 4-6, 7.
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FIGURE A-1
STATE NONATTAINMENT OFFSET POLICIES
ORIGINAL PA^E Is
OF POOR QUALITY
OFFSET POLICY ONLY
OFFSET POLICY AS PARALLEL STRATEGY
WITH GROWTH ALLOWANCE POLICY
OFFSET POLICY AS "LAST RESORT" STRATEGY
NO OFFSET POLICY (INCLUDING ALASKA AND HAWAII)
SOURCE' VIVIAN, PP. 3-5, 6; 6-1 FF (TABLE 6A.1).
i
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EXTERNAUINTERNAL NONATTAIN14ENT OFFSET CASES
APPROVED OR PENDING AS OF NOVEMBER 1980
#/# - External Cases (approved or pending)/Internal Cases (approved or pending)
No Entry - No External Cases or Internal Cases approved or pending
STATES WITH GREATER THAN TEN CASES:
California (> 500)	 Indiana (15)
Wisconsin (22)	 Texas (11)
Michigan (16)
SOURCE: Vivian, Table 7B.1, pp. 7-1 ff.
A-33
BORMAL PAGE 4
OF POOR QUALM
FIGURE  A-3
REPORTED PRICES FOR EXTERNAL OFFSETS
BY STATE AND POLLUTANT
($-PER-TPY)
SOURCE: Vivian , pp. 4-6, 7.
A-34
($8 per tpy) in Maryland to $566 per 10' kg/y ($515 per tpy) in Michigan and Texas.
It should be noted that offset price differentials may occur as well between
nonattainment regions within u state.
Summarizing the previously mentioned findings of the Vivian study,
we see that:
1. Nationwide internal offset transactions have outpaced external
ones by a factor of twenty.
2. Of the relatively few external offset transactions to date,
only a small portion have involved the payment of money by the
recipient of the offsets.
3. California has approved the lion's share of offset transactions
nationwide.
Z. OTHER OFFSET ACTIVITIES
To date, the level of activity for offset transactions other than
nonattainment offsets has been low. For certain of these offsets, this has
been due in large part to a lag in the development and implementation of
regulations, as compared with the nonattainment offset policy which was
first instituted by EPA in 1976.64
a. PSD INCREMENT EXCEEDANCE: OFFSETS
Although the rules governing offsets for PSD increment exceedances
were established in June 1978, 65 only a handful of states currently have
6441 Fed. Reg. 55524 (December 21, 1976).
6543 Fed. Reg. 26380 (June 19, 1978).
,y
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attainment areas with PSI) !c^rements in danger of being exceeded (i.e.,
allocatable increment at lf:ss than 15 percent of maximum increment level):
Louisiana (HC) ; Tej.as (11C) ; and North Dakota (SO2) .66 The Vivian study
was able to identify only un.a :'SD offset transaction nationwide: offsets
for S0 2 increment exceeda"ce of a Class I area in North Dakota. 67
b. "BUBBLE" OFFSETS
EPA form;,Iized its h^.bble policy three years after its nonattain-
went offset policy. 	 the Vivian :study indicated three states as having
bubble provisions to t1tcir SIP submittals to EPA: New Jersey (HC); Alabama
(HC, NOx , SO , ,	 '.r', and Indiana (HC, NOx , S02 , PM, C0)-69 In January
1981, EP" _rean^.i'.r^e:i its }rrcvisions for S0 2 and PM "bubbles" and extended	 f
the-m : j include nonattainment areas (as well as attainment areas) in
states unose SIPs had not been fully approved by EPA, 70 and this past April,
EPA approved New Jersey ' s HC "bubble" provisions as a model for other states. 71
This past February, EPA announced that seventy "bubbles" were being
developed by firms, and that at least thirty had been formally submitted to
state agencies for approval. Roughly half of these bubbles were for HC
emissions, and the remainder were evenly divided between PM and S02 . EPA
66 Vivian, Table 6A.1, pp. 6-15, 6-18.
67
1d., Table 7A.1 (Case ND01).
6844 Fed. Reg. 71780 (December 11, 1979).
69 Vivian, Table 6A.1, pp. 6-5, 6-9, and 6-12.
70
U.S. Environmental Protection Agencv, Press Release, "Detailed
Statement on Bubble Policy Changes," January 16, 1981.
71 Officeof Planning and Management, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Emission Reduction Banking and Trading Status Report, June 15, 1981,
p. 2.
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The "netting" rules for major modifications subject to nonattainment
or PSD regulation were only recently finalized. 73
S. BANKING ACTIVITIES
a. BANKING EXPLAINED
As we noted in section IIIA, the operator of an existing source has
several options regarding emissions reductions at the source in excess of
SIP emissions limitations: immediate use of the surplus emission reductions
as internal offsets; immediate transfer to another entity of the reductions
as external offsets; or "banking" the reductions as credits for future usage
as internal or external offsets.74
The "banking" process may be accomplished one of two ways: in
informal banking, the operator of a source keeps internal records of
emissions reductions credits, and presents the records to an air pollution
control agency for certification when the credits are needed as offsets.
72 Officeof Planning and Management, U.S. EPA, The Bubble Policy
Status Report, February 1, 1981, p. 1.
73
45 Fed. Reg. 52676 (August 7, 1980).
7444 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3285 (January 16, 1979); 40 CFR Part 51,
Appendix S, section IV.C.5. The operator of a major new source or major
modification in a nonattainment area may, likewise, bank any acquired
external offsets which exceed the amounts of offsets required to ensure
reasonable further progress in the nonattainment area. Id.
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In formal banking, a state or local agency establishes a central registry
where emissions reduction credits are certified at the time they are
created (for example, when a process is shut down or additional pollution
control equipment is installed at an existing source), recorded as public
information, and stored for future use as offsets.
The formal banking system serves several purposes: The bank reduces
the uncertainty of the owner of the credits that the credits are available
to meet future internal offset requirements necessitated by future construc-
tion of major new sources or modifications. It also serves as a central
repository of information on potential offset avat'nbility for firms seeking
external offsets; over time, as more and more external offset transactions
occur, facilitated by the bank, market prices for external offsets should
become mo-e predictable.
b. FORMAL SYSTEMS IN PLACE OR UNDER CONSIDERATION
In Table A-2, we list the three regional air quality agencies
which currently have formal banking systems in operation, as well as the
twelve states and nineteen local/regional agencies considering the insti-
tution of formal banking systems. Figure A-4 displays this information
on a map; a quick glance at Figure A-2 reveals a fairly good correlation
between states with significant offset case activities and states, locali-
ties or regions actively considering or instituting banking. Of the states,
localities and regions interested in formal banking, the ones leading the
pack in terms of finalizing their proposals for submittal to EPA are:
Oregon; Maryland; Chicago, IL; Southeast Michigan Council of Governments, MI;
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TABLE A-2
FORMAL BANKING SYSTEMS
IN PLACE OR UNDER CONSIDERATION
I. ESTABLISHED BANKING SYSTEMS
Jefferson County (Louisville), KY
Puget Sound (Seattle), WA
San Francisco Bay Area, CA
II. STATES INTERESTED IN FORMAL BANKING
Alabama New Jersey
Colorado New York
Illinois Oregon
Indiana Texas
Maryland Virginia
Minna►ota Washington
III. LOCALITIES AND REGIONS INTERESTED IN FORMAL BANKING
<
Boston, MA
Buffalo, NY
Charleston, SC
Chicago, IL
Cincinnati, OH
Dayton, OH
Detroit/
S.E. Michigan, MI
Evansville, IN
Grand Rapids, MI
Madison, WI
Minneapolis, MN
New ur eans, LA
New York, NY
Portland, OR
Richmond, VA
San Diego, CA
Shasta County, CA
South Coast (Los Angeles), CA
Ventura County, CA
SOURCES: Controlled Trading Project, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, map entitled "Many Cities, Regions, and States
Have Expressed Interest in Banking," undated.
Office of Planning and Management, U.S. Environmantal
Protection Agency, Emissions Reduction Banking and Trading
Status Report, June 15, 1981.
A-39
ORNWMAL PAGE 11
OF POOR QUALITY
77
:I
FIGURE A-4
FORMAL. OFFSET BANKING SYSTEMS
IN PLACE OR UNDER CONSIDERATION
0	 FORMAL BANKING SYSTEM IN PLACE
O	 LOCALITY OR REGION CONSIDERING FORMAL BANKING
® STATE CONSIDERING FORMAL BANKING
SOURCE: TABLE A-Z.
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Ventura County, CA; and Shasta County, CA. 75
As of June of this year, the three operational banking systems had
performed the following activities: 76 Jefferson County, Kentucky, had
logged twenty emissions reduction credit deposits, six credit withdrawals,
and one external trade. The San Francisco Bay Area AQMD had recorded
fifty deposits and was undertaking an outreach program to inform area
industries about the benefits of banking. Puget Sound AQMD in Washington
had approved substantial emissions reduction credit deposits for PM, HC,
and CO emissions.
c. RESTRICTIONS ON OFFSET BANKING AND TRADING
Subject to the general proviso that the Clean Air Act pollution
control requirements be satisfied, EPA permits each state the freedom
"to govern ownership, use, sale, and commercial transactions in banked
emissions offsets as it sees fit. ,77 EPA exhorts each state to "provide
a registry to identify the person, private entity, or governmental authority
that has the right to use or allocate the banked emissions reductions, and
to record any transfers of, or liens on, this right that the reviewing
authority may allow." 78 Given this latitude, states and local agencies
have taken different tacks in establishing ground rules for offset banking
and trading.
75 Officeof Planning and Management, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Emission Rc.iuction Banking and Trading Status Report, June 15, 1981.
76 Td.
77
44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3280 (January 16, 1979).
7I d. , p. 3280.
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At a minimum, major existing sources in areas with offset trading
and banking programs will be permitted to bank emissions reductions credits
to meet present or future internal or external offset demands. State and
local air pollution control agencies have, however, the discretion to
permit or prohibit offset banking and trading by minor sources. EPA
encourages states and localities to permit such offset banking and trading
by minor sources (as a potentially inexpensive supply of offsets) in areas
where major sources may be subjected to substantial incremental pollution
control burdens; however, it notes the potential difficulties of estab-
lishing baseline emissions levels for minor sources, in order to approve
potential emissions reduction credits, and of monitoring such reductions. 78a
The Puge t_ Sound AQMD in Washington permits the owners of formally
banked emissions reduction credits an eight-year period (from the initial
date of deposit) in which to utilize the credits for external or internal
offset purposes.	 During this eight-year period, banked credits will be
discounted on a pro-rata basis only to the extent that EPA requires an
emissions rollback within nonattainment areas to ensure reasonable further
progress to attainment. At the conclusion of the eight-year period, the
AQMD will confiscate unused banked credits and offer them for sale at a
public auction with the proceeds being used to compensate the offset owner
for the taking. This auction provision is designkd to ensure that owners
of banked credits do not tie up the offset market by hoarding credits
indefinitely.
78a Officeof Planning and Management, United States Environmental
Protection Agency, }mission Reduction Manual, September 1980, p. 13.
79 Vivian, Table 6A.1, p. 6-25.
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The Bay Area AQMD in California utilizes a two-tier approach. so
Operators of offset sources may utilize informal banking to keep track of
source emissions increases and decreases used for internal offsets.
Formal banking is required for banked credits used as external offsets.
The AQMD affords owners of formally banked credits a three-year grace
period following banking during which time no banked credits will be
confiscated; following this period, pro-rats reductions of banked credits
may occur, to meet ratcheted air quality requirements, and the AQMD reserves
the right to impose a moritorium on all future credit banking, depending
upon the relative success of efforts to ensure reasonable further progress
to attainment. The grace period is designed to add some regulatory
certainty to the banking and trading process.
The Jefferson County AQMD in (Louisville) Kentucky confiscates a
portion of formally banked emissions reduction credits at the time of deposit. 81
These confiscated credits are reserved by the AQMD for future allocation
to designees of its own choice. The AQMD reserves the right to undertake
future additional confiscations if it encounters difficulties in meeting
attainment deadlines.
The Southeastern Michigan Council of Governments has proposed a
banking plan whereby, after an initial grace period, a portion of a holder's
unused banked credits is periodically subject to confiscation for sale at
public auction (with the auction proceeds providing compensation to the
80 
Id. pp. 6-21, 6-22
81 Id. p. 6-10.
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Timetable for Cunfiscatiun and
Public Auction of Banked
Credits Following Deposit
5 years: 50 percent
7 50
3 25
4	 " 25
6 50
2 25
3 25
4 50
1 100
holder for the confiscation). 82 Different confiscation timetables are
applied to banked emissions reduction credits created in different manners:
Method of Creation
of Banked Credit
Improved Control Technology
Curtailments, Fuel Switches,
Process Changes
Shutdown of Plant if Company
Has Other Manufacturing
in Area
Shutdown of Plant if Company
Has No Other Manufacturing
in Area
One sees a strong policy in this proposed scheme disfavoring industries
leaving an area and reaping an economic benefit (via offsets) from their
plant shutdown.
Other states such as Massachusetts, Conaecticut, Rhode Island and
New York place no time limit on the bankability of emissions reduction
credits. 83
At least two states, Pennsylvania and Oregon, permit offset trans-
actions only between the operator of an offset source and the actual user
of the offset for a major new source or modification. 84 This type of
82 Id. p. 6-13.
83 Id. pp. 6-3 to 6-5.
84
Id. pp. 6-7, 6-24.
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restriction precludes "free trade" in offsets, since it cuts out potential
middlemen such as offset brokers from offset transactions and forces an
entity acquiring offsets in excess of its current external offset require-
ments to bank them for its own future use, in lieu of trading them to a
third party.
We see from these varying approaches the competing tensions that
each state or local air pollution control agency must balance in developing
a banking policy. It must face the contingency that its nonattainment
strategy will fall behind schedule, necessitating additional emissions
reductions from existing stationary sources, additional reductions in
banked emissions reduction credits, and/or more stringent offset require-
ments. By the same token, it must be careful to avoid undue restrictions
upon offset banking and trading, as well as regulatory uncertainties,
which interfere with an efficient banking and trading system; otherwise,
operators of existing sources facing stringent, changing or otherwise
uncertain ground rules for banking and trading may decide to postpone
emissions reductions until an internal or external offset demand arises,
thereby frustrating a state's efforts to foster banking and early air
cleanup. On the other hand, rules lacking time restrictions on the
duration of banking may promote hoarding of potential offsets by firms.
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C. FUTURE OFFSET TRADING AND BANKING TRENDS
1. STATUS QUO AIR QUALITY REGULATORY REGIME
In this section we examine future trends in offset demand, trading
and banking for both nonattainment and attainment areas, with the operating
}
assumption that the federal and state air quality regulatory regimes will
remain substantially similar to the ones currently in place through the
early 1990s. In the following section, we describe changes in these regu-
latory approaches proposed by the National Commission on Air Quality and
by the Reagan Administration, and explore the implications of these
proposals for future offset trading and banking activities.
a. NONATTAINMENT OFFSETS AND NETTING
The National Commission on Air Quality (NCAQ) 85 has developed
projections on the ability of nonattainment areas nationwide to attain
NAAQS by the Clean Air Act deadlines in 1982 and 1987. 86
 Its studies
indicate that certain regions of the country probably will not meet the
federal deadlines for attainment. Figures A-5 through A-8 depict
the results.
Figure A-5 contains the NCAQ projections for ozone nonattainment
areas in 1982 and 1487. 87
 NCAQ projects that at least the following regions
85 Inthe 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act, Congress established
NCAQ to study, and report on, alternative air pollution control technolo-
gies and strategies and the efficacy of the current air quality regulatory
regime. CAA section 323. In March 1981, NCAQ released its report to the
Congress entitled 7b Breath Clean Air (hereafter NCAQ).
86 SeeSection II.A., supra.
87NCAO, pp. 18, 121-127.
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O Areas Over 500,0001980 Urbanized
Population
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PROJECTED NONATTAINMENT, 1982
q Areas With 1987 Extension
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SOURCE: NCAQ, P. 122.
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will still be nonattainment by 1987: the Philadephia (PA)-Camden (NJ)
area to the Northeastern New Jersey-New York City-Southwestern Connecticut
area; the Houston M) area; and the Southern California coastal and inland
areas. Assuming that these projections are correct, in these areas one
would expect that nonattainment offsets for ozone precursors — NO  and HC
will continue to be required after 1987, with perhaps greater required offset
ratios than presently in effect, in order to compensate for slippage in the
attainment schedule.
Figure A -6 depicts the NCAQ projections for PM nonattainment areas
following the 1982 deadline. 88 NCAQ has not performed any PM projections
for the late 1980s, and its report does not indicate how long the PM
nonattainment problem will persist after 1982.
Figure A -7 contains NCAQ's 1982 projections for S02
 nonattainment
areas. 
89 
Areas with major SO 2
 problems in this time frame include: four
urban areas (Pittsburgh, Indianapolis, Gary, and Chicago); and areas near
nonferrous smelters in the Southwest and Northjest. No SO 2 nonattainment
projections have been done for the late 1980s.
881d. pp. 18, 124, 127-128.
891d. pp. 18, 112-113, 126, 129.
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NCAQ NONATTAINMENT PROJECTIONS FOR TOTAL SUSPENDED
PARTICULATES PRIMARY STANDARD (1982 DEADLINE)
0 Major Metropolitan Areas (Certain Nonattainment)
O Minor Areas (Certain Nonattainment)
q Potential Nonattainment Areas
SOURCE; NCAQ, P. 124.
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NCAG NONATTAINMENT PROJECTIONS,
SULFUR DIJXIDE PRIMARY STANDARD (1982 DEADLINE)
O Major Metropolitan Areas (Certain Nonattainment)
O Nonferrous Smelter Areas (Certain Nonattainment)
q Potential Nonattainment Areas
SOURCE: NCAO, P. 126.
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NCAQ projects that the NO  standard will be attained in the early
1990s nationwide if stricter NO  emissions standards are promulgated for
light and heavy trucks in 1986 (as required by the Clean Air Act). On
the other hand, if current automobile NO  emissions standards are relaxed
by a factor of two, Phoenix, Philadelphia and many other large cities
would be in nonattainment in the 1990s.90
Figure A-8 portrays CO nonattainment areas in 1982 and 1987 as
projected by NCAQ. 91 Problem areas in 1987, 	 largepdue in 	 art to mobile
sources (automobiles and trucks), are Denver, Los Angeles, and Chicago.
Based upon its projections, NCAQ concludes that, after 1982, ozone
and particulate matter are the only criteria pollutants whose NAAQS will
be "exceeded in any significant number of areas where stationary sources
are major contributors;" therefore, most of the offsets required for
major new sources and major modifications in nonattainment areas will be
for NO, and HC as ozone precursor pollutants and for PM. 92
NCAQ does not address the question of "netting" by modified sources
in nonattainment areas, but we can safely assume that existing sources with
901d. p. 129.
91 1d. pp. 18, 125, 128.
92 rd. p. 137.
A-51
L
Ohm. PAGE IS_
OF Pom QUALffy.
r
F
. e.
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NCAA «ONATTAINMENT PROJECTIONS,
CARBON MONOXIDE (ASSUMES NO RELAXATION OF
CARBON MONOXIDE EMISSION STANDARDS)
0 Will Not Attain by 1987
q Will Not Attain by 1982; Will Attain by 1987
050% Over Standard With Over 500,000 1980 Urbanized Population)
Q Will Not Attain by 1982; Will Attain by 1987
SOURCE: NCAA, P. 125.
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available internal offsets will pursue "netting" to that a source modifi-
cation does not trigger nonattainesnt regulations for a major modification. 93
Those areas of the country that are currently designated nonattain-
ment for which NCAQ projects attainment by 1987 will require measures by
the stater: xnd local air quality control agencies to ensure the maintenance
of NAAQS. While section 110(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act requires SIPs to
include plans to maintain NAAQS once attainment occurs, NCAQ notes that
only California and Idaho have developed maintenance strategies: for
example, the Bay Area AQHD proposes increased offset ratios as one
technique to ensure maintenance of standards. In NCAQ's words, the
"focus of EPA is on ensuring that the NAAQS are met; maintenance is
to be considered at a future time." 94
 One would, however, expect that,
in the absence of substantial regulatory changes, offset transactions
will play an important role in fostering economic growth in these areas
in the late 1980s and beyond.
b. PSD INCREMENT EXCEEDANCE OFFSETS AND NETTING
The degree to which offsets for PSD increment exceodances will take
on growing importance is uncertain. As we noted earlier, only one such
offset has been certified to date. 95 The Vivian study concludes that
these offsets will become common, based on reported deterioration in
increment levels in some areas. 96 NCAQ believes that industries seeking
93 SeeSection II.C.I.c., supra.
94mcAQ , p. 120.
95See section III.B.2.a., supra.
Vivian, p. 3-3.
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sites for major new sources in attainaent areas will generally pursue a
policy of "site avoidance" in areas where PSD increment exceedances may
be expected to occur; 97 hilly terrains and proximity to Class I PSD areas 	 }
are factors incorporated into "site avoidance" planning. NCAQ concludes
that sources potentially encountering increment exceedance problems will be
limited to certain major modifications of existing sources, oil shale
t
facilities in Colorado and Utah, energy facilities in the Gulf Coast area
near Houston, and other sources limited to a particular site. 98 One can
surmise that the operators of the modified sources with adequate internal
offsets will resort to "getting" to avoid PSD regulations governing
major modifications. 99
c. BUBBLE OFFSETS
As we previously indicated, EPA has recently streamlined and expanded
A
the scope of its "bubble" regulations, and a
applications are currently in the regulatory
concluded that "bubble" offsets may comprise
transactions in the near term. 101 It is con
substantial number of "bubble"
pipeline. 100
 The Vivian study
the lion's share of all offset
:eivable that, in those
nonattainment areas nationwide experiencing attainment schedule delays
well into the late 1980s, existing sources may be subject to tighter
97NCAQ, pp. 25, 26, 168-69, 184-85.
981d. 25-27, 52, 168-69, 184-85.
99See section II.C.I.c., supra.
100 Seesection III.B.2.b., supra.
101Vivian. p. 2-2.
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sources in these areas would be expected to pursue a "bubble" approach
to contain their compliance costs. Similarly, existing sources in attain-
ment areas experiencing PSD increment exceedance problems may also rely
more extensively on the "bubble" technique.
d. OFFSET TRADING AND BANKING
Future volumes of offsets traded and banked in the previously
described nonattainment and attainment areas with significant anticipated
offset demands will hinge on a number of countervailing factors.
The volumes of offsets traded among operators of stationary sources
within an area with high offset demands will depend in large part upon:
(1) the physical availability of sufficient banked and/or potential
emissions reductions from existing sources within the area to satisfy the
area's ongoing aggregate demands for internal and external offsets; and
(2) the willingness of operators of these existing sources to transfer
offsets surplus to their own needs to other firms in the area.
The Vivian study concludes that industrial firms with existing
sources have a supply of potential emissions reductions at these facili-
ties which are well in excess of current production emissions levels; 102
however, the study does not attempt to assess the ability of available
supplies of these potential emissions reductions credits to satisfy both
internal and external offset demands within a particular nonattainment
or attainment area. Generally only firms without adequate internal
102nd.
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offsets which are constructing major new sources seek out external offsets.
Firms with potential emissions reductions that could be sold as external
offsets do not, however, realize the potential market value of external
offset transactions due to the paucity of such transactions to date
and the inaccessibility of information on offset prices and availability, and
these firms are likely to do nothing in the way of undertaking such reduc-
tions until another firm approaches them with a lucrative offer to purchase
offsets. 103
NCAQ also concludes that firms undertaking facility modifications
will generally have recourse to adequate internal offsets; therefore,
operators of large facilities (major new sources) locating in areas where
they have no current facilities operating will provide the principal
demand for external offsets. 
104 NCAQ notes that firms may prefer to hoard
potential emissions reductions to meet future internal offset demands,
in lieu of selling them to others, and operators of major new sources may
need government assistance to obtain offsets. 
105 Similarly, $irms with
bankable emissions reduction credits may resist banking, to avoid the
possibility that a competitor will acquire their credits for its own
facility expansions, or that a competitor will learn about a low-polluting
production process. 106.
In a previous section, we delineated particular features in state
103rd.
104
lvCAQ, pp. 136, 185.
105 1d., DA• 136-137.
106
Id., pp. 278-279.
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and local air quality agencies' offset policies which may inhibit or
promote trading and banking. 107
Clearly, it is too early in the game to proclaim federal, state
and local offset trading and banking programs as long-term unqualified
successes or failures. Assuming the current regulatory regime continues
substantially unchanged, the efficacy, longevity and nationwide diffusion
of these programs will hinge upon whether more and more state and local
agencies undertake formal banking and trading programs to attain and
maintain air quality standards in nonattainment and attainment areas,
whether agencies with existing banking and trading programs remove
potential impediments to banking and trading in their regulatory provisions,
and whether firms with potential on-site emissions reductions will be
able and willing to satisfy internal and external offset demands.
2. MODIFIED AIR QUALITY REGULATORY REGIME
In this section we consider the ramifications of several proposed
changes in the existing air quality regulatory regime on future offset
demand, trading and banking.
a. NCAQ PROPOSALS
In addition to evaluating the efficacy of current offset trading
and banking activities, NCAQ has evaluated alternative approaches to
attaining and maintaining NAAQS in nonattainment and attainment areas.
107 See section III.B.3.c., supra.
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One option endorsed by NCAQ is the use of mission fees, in lieu
of direct regulation, as a method to induce firma to reduce pollution at
their facilities. 108 Under this approach, fees could be not at a level
which would make the addition of emission controls at a source more economical
than payment of the fee. The fee could be used for subsidizing pollution
controls, for financing air pollution control agencies, or for general
revenue purposes. Potential problems of the mission fee approach include
setting an appropriate fee level and ensuring the adequacy and accuracy
of monitoring data for source emissions as a basis for assessing the fee.
Based on its studies, NCAQ recommended to the U.S. Congress that
states and the federal government should consider economic incentive
measures such as emission fees "as a substitute for, or as a supplement
to, direct regulation. 109 More specifically, NCAQ recommended that states
should consider these economic incentive measures as an alternative to
RACT
110
 for existing sources in nonattainment areas. ill The fee approach,
if applied to existing sources as a substitute for RACT, could undercut
the market for external nonattainment offset transactions between
operators of existing sources and operators of major new sources; the
inducement of paying a fee might be more attractive to the operator of an
existing source than the "headache" of retrofitting and maintaining adequate
108 NCAQ, pp. 48, 279-280.
109 id., p. 65.
110 Seesection H .B.2., supra.
ill NCAQ, p. 59.
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pollution control equipment, not only to satisfy RACT requirements, but also
to create additional emissions reductions to provide an external offset for
another firm. In lieu of a market approach, the state or local control
agency would allocate "offsets" (by using the fees to clean up sources)
in a manner analogous to the growth allowance approach. 112
NCAQ also recommended that the federal emission offset policy be
revised to permit a state to require operators of new sources in nonattain-
ment areas to pay a fee in lieu of securing offsets from operators of
existing sources. 113 The state would utilize the fee to reduce other
sources' emissions of pollutants emitted by the new sources. EPA would
set the fees by pollutant on a nationwide basis based upon new source emis-
sion control costs. While it appears to offer operators of new sources a
means of circumventing the previously mentioned problem of obtaining
adequate external offsets, this proposal would effectively displace the
market for external offset transactions in nonattainment areas implementing
the fee approach, assuming that most operators of modified and unmod1fied
existing sources can satisfy their own offset requirements internally, and
that operators of major new sources would be the primary (or sole) market
for external offsets.
b. ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS
The 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act authorized appropriations
for carrying out the act ' s provisions through fiscal year 1981;114
112 Seesection II . C.2.c., supra.
113NCAQ, p. 60.
114CAA, section 327.
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consequently, this year Congress is considering reauthorization of the tct
for the fiscal year 1982 and subsequent years. The Reagan Administration
has not formally proposed legislative changes, but press accounts reveal
that the Administration is actively considering substantial modifications
of the act's provisions proposed in a draft policy paper prepared by the
White Souse Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and Environment under the
direction of Interior Secretary James Watt. 115
	
A
The council's draft paper includes the following significant pro-
posed changes in the Clean Air Act: 116
In nonattainment areas, new sources would not be required to obtain
emissions offsets or to install pollution control equipment to satisfy
LAER requirements. 117 States which fail to submit SIPs would not be
subject to federal sanctions, 118 and EPA would not be permitted to
devise SIPs for such states; in short, the federal air quality regulatory
regime would be founded upon "state voluntarism." In nonattainment
areas which could not attain XAAQS by 1987, a state would only be required
to impose RACT 119 on all sources not in compliance, and EPA would be
empowered to extend the compliance date for such sources beyond 1987.
115 The Energy Daily Vol. 9, No. 120, June 23, 1981, pp. 1-2, 6.
116 Id.
117 Seesection II.C.2.a.,supra.
118 See fn. 6, supra.
119See section II.B.2., supra.
LAER.
RACT is less stringent than BACT or
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With respect to PSD regulations, the council proposes that Class II
and III areas be eliminated and that Class I areas be preserved. As a
result, with the exception of Class I areas, attainment area increments 120
would be abolished, and air quality in these areas would be permitted to
deteriorate to NAAQS levels.
The implications of these proposals for offset banking and trading
are clear: if enacted into law, they would effectively end external
offset transactions involving nonattainment offsets or PSD increment
exceedance offsets for major new sources and major modifications. At the
present time, it is uncertain whether the Administration will propose
formally these sweeping legislative changes and whether Congress will
modify substantially the Clean Air Act in the course of its pending
reauthorization debate.
A
120 Seesection II.C.3.b., supra.
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IV. OFFSETS AS AN IMPETUS FOR
FUEL CELL COMMERCIALIZATION
In this section, we identify potential market opportunities for fuel
cells in the late 1980s and thereafter, based upon the offset trading
and banking trends described in section III. In this time frame, a
lea selling point for fuel cells via a via conventional generation and
cogeneration technologies can be the degree to which emissions levels of
regulated air pollutants for fuel cell systems are significantly lower than
those for the latter technologies. 121 By virtue of this air quality benefit,
the fuel cell can be utilized as a tool for creating emissions reduction
credits for use as internal or external offsets. This marketing advantage
may, however, be neutralized if the current regulatory scheme of offset
requirements is abrogated.
A. FUEL CELLS AS SOURCES OF EMISSIONS REDUCTION CREDITS
Operators of existing sources can utilize fuel cells (prefer-
ably in a cogeneration mode for econom{c efficiency) to replace their
existing, polluting on-site energy-generating equipment — for example,
diesel generators and oil- or gas-fired boilers — and thereby create
emissions reduction credits. They may derive an economic benefit
from utilizing these credits as internal offsets, selling them to
others as external offsets, or banking them for future internal or
121 SeeTable A-1 in Section H .C.l.b. (Appendix), supra, for the
requisite sizes of an experimental fuel cell. system to generate 100 tpy
of SO2 , PM, NO  and HC, respectively.
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{external use. 12 2 To the extent that its potential supply of smis-
*ions reduction credits is otherwise inadequate to meet its present
internal offset demand, or its prospective internal demand as necessitated
by future planned source modifications or future tightening of state/local
air pollution control requirements, the operator of an existing source may
perceive the fuel cell as an attractive replacement for polluting equipment.
In a nonattainment or attainment area where the external offset demand is
high and external offsets are scarce and/or costly, the operator of an
existing source may view the fuel cell as a profitable method to produce
emissions reduction credits for sale as external offsets. Open questions
remain as to the prospective ability of operators of existing sources to
satisfy internal and/or external offset demands within particular nonattain-
meat or attainment areas, and as to their prospective willingness to do so.123
Conversely, operators of new sources with external offset require-
ments in nonattainment or attainment areas could purchase fuel cell systems
for one or more existing sources within their area to replace the latter's
existing polluting generating equipment as an offset for the former's
incremental pollutant emissions. The operator of the existing source would,
in effect, get a "free ride" by being able to modernize (and perhaps
expand) its on-site energy-generating capability at someone else's expense. 124
122 See, generally, section III.A., supra. The operator of an existing
source can derive an added economic benefit from oversizing the fuel cell
system in order to sell surplus electrical energy and/or capacity to a
local electric utility at the latter's "avoided costs" pursuant to PURPA
section 210 (see section IV.B. of this report).
123 Seesection III.C.l.d., supra.
124The operator of the new/modified source would probably be able to
bank for its own future use surplus external offsets resulting from this
offset transaction. See fn. 74, supra.
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B. POTENTIALLY ATTRACTIVE FUEL CELL MARKETS
Major sources — both existing and new — in nonattainment and
attainment areas with significant anticipated offset demands should be
designated as prime targets of opportunity for fuel cell marketing efforts.
Assuming the current air quality regulatory regime continues in its
present form well into the 1990s, these sources will be subject to a
variety of possible offset requirements: "bubble," "netting," nonattain-
meet or PSD increment exceedance offsets. 125 These major sources will
	 1
generally be large-scale industrial facilities. 126
Potentially attractive fuel cell market areas would include:
nonattainment areas where 0 3 and PM violations of NAAQS are .expected to
continue through the late 1980s, necessitating NOx , HC, and/or PM
nonattainment offsets for major new sources and major modifications, and
perhaps "bubble" offsets for major existing sources as well; 127 and attain-
ment areas with significant air quality degradation problems, necessitat-
ing PSD increment exceedance offsets for major new sources and major
modifications, and perhaps "bubble" offsets for major existing sources as
well. 128 Within this group of potentially attractive market areas, those
125 See, generally, sections II.B., II.C., and III.C., supra.
126 Seesection II.C.I.b., supra, for a list of industrial source
types which can be expected to emit at least 100 tpy of a regulated
pollutant and therefore be considered as major sources.
127 Seesections III.C.I.a. and c., supra, for specific nona.ttainment
areas where these offsets may be required within this time fra".
128See sections III.C.I.b. and c., supra, for descriptions of sources
in attainment areas for which these offsets may be required.
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with only a modicum of restrictions should be slated for the first round
:_.f aarketing activities. 129
In certain nonattainment and attainment areas nationwide, existing
and new minor sources may also be subject to offset requirements, and
existing minor sources may be permitted to bank emissions reduction credits
and sell them as external offsets. 130 In these areas, the potential air
quality and economic benefits of fuel cells relative to conventional energy
technologies may be marketed to operators of minor sources as well as to
operators of major sources. It should be noted, however, that the smaller
the size of a fuel cell system (and the equipment that it replaces) is,
the smaller the resulting emission reduction credits; below a certain size,
these credits may have only nominal market value, for example, to a major
source shopping for external offsets in areas where the major source has the
option of acquiring sufficient credits, to meet its external offset needs,
from a few large sources, in lieu of from many minor sources. In short, the
size of the potential emissions reduction credits and their market value as
external offsets may have a direct and substantial searing upon the economic
attractiveness of a fuel cell system: to the operator of an existing minor
source who contemplates purchasing a fuel cell, and to the potential pur-
chasers of the resulting emissions reduction credits within the area; to the
operator of a major or minor new source or modification who contemplates
purchasing fuel cells for one or more minor sources as an offset to its
own incremental emissions.
129 See sections III.B.3.b. and c., supra, for examples of current
and proposed banking programs and of banking and trading restrictions.
130See sections II.B., III.B.I.a., and III.B.3.c., supra, for
examples of specific areas.
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C. REGULATORY PROPOSALS IMPEDING FUEL CELL COMMERCIALIZATION
Up to this point, our observations in section IV on potential
markets for fuel cells have been founded upon continuation, well into
the 1990s, of the current air quality regulatory regime, including offsets
requirements. In section III.C.2., we examined the impacts of several
proposed modifications of this regime upon future offset trading and
banking trends. NCAQ has suggested that states should have the option of
i
substituting emissions fees or other economic incentives for an
emissions offset approach. 131 A draft proposal currently under internal
review by the Administration would effectively abrogate current regula-
tions governing nonattainment offsets, postpone deadlines for compliance
with NAAQS, and dilute pollution control technology requirements, among
other things. 132 It remains to be seen whether these options are formally
proposed in legislation during the current session or subsequent sessions
of the Congress, and whether such legislation survives the ensuing
political battle.
Enactment of one or more of these proposals could effectively
remove the substantial impetus provided by the current regulatory regime
to source operators to replace their existing generating equipment with
less polluting equipment in existing sources and to install generating
equip°-ent with low emissions levels in new sources. As a result, a key
marketing advantage of fuel cells over conventional generation and
131 Seesection III.C.2., supra.
132zd.
A-66
cogsn.ration technologies — low missions levels — could be effectively
neutralized.
Ons^ing monitoring of future offset trading and banking trends and
of potential or actual air quality regulatory changes until the cooserciali- 	 I
nation date of fuel cells will be required, in order to properly assess
whetter the fuel cell's air quality benefits will persist as a marketable
feature of the technology throughout its initial comercialization phase.
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